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Abstract of Thesis 
Background: A growing body of research suggests that phenomena typically 
observed in alcohol dependence syndrome (ADS), which are believed to reflect 
dysfunctional activity within the mesocorticolimbic (MCL) dopamine (DA) system – 
notably, heightened cue-reactivity (CR) and disturbances of inhibitory 
control/impulsiveness – are present in non-physically-dependent drinkers. 
Aims: The present thesis investigated these findings further via three empirical 
studies. The first developed and gathered preliminary validation data on a new self-
report questionnaire measuring ‘recent’ impulsiveness – the Recent Impulsivity Scale 
(STIS). The second and third examined whether, and to what extent, CR and 
disturbances of inhibitory control were present in heavy social drinkers (HDs) and 
problem drinkers (PDs), respectively, compared to controls; and also whether these 
variables were related to SIS scores. Additionally, Study 3 also examined whether 
PDs demonstrated disturbed responsivity to non-alcohol-associated reward-related 
stimuli – another manifestation of dysfunction within MCL DA circuitry – compared 
to controls. A further aim of Study 3 was to explore whether in social drinkers (SDs) a 
small ‘priming’ dose of alcohol would increase impulsivity and CR. The possible 
contribution of familial predisposition to alcohol use disorders (AUDs) was also 
investigated. 
Principal findings: 
 The RIS comprised two factors: Cognitive Impulsivity (CI) and Motor 
Impulsivity (MI). The final version demonstrated good internal and test-retest 
reliability, and good construct validity. Across the three studies RIS scores 
correlated significantly with several – though not all – self-report measures 
of recent alcohol intake and behavioural indices of CR, non-alcohol-related 
reward responsiveness, impulsivity and decision-making. 
 HDs in Study 2 showed elevated electrophysiological (but not subjective) CR – 
reflected in heightened P3 amplitudes – compared to light drinking controls. 
6 
 
 During acute abstinence, the PDs in Study 3 demonstrated evidence of (i) 
dysfunctional responsiveness to non-alcohol-associated reward-related 
stimuli and (ii) subjective CR, compared to socially drinking controls. 
 The PDs of Study 3, but not the HDs in Study 2, demonstrated evidence of 
heightened impulsiveness, compared to controls. 
 There was no indication that the respective abnormalities demonstrated by 
HDs and PDs reflected differential familial predisposition to AUDs. 
 SDs in Study 3 did not show effects of alcohol priming. 
Conclusions: There was considerable support for the thesis that cognitive and 
behavioural characteristics believed to reflect disturbances of brain reward 
pathways are manifest in non-dependent drinkers rather than being confined to 
those with alcohol dependence. They may develop as a consequence of cumulative 
alcohol consumption, though the cross-sectional nature of these studies cannot 
exclude the possibility that they precede and are possibly risk factors for heavy 
drinking. In general, the present data are consistent with contemporary 
neurobiological models of addiction and suggest a continuum along which 
abnormalities develop in parallel with cumulative alcohol consumption.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
Overview 
The misuse of alcohol poses diverse problems for society. It is therefore important 
that research investigates factors involved in Alcohol Use Disorders (AUDs) in order 
that future treatment strategies can be developed accordingly. It is of particular 
relevance to contemporary theories of addiction that people with AUDs tend to 
demonstrate two key phenomena: i) characteristic responses to stimuli associated 
with alcohol (‘cue-reactivity’ (CR)); and ii) heightened impulsiveness. Several major 
theories (e.g. Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2000; Jentsch & Taylor, 1999) explain 
these phenomena in terms of underlying dysfunctions within the mesocorticolimbic 
(MCL) dopamine (DA) system. A growing body of research suggests that social 
drinkers who do not have an AUD may also demonstrate CR and heightened 
impulsiveness. The present thesis extends this research by testing predictions from 
current models of alcohol addiction in non-alcohol-dependent drinking groups. 
Section I of this chapter illustrates the extent to which alcohol misuse incurs 
physical, psychoemotional and financial burdens for the alcohol misuser, their 
families and broader society. Sections II and III define and describe psychological 
features of the two recognised alcohol use disorders (AUDs): alcohol abuse and 
alcohol dependence syndrome (ADS). 
Section IV reviews recent evidence of psychological dysfunction in other, non-
dependent drinker groups. If such individuals show signs of underlying biological 
disturbance, this may illuminate factors associated with the initial development of 
AUDs. Section V then sets out the principal research aims of this thesis. 
1) Individual, interpersonal and societal problems associated with alcohol misuse 
Maladaptive patterns of alcohol consumption pose enormously complex and wide-
ranging physical, emotional and financial problems, which are not confined only to 
the individual drinkers themselves, but which place a considerable burden upon 
their families and loved ones as well as wider society. 
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In broad terms, increasing levels of alcohol consumption are detrimental to health, 
both directly and indirectly. Alcohol consumption increases risk for major illnesses, 
including various forms of cancer, unipolar depression, ischaemic heart disease, 
epilepsy, hypertension, stroke and cirrhosis of the liver, as well, of course, as 
alcohol use disorders (AUDs) (Rehm et al., 2003; Balakrishnan et al., 2009). Heavy 
drinkers are also at elevated risk of traffic accidents, drowning, falls, violence and 
suicide (Balakrishnan et al., 2009; Grønbæk, 2011). Interestingly, however, 
moderate levels of alcohol consumption may actually reduce the risks of coronary 
heart disease (CHD), stroke and diabetes mellitus (Rehm et al., 2003). 
Alcohol misuse also has emotional, physical and medical implications for others. In a 
recent review, Navarro, Doran and Shakeshaft (2011) report that family members 
often suffer domestic violence, neglect, abuse and poverty, which frequently 
culminates in separation/family breakdown. Maternal drinking can harm the 
developing foetus. Thus Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD) may manifest in 
birth defects, including characteristic abnormalities of the upper lip and eyes, and 
neurodevelopmental disorders; the risk of miscarriage, stillbirths and underweight 
births are all elevated. Alcohol-related aggression also has overt consequences in 
the forms, for example, of interpersonal violence, traffic accidents and fire 
destruction. 
In terms of financial impact, Balakrishnan et al. (2009) have estimated that in 2005-
2006 illnesses related to alcohol consumption cost the National Health Service 
(NHS) £3 billion, or 3.2% of total NHS expenditure. However, substantial additional 
indirect costs arise from work absenteeism, informal care, non-fatal alcohol-related 
injuries and crime. Thus, the Cabinet Office (2003) estimated that in the years 2001-
2002, alcohol-related crime cost England and Wales around £11.7 billion, and 
alcohol-related lost productivity was estimated at £6.4 billion. 
Given the physical, social and financial burdens associated with alcohol misuse, Lee 
and Forsythe (2011) are among others who argue that alcohol is more dangerous 
than heroin. It is likely that these burdens will worsen as the number of people 
reporting harmful alcohol consumption increases. Whereas in 1988 around a 
17 
 
quarter of men and 10% of women reported drinking above weekly 
recommendations, in 2006 these figures had risen to around a third of men and a 
fifth of women (Office for National Statistics, 2001; The NHS Information Centre, 
2008). Correspondingly, the per capita consumption of alcohol in the UK increased 
from 6.61 units per week per head in 1973 to 9.11 in 2003 (British Beer and Pub 
Association, 2004). It is therefore of vital importance to increase our understanding 
of the factors associated with maladaptive patterns of alcohol consumption. 
2) Definitions and prevalence of alcohol use disorders 
The latest versions of the World Health Organisation (WHO) International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; 1992) and the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV; 1995) each 
identify two forms of diagnosable alcohol use disorder (AUD) (see Tables 1.1 and 
1.2 on pages 19 and 20, respectively). In the ICD-10, these are termed ‘harmful 
alcohol use’ and ‘alcohol dependence’. Harmful alcohol use is defined as 
“A pattern of psychoactive substance use that is 
causing damage to health. The damage may be 
physical (e.g. hepatitis) or mental (e.g. depressive 
episodes secondary to heavy alcohol intake). Harmful 
use commonly, but not invariably, has adverse social 
consequences: social consequences in themselves, 
however, are not sufficient to justify a diagnosis of 
harmful use”. 
Individuals do not demonstrate evidence of physical dependence (i.e. ‘tolerance’ 
and a withdrawal syndrome upon cessation of drinking). The DSM-IV equivalent is 
‘alcohol abuse’. Though not a diagnosable condition in either ICD-10 or DSM-IV, the 
term ‘problem drinker’ is often used in research contexts and is broadly equivalent 
to harmful alcohol use and alcohol abuse. 
Alcohol dependence, on the other hand, is defined in the ICD-10 as: 
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“A cluster of behavioural, cognitive and physiological 
phenomena that develop following repeated 
substance use and that typically include a strong 
desire to take the drug, difficulties in controlling its 
use, persisting in its use despite harmful consequences, 
a higher priority given to alcohol use than to other 
activities and obligations, increased tolerance and 
sometimes a physical withdrawal state”. 
Alcohol dependence is likewise a category in DSM-IV although, as indicated in Table 
1.2, the criteria differ slightly from those used by ICD-10 (e.g. a strong desire or 
compulsion to use substances is not included in DSM-IV). In everyday language and 
in earlier versions of these classification systems, this has been referred to as 
‘alcoholism’. The term alcohol dependence, however, is preferable as it is more 
precise and more reliably defined and measured using ICD-10 and DSM-IV criteria. 
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Table 1.1: Diagnostic criteria for ‘Alcohol and Drug Abuse’ (DSM-IV) and ‘Harmful 
Use of Alcohol and Drugs’ (ICD-10) 
DSM-IV Alcohol and Drug Abuse ICD-10 Harmful Use of Alcohol and 
Drugs 
A. A maladaptive pattern of substance 
use leading to clinically significant 
impairment or distress, as 
manifested by one (or more) of the 
following occurring within a 12-
month period: 
1. Recurrent substance use 
resulting in a failure to fulfil 
major role obligations at work, 
school or home; 
2. Recurrent substance use in 
situations in which use is 
physically hazardous; 
3. Recurrent substance-related 
legal problems; 
4. Continued substance use 
despite having persistent or 
recurrent social or 
interpersonal problems caused 
or exacerbated by the effects of 
the drug. 
B. The symptoms have never met the 
criteria for substance dependence 
for the same class of substance. 
A. A pattern of substance use that is 
causing damage to health. 
The damage may be physical or 
mental. 
The diagnosis requires that actual 
damage should have been caused 
to the mental or physical health of 
the user. 
B. No concurrent diagnosis of the 
substance dependence syndrome 
for the same class of substance. 
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Table 1.2: ICD-10 and DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for ‘Alcohol and Drug Dependence’ 
Symptoms DSM-IV Definitions ICD-10 Definitions 
 
Clustering Criterion 
 
 
Three or more of the following have been experienced or 
exhibited at some time during the previous year: 
A maladaptive pattern of substance use, leading to 
clinically significant impairment or distress as manifested 
by three or more of the following occurring at any time in 
the same 12-month period: 
 
Tolerance 
Evidence of tolerance, such that increased doses are 
required in order to achieve effects originally produced 
by lower doses; or markedly diminished effect with 
continued use of the same amount of the substance; 
 
Need for markedly increased amounts of a substance to 
achieve intoxication or desired effect; 
 
 
Withdrawal 
 
The characteristic withdrawal syndrome for a substance 
or use of a substance (or a closely related substance) to 
relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms; 
A physiological withdrawal state when substance use has 
ceased or been reduced as evidenced by the 
characteristic substance withdrawal syndrome, or use of 
the substance (or a closely related substance) to relieve 
or avoid withdrawal symptoms; 
 
Impaired Control 
Persistent desire or one or more unsuccessful efforts to 
cut down or control substance use; 
Substance used in larger amounts or over a longer period 
than the person intended; 
 
Difficulties in controlling substance use in terms of onset, 
termination, or levels of use; 
Table 1.2 continues over the page 
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Table 1.2 continued 
Neglect of Activities Important social, occupational, or recreational activities 
given up or reduced because of substance use; 
Progressive neglect of alternative pleasures or interests 
in favour of substance use; or 
A great deal of time spent in activities necessary to 
obtain, to use, or to recover from the effects of 
substance used; 
 
Time Spent 
A great deal of time spent in activities necessary to 
obtain, to use, or to recover from the effects of the 
substance used; 
Continued use 
despite problems 
Continued substance use despite knowledge of having a 
persistent or recurrent physical or psychological problem 
that is likely to be caused or exacerbated by use; 
Continued substance use despite clear evidence of 
overtly harmful physical or psychological consequences; 
Compulsive use None. A strong desire or sense of compulsion to use substance. 
 
Duration criterion 
No duration criterion separately specified. However, 
several dependence criteria must occur repeatedly as 
specified by duration qualifiers associated with criteria 
(e.g. ‘often’, ‘persistent’, ‘continued’). 
 
A. No duration criterion separately specified. 
 
Criterion for 
subtyping 
dependence 
With physiological dependence: Evidence of tolerance or 
withdrawal (i.e., any of items A-1 or A-2 above are 
present); 
Without physiological dependence: No evidence of 
tolerance or withdrawal (i.e., none of items A-1 or A-2 
above are present). 
 
None. 
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For the pragmatic purposes of diagnosis, ICD-10 and DSM-IV criteria define the 
disorders of alcohol abuse and alcohol dependence categorically, as either present 
or absent. However, in reality, these disorders exist along a continuum of severity. 
Thus the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE; 2011) refers to 
mild, moderate and severe dependence, the latter group consuming a litre or more 
of spirits per day. 
In the UK, one unit of alcohol is defined as 8 g (or 10 ml) of pure ethanol. 
Department of Health guidelines (Department of Health, 1995) recommend that 
men should not regularly consume more than four units of alcohol per day, and 
women no more than 3 units; similarly, the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCP; 
1986) advises that men should drink less than 21 units of alcohol per week, and 
women less than 14. Those consuming below these recommended limits are 
considered to be at low risk of health or social harm. Individuals who regularly 
consume alcohol above these levels, but who have not as yet experienced alcohol-
related harm, can be termed ‘hazardous drinkers’: that is, they are at increased risk 
for harm in the future (NICE, 2011). Research studies, however, tend to use the 
alternative yet broadly operationally synonymous terms ‘heavy social drinkers’ or 
‘heavy drinkers’ in reference to such individuals. For example, Cox, Yeates and 
Regan (1999) defined their heavy drinkers as females consuming more than 16 units 
per week and males consuming more than 26 units per week. The RCP (1986) 
defines ‘harmful’ drinking as the consumption of more than 50 units per week by 
men, and more than 35 units by women. ‘Binge’ drinking is defined as men 
consuming more than 8 units, and women drinking more than six, in a single day 
(Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, 2004). Thus, there are several patterns of non-
dependent yet dysfunctional alcohol consumption. 
Prevalence of alcohol use disorders 
Reliable data concerning the prevalence of alcohol dependence and alcohol abuse 
are difficult to obtain given that UK population-wide surveys do not tend to include 
self-report diagnostic instruments. Some surveys, however, have included the 
Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders et al., 1993). Using this 
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measure, the Alcohol Needs Assessment Research Project (ANARP) found the 
prevalence of alcohol dependence to be 6% in men and 2% in women aged 16-64 
(Drummond et al., 2005). This translates to approximately 1.1 million alcohol-
dependent people in England in 2000; a similar survey suggested this figure had 
increased to 1.6 million by 2007 (McManus et al., 2009). 
Unhealthy albeit non-dependent levels of alcohol consumption are even more 
prevalent, as revealed for example by the General Household Survey (Robinson & 
Bulger, 2010), the Health Survey for England (Craig, Mindell & Hirani, 2009) and the 
Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (McManus et al., 2009). Thus in 2008, 21% of men and 
15% of women were drinking at ‘hazardous’ levels. A further 7% of men and 5% of 
women were identified as harmful drinkers and 21% of men and 14% of women as 
binge drinkers. In all, McManus et al. (2009) report that 24% of English adults (33% 
of men and 16% of women) consume alcohol in a manner which is either potentially 
or actually harmful. 
3) Alcohol consumption and mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic circuitry 
A large and growing body of research literature documents the psychological 
features demonstrated by people with alcohol use disorders, and especially those 
with alcohol dependence. Numerous empirical studies (e.g. Goldstein & Volkow, 
2002; Volkow et al., 2002; Jentsch & Taylor, 1999; Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2000) 
have revealed alcohol and substance users to show pathology or dysfunction in 
brain ‘reward’ circuitry comprising dopaminergic (DAergic) projections from the 
ventral tegmental area (VTA) to the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), amygdala, anterior 
cingulate gyrus (ACG) and prefrontal cortex (PFC) (see Figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1: Neurochemical neurocircuits implicated in drug reward (image taken 
with permission from Koob & LeMoal, 2006). The figure depicts a sagittal section 
through a representative rodent brain showing the pathways and receptor systems 
implicated in the reinforcing actions of drugs of abuse. Alcohol activates γ-
aminobutyric acid-A (GABAA) receptors in the VTA, N Acc and AMG by either direct 
actions at the GABAA receptor or through indirect release of GABA. Alcohol is 
hypothesised to facilitate the release of opioid peptides in the VTA, N Acc and 
central nucleus of the AMG. Alcohol facilitates the release of dopamine in the N Acc 
through an action either in the VTA or the N Acc. The blue arrows represent the 
interactions within the extended amygdala system hypothesised to have a key 
function in drug reinforcement. AC, anterior commissure; AMG, amygdala; ARC, 
arcuate nucleus; BNST, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis; Cer, cerebellum; C-P, 
caudate-putamen; DMT, dorsomedial thalamus; FC, frontal cortex; Hippo, 
hippocampus; IF, inferior colliculus; LC, locus coeruleus; LH, lateral hypothalamus; N 
Acc., nucleus accumbens; OT, olfactory tract; PAG, periaqueductal gray; RPn, 
reticular pontine nucleus; SC, superior colliculus; SNr, substantia nigra pars 
reticulata; VP, ventral pallidum; VTA, ventral tegmental area. 
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Collectively termed the mesocorticolimbic (MCL) system, it is believed that these 
tracts have evolved to direct appropriate responses towards ‘natural’ rewards such 
as food or sex (Kelley & Berridge, 2002). Exposure to an appetitive stimulus 
phasically increases dopamine (DA) transmission in the VTA, signalling the 
availability of reward and influencing attention, decision-making and behaviour via 
DAergic projections to the NAcc, striatum, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and other 
prefrontal regions (Schultz, Dayan & Montague, 1997). DA release likewise occurs in 
response to stimuli with other forms of motivational salience, such as aversion and 
novelty (Gray, Young & Joseph, 1997; Salamone, 1994; Volkow et al., 2004a). 
Chronic drug use is associated with attenuation of tonic or resting activity in this 
circuitry (reviews by Grace, 2000, Diana et al., 2003, Volkow et al., 2004b, and 
Weiss & Porrino, 2002). Alcohol dependence is associated with reduced DA D2/D3 
receptor availability in the striatum as well as reduced striatal DA release, as 
indicated by positron emission tomography (PET) and single photon emission 
computed tomography (SPECT) (e.g. Heinz et al., 2004; Volkow & Li, 2004; Shen, 
Choong & Thompson, 2007; Volkow et al., 2007) and by post-mortem studies 
(Tupala et al., 2001, 2003). 
Crucially, even in dependent individuals drugs of abuse directly increase DA 
transmission in the VTA in the MCL circuitry with a potency, immediacy and 
reliability that exceed the effects of almost every natural reward (Hyman & 
Malenka, 2001). For example, Martinez et al. (2005) employed PET and the D2 
receptor radiotracer [11C]raclopride to measure DA D2 receptors and DA release in 
fifteen alcohol-dependent (AD) and 15 healthy control participants. Participants 
underwent scans at baseline and following administration of 0.3 mg/kg of 
amphetamine, which produces acute reductions in [11C]raclopride binding and 
corresponding changes in extracellular DA (Breier et al., 1997). At baseline, 
[11C]raclopride binding was significantly lower in ADs than in controls in the limbic 
striatum, associative striatum, and sensorimotor striatum. Following amphetamine 
administration, however, this was the case only in the limbic striatum. Similar 
findings have been reported in people addicted to nicotine, cocaine, 
methamphetamine and heroin (Martinez et al., 2004, 2007; Volkow et al., 1997). 
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It has been argued that they ‘hijack’ the MCL system (Lubman, Yücel & Pantelis, 
2004). A psychological manifestation of this so-called ‘hijacking’ is likely to be the 
user’s enduring preoccupation with the procurement and consumption of alcohol; 
in other words, craving. 
4) Craving: Definitions and measurement 
‘Craving’ can be defined as ‘a subjective feeling of a strong urge to do something’ 
(West, 2006, p. 11). Craving for alcohol is considered to be a fundamental element 
in the maintenance of AUDs (Kozlowski & Wilkinson, 1987). In spite of its 
importance, however, definitions and conceptualisations of craving are highly 
varied; differing approaches have been identified, for example, by Kozlowski & 
Wilkinson (1987), Drobes & Thomas (1999), Sayette et al. (2000), Tiffany, Carter & 
Singleton (2000), Flannery et al. (2001) and Grüsser, Mörsen & Flor (2006). The 
term ‘craving’ is often used to refer both to self-reported desires and/or urges to 
ingest alcohol, and to ‘wanting’ or ‘needing’ to drink alcohol (Grüsser et al., 2006). 
Verheul, Van den Brink and Geerlings (1999) have proposed three distinct forms of 
craving – reward craving, relief craving and compulsive craving – each with different 
underlying mechanisms. Tiffany and Drobes (1991) have postulated four principal 
sub-types: desire to take the drug, anticipation of positive outcomes, 
avoidance/relief of withdrawal and/or negative affect and intention to take the 
drug (see also Tiffany et al., 2000). There are, accordingly, varied approaches to the 
measurement of craving; some are based on self-report, others on 
behavioural/physiological responses. 
Self-report measures of craving may be either single- or multi-item instruments; 
some ask about the respondent’s craving over the course of the preceding day, 
week, month or even longer periods, whereas ‘state’ versions are concerned with 
the respondent’s craving at that moment. The former (‘global’) measures index 
craving in the ‘natural’ context of the respondent’s daily life, whereas state 
measures can be used to tap fluctuations in craving in response to experimental 
manipulations. 
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Multi-item questionnaires are constructed to offer rich measures of the subjective 
craving experience. The Alcohol Craving Scale (ACQ; Singleton, Tiffany & 
Henningfield, 1994) for example, contains 47 items related to five domains: desire 
to drink alcohol; intention to drink alcohol; lack of control over the use of alcohol; 
anticipation of positive effects from drinking; and expectancy of relief from 
withdrawal or other negative states. However, such instruments are often time-
consuming to administer, limiting their use in experimental studies. The Yale-Brown 
Obsessive Compulsive Scale for heavy drinkers (Y-BOCS-hd; Modell et al., 1992), for 
example, is a clinical interview taking between 15 and 30 minutes (Drobes & 
Thomas, 1999). 
Single-item instruments take the form of questions such as ‘How strong is your 
craving for alcohol?’ or ‘How strong is your urge to drink?’ with anchor responses 
like ‘The most I’ve ever felt’ and ‘Not at all’. Respondents typically either select the 
most appropriate choice on a 7- or 10-point Likert-type scale or use a Visual Analog 
Scale (VAS), marking a line connecting the two anchor statements; the distance 
between the ‘no craving’ end of the line and the respondent’s mark serves as the 
craving index. 
Compared to healthy controls, alcohol dependent patients consistently 
demonstrate increases in self-reported craving, as recorded via Likert-type and 
visual analog scales, following presentation of alcohol-related compared to neutral 
cues in CR designs (e.g. Pomerleau et al., 1983; McCusker & Brown, 1995; Cooney et 
al., 1987; Reid et al., 2006). Such manipulations generally adopt the following 
procedure. In one condition, the participant is presented with a stimulus considered 
‘neutral’ (i.e. of no particular significance to the participant), whilst in another they 
are presented with alcohol or an alcohol-associated stimulus. The latter types of 
stimuli have included: the sight, smell and taste of alcohol (often the respondent’s 
preferred beverage); words, pictures or videos representing alcohol or alcohol-
related scenarios; the expectation that alcohol will be consumed; and mental 
imagery of alcohol-related contexts (Drobes & Thomas, 1999). The participant self-
reports their craving during or immediately following exposure to each stimulus (or 
‘cue’). ‘Cue-reactivity’ is calculated by subtracting their craving in the neutral 
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condition from that in the alcohol-associated condition. Such studies experimentally 
explore and replicate earlier anecdotal observations (e.g. Wikler, 1973) that when 
exposed to drugs or associated stimuli, dependent individuals demonstrate 
characteristic subjective, behavioural and physiological responses (Drummond et 
al., 1995). In most CR studies, craving is indexed via a single item rating; however, a 
few have used multi-item questionnaires. For example, Sobell et al. (1993) 
presented videotapes of a popular prime-time television program with and without 
alcohol-related advertisements to severely dependent alcohol abusers who then 
completed a modified version of the Situational Confidence Questionnaire (SCQ; 
Annis, 1982) which asked them to rate their perceived ability to resist the urge to 
drink heavily in various situations. The most highly dependent participants reported 
a significant decrease in confidence after exposure to the alcohol-related cues. 
All self-report measures, whether single- or multi-items, may of course be subject to 
either conscious or unconscious biases; for this reason many studies have 
additionally (or alternatively) utilised behavioural and/or physiological indices. 
5) Behavioural and physiological reactivity to alcohol-related stimuli 
Behavioural and physiological responses are often investigated via CR designs. A 
number of studies have reported alcoholics to demonstrate cue-elicited increases in 
indices of autonomic arousal, such as salivation (Pomerleau et al., 1983), skin 
temperature, respiration, blood pressure, heart rate (Kaplan et al., 1985; Turkkan, 
McCaul & Stitzer, 1989; Payne et al., 1992) and skin conductance3 (Kaplan et al., 
1985; Turkkan et al., 1989). Changes in brain activity have also been recorded. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has demonstrated that when 
presented with alcohol-related cues, alcoholics show increased activity within 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), adjacent prefrontal areas, the OFC and the ventral 
striatum including the NAcc, dorsal striatum, amygdala and thalamus (e.g. see 
reviews by Wrase et al., 2002; Heinz et al., 2009; George et al., 2001). Numerous 
                                                          
3
 The term ‘skin conductance’ refers to the skin’s ability to conduct weak electrical currents. This 
ability varies as a function of the amount of moisture on the surface of the skin, and is therefore 
used as an index of sweat gland activity (Drobes & Thomas, 1999). 
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studies have also documented changes as recorded by event-related potentials 
(ERPs); these are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Subjective, physiological and electrophysiological changes may be desynchronised 
and patterns of physiological activity to alcohol cues are not consistent (Niaura et 
al., 1988). However, some studies have reported different indices to co-vary. For 
instance, Sayette et al. (1994) required male alcoholics to respond to computer-
generated tones as quickly as possible during exposure to alcohol or control cues. 
Not only did their reaction time increase during exposure to alcohol cues but there 
was also a significant correlation between reaction time and self-reported urge to 
drink. Similar findings have been reported in smokers (Sayette & Hufford, 1994; 
Mogg & Bradley, 2002), cocaine addicts (Franken, Kroon & Hendriks, 2000; 
Copersino et al., 2004) and recreational users of cannabis (Field, Mogg & Bradley, 
2004). 
Many behavioural measures tap the extent to which the participant’s attention is 
‘captured’ by alcohol-related cues. This ‘attentional bias’ is often indexed via the 
visual probe (or dot probe) task or a modified Stroop task. In the visual probe 
procedure, participants sit in front of a computer screen, in the centre of which a 
fixation cross is presented for a short period (e.g. 500 msec). This is then replaced 
by a pair of pictures, one to the left of the screen, the other to the right. One is 
alcohol-related, the other a matched neutral image. These appear briefly (e.g. 50 
msec), and immediately following picture offset, a ‘dot probe’ appears in one of the 
two locations and remains until the participant presses a response key to indicate 
its position. Shorter response latencies when the dot appears in the locations 
formerly occupied by the alcohol-related images indicate that the participant had 
oriented towards these stimuli. Participants with AUDs have been found to show 
such attentional bias (Noël et al., 2006; Vollstädt-Klein et al., 2011). 
The Stroop colour-naming task (Stroop, 1935) is the most widely-used measure of 
attentional bias, in which participants must name the colour of the ink in which 
conflicting colour words are printed. Performance in this condition is compared 
with another in which the words are not colour names. The differences between 
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conditions in the times taken to name the colours, and the number of errors made, 
indicate the extent to which the semantic content of the words has been processed 
and has interfered with the naming of the conflicting ink colour. The ‘modified’ or 
‘emotional’ Stroop task (Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996) is a variation of the 
above procedure which examines the effect of varying the semantic content of the 
words. Differential interference by words with different semantic connotations is a 
function of their salience to the individual. Thus, for example, some studies have 
reported that anxious patients are more susceptible than non-anxious controls to 
interference in response to threat-related words (e.g. Martin, Williams & Clark, 
1991). 
The modified Stroop task has similarly been used in a number of studies to 
determine whether people with alcohol use disorders (AUDs) show attentional bias 
towards alcohol-related words. Thus, both Johnsen et al. (1994) and Stetter et al. 
(1995) reported that problem drinkers demonstrated greater interference from 
such words than did social drinkers. This has since been replicated in numerous 
studies (e.g. Cox, Blount & Rozak, 2000; Stormark et al., 1997, 2000; Sharma, Albery 
& Cook, 2001; Franken, 2003; & Lusher et al., 2004). However, some studies have 
reported no significant difference between AUD groups and controls (e.g. Bauer & 
Cox, 1998; Stetter et al., 1994). 
Despite their widespread use in assessing attentional bias in AUDs, questions have 
recently begun to arise concerning the internal reliability of the visual probe and 
modified Stroop tasks (Field & Christiansen, 2012). In the first and only study of its 
kind, Ataya et al. (2012) estimated the internal reliability of the visual probe task 
and unblocked4 versions of the Stroop task to be very poor. Blocked versions of the 
Stroop task, however, demonstrated acceptable levels of reliability (i.e. α > 0.70). 
Ataya et al. (2012) attribute poor reliabilities in the visual probe task to the use of 
reaction time – a ‘noisy’ measure – as the index of attentional bias. Given the 
superior reliability of the blocked Stroop, Ataya et al. (2012) recommend 
                                                          
4
 In the blocked version of the modified Stroop, substance-related words are presented in one sub-
block and neutral words are presented in another, whereas in the unblocked version of the task, 
substance-related and neutral words are randomly intermixed. 
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researchers use this version of the task to assess attentional bias. In relation to the 
Stroop, Field & Christiansen (2012) suggest that poor reliability may reflect the 
varying relevance of different substance-related stimuli to individual participants. 
For example, the words ‘beer’, ‘wine’, ‘spirits’ and ‘cider’ will not be of equal 
significance to a particular respondent: if s/he drinks only a certain brand of beer, 
s/he is likely to be most responsive to words associated with that brand, less so to 
words associated with other beer brands and possibly not at all responsive to those 
associated with wine, spirits or cider. Thus, the overall index of attentional bias may 
be small and unreliable, since it is diluted by the lesser or non-reactivity to all the 
presented stimuli. This might also explain the apparently greater sensitivity and 
internal consistency of blocked, compared to unblocked, formats: though 
participants may still only respond strongly to a minority of stimuli, carry-over 
effects may cause colour-naming interference even in response to less salient 
words. 
Field and Cox (2008) have noted that observed Stroop interference effects could 
result from attempts to avoid elaborative processing of alcohol-related words just 
as well as from heightened processing. Consistent with this interpretation, Klein 
(2007) found that alcohol abusers instructed to suppress their thoughts about 
alcohol demonstrated interference in response to the word ‘alcohol’, whereas those 
encouraged to freely experience alcohol-related thoughts did not show 
interference. Another alternative explanation relates to Tiffany and Conklin’s (2000) 
argument that subjective craving utilises cognitive resources. If alcohol-related 
words in a Stroop task elicit subjective craving, this could itself give rise to a general 
cognitive slowing (Algom, Chajut & Lev, 2004; Field & Cox, 2008). 
The alcohol Stroop effect is seen not only in people with an AUD but also in healthy 
social drinkers. Bauer and Cox (1998) and Ryan (2002a), for example, found that 
alcohol-related words produced interference in drinkers regardless of their habitual 
level of alcohol consumption. Likewise, Sharma, Albery and Cook (2001) reported 
attentional bias towards alcohol-related stimuli in both problem and non-problem 
drinkers; and Cox et al. (1999) and Jones and Schulze (2000) observed such 
interference in heavy social drinkers. Lusher et al. (2004) suggest that alcohol-
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related words may be distracting for drinkers in general, because such cues acquire 
motivational salience long before dependence develops. 
Methodological factors and participant characteristics may affect the level of 
interference observed. For example, Sharma and McKenna (2001) reported that 
time pressure influenced emotional Stroop performance. Elsewhere, Ryan (2002a) 
has noted that low mood might amplify susceptibility to Stroop interference in 
alcoholics. However, Lusher et al. (2004) controlled for mood and demographic 
factors and found that alcoholics nevertheless showed greater interference from 
drink-related words than did controls. 
6) Cue-reactivity: Theoretical explanations 
CR has been suggested to play an important role in the maintenance of problematic 
drinking behaviour (Drummond et al., 1995) and in triggering alcoholic relapse 
following quit attempts (Junghanns et al., 2005). CR effects were for a long time 
interpreted in terms of Pavlovian conditioning, that is, as a consequence of 
repeated pairings of the effects of a psychoactive drug with contingently presented 
contextual cues (e.g. the sight and smell of alcohol). It was postulated that 
conditioned responses were either appetitive / drug-like (i.e. conditioned responses 
mimicking the unconditioned effects of the drug; e.g. Stewart, de Wit & Eikelboom, 
1984) or compensatory / withdrawal-like (i.e. conditioned responses opposing the 
unconditioned effects of the drug; e.g. Siegel & Ramos, 2002). However, in a meta-
analysis of CR research, Carter and Tiffany (1999) concluded that the evidence 
supported neither of these positions: drug-related cues, they claimed, consistently 
triggered increased subjective craving and changes in physiological arousal, but 
such responses could not easily or straightforwardly be categorised as either drug-
like or withdrawal-like. 
More recently, it has been suggested that alcohol-related stimuli can acquire 
incentive-motivational properties, thereby altering the way in which these stimuli 
are processed. In  their ‘incentive sensitisation’ theory, Robinson and Berridge 
(1993, 2000) argue that, in susceptible individuals and under certain circumstances, 
the repeated administration of an abusable drug can persistently change the 
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structure and function of brain cells and circuits involved in regulating the 
attribution of incentive salience to stimuli. In particular these include DAergic 
projections within MCL circuitry. Neuroadaptations render these brain circuits 
hypersensitive such that pathological levels of incentive salience are attributed to 
drugs and their associated stimuli. 
Robinson and Berridge (1993, 2000) contend that incentive motivation is 
underpinned by two separable neural substrates: (a) that associated with 
determining incentive value and the linked psychological state of ‘wanting’; and (b) 
that mediating hedonic tone and the linked psychological state of ‘liking’. ‘Wanting’ 
thus reflects the attribution of incentive salience to stimuli. Repeated drug 
administration is claimed to sensitise the neural systems mediating incentive 
salience, so that the drug is perceived as increasingly salient and becomes imbued 
with strong motivational properties, but not the neural systems which mediate 
‘liking’. This is consistent with the observation that the transition to addiction 
appears to be accompanied by decreasing drug liking, but increasing drug ‘wanting’. 
Thus, the drug and its associated stimuli ‘grab attention’ and elicit approach 
behaviour. Procuring and consuming the drug become increasingly more important 
and strong subjective cravings develop. 
Robinson and Berridge (1993, 2000) argue that such sensitisation, when combined 
with the impaired executive control and decision-making commonly observed in 
addicts (Jentsch & Taylor, 1999; Rogers & Robbins, 2001; Bechara, Dolan & Hindes, 
2002; Schoenbaum & Shaham, 2008; see Section 7), can explain the core symptoms 
of addiction: compulsive drug-seeking and consumption despite profound adverse 
consequences, and relapse. 
According to the incentive sensitisation model, then, subjective craving and 
attentional bias are conceptualised as cognitive and emotional outputs of the 
sensitised MCL DA system and both should parallel and/or influence alcohol-seeking 
behaviour. Accordingly, they should be positively correlated. Franken (2003) has 
additionally contended that a reciprocally excitatory relationship exists between 
subjective craving and attentional bias. That is, when alcohol-related cues become 
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the focus of attention, subjective craving increases, which in turn heightens the 
‘attention-grabbing’ properties of alcohol-related stimuli. Thus, a ratchet effect 
occurs, increasing the likelihood of alcohol eventually being ingested. Similar 
models positing this bidirectional causal relationship have been advanced by Ryan 
(2002b) and Kavanagh, Andrade and May (2005). 
Other models posit different underlying mechanisms for addicts’ characteristic 
selective processing of drug-associated stimuli and craving. For example, Tiffany 
(1990) and Tiffany and Conklin (2000) contend that alcohol abusers experience 
subjective craving primarily when alcohol is not readily available and they have to 
engage in effortful behaviour to obtain it. Drug-associated stimuli then become 
particularly salient and able to capture attention. 
7) Impulsiveness in alcohol-dependent individuals 
Deficits of inhibitory control are implicated in virtually all contemporary 
neurobiological theories of addiction, accounting for the impulsive use of 
substances despite the problems they cause the individual, and their difficulty in 
resisting the urge to consume the substance when it is easily available to them. For 
example, Lubman et al. (2004) have characterised addiction as a compulsive 
disorder in which deficient inhibitory control mechanisms underpin loss of control 
over drug use. Likewise, the ‘Impaired Response Inhibition and Salience Attribution’ 
model (IRISA; Goldstein & Volkow, 2002, 2011) maintains that dependence is 
associated with overvaluing of drug rewards, undervaluing of natural rewards and 
deficient inhibitory control. 
There appears to be a central inhibitory control mechanism which modulates pre-
potent appetitive responses to reinforcers such as food, water and sex, as well as 
drugs of abuse. This mechanism transiently suppresses rapid, semi-automatic 
conditioned responses and enables more reasoned cognitive mechanisms to 
influence behaviour. This seems to be a function of the frontostriatal system, since 
dysfunction within this region is associated with pathologically impulsive behaviour 
in a variety of psychological disorders (Robbins, 1990, 1996; Damasio, 1996). Thus 
traumatic damage to frontal regions is often associated with disinhibition, whereby 
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behaviour becomes strongly driven by conditioned stimuli (Robbins, 1996). Damage 
to orbitofrontal cortex or prelimbic cortex has been associated with a tendency to 
prefer smaller, immediate rewards to larger, delayed rewards (Damasio, 1996). 
Jentsch and Taylor (1999) argue that chronic exposure to drugs of abuse induces 
dysfunction within the MCL DAergic system. DAergic neurons from the VTA project 
diffusely to prefrontal cortex (PFC), which is critically involved in higher-level 
‘executive’ cognitive functions including inhibitory control, behavioural regulation, 
novel problem-solving and decision-making. Deficits in these abilities therefore 
manifest as impulsive/disinhibited behaviour. 
Chronic drug abusers show reduced levels of DA D2 receptors in striatal regions, and 
this appears to be associated with reduced PFC activity (Volkow et al., 1993, 2001). 
Addicted individuals demonstrate abnormalities in the structure and function of 
regions of the PFC, in particular the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate 
gyrus (ACG; London et al., 2000; Volkow et al., 1993) and dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC; 
Robinson et al., 2001). Chanraud et al. (2007) found volumetric differences between 
alcohol-dependent (AD) individuals and controls using MRI and voxel-based 
morphometry. Specifically, ADs showed significant reductions in gray matter 
bilaterally in the DLPFC, and in temporal cortex, insula, thalamus and cerebellum. 
There were also widespread decreases in white matter. These effects may have 
been exacerbated by elevated rates of smoking in ADs compared with controls (Feil 
et al., 2010). Similarly, Makris et al. (2008), using segmentation-based MRI 
morphometry, reported that volumetric reductions were most prominent in the 
DLPFC and right insula (as well as right NAcc and left amygdala) of abstinent long-
term chronic alcoholics. Interestingly, there was a positive correlation between 
length of abstinence and volumes in some areas, suggesting that brain volume may 
normalise with abstinence. However, no correlation was observed between length 
of abstinence and volume of the DLPFC and amygdala, possibly indicating persisting 
abnormality in these areas which might either have predated or resulted from 
chronic drinking. 
Akine et al. (2007) assessed brain activation in 9 young AD patients and 9 controls 
while they completed a memory task activating the frontal lobe. Even though there 
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was no difference in the behavioural performance of the two groups, the ADs 
exhibited lower activation in the right DLPFC, ACC, left pulvinar in the thalamus, and 
the right ventral striatum. Clark et al. (2007) similarly found that young alcohol-
dependent women showed lower cerebral perfusion than controls in prefrontal and 
left parietal regions. 
However, most structural and functional brain studies are of limited conclusiveness 
through small sample sizes and poor matching of ADs and controls in relation to 
their histories of nicotine and other drug use (Feil et al., 2010). Thus between-group 
differences may either be artificial or reflect poly-drug use and associated socio-
demographic factors. In this regard, it is interesting that Loeber et al. (2009a, 
2009b, & 2010) have argued that withdrawal from alcohol may itself produce 
neurotoxic lesions in the frontal lobe. They reported that alcoholic patients with 
two or more medically-supervised detoxifications demonstrated greater 
impairments than those who had been detoxified no more than once, on the IGT, a 
maze task, a reward delay task, and a vigilance task. Chronic alcohol consumption 
disrupts glutamatergic transmission in the brain and is associated with prolonged 
inhibition of the N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor (Lovinger, 1993). Tsai and Coyle 
(1998) suggest that an abrupt cessation of alcohol consumption can lead to toxicity 
due to under-opposed glutamate release; and since the frontal lobes are richly 
innervated by glutamatergic pathways (Kril et al., 1997), they may be particularly 
susceptible. 
In relation to the executive functions of the PFC noted above, Aron, Robbins & 
Poldrack (2004) suggest that orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) function is involved in 
processing the affective value of stimuli and adjusting behaviour accordingly; the 
anterior cingulate in inhibition of prepotent reflexive responses; and the 
dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) in the monitoring of strategically-guided behaviour and 
working memory. 
In any event, the evidence of deficient PFC functioning in ADs is complemented by 
questionnaire and behavioural evidence of abnormally high levels of impulsiveness. 
As noted previously, this is likely to be a behavioural manifestation of weak 
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inhibitory control and/or heightened sensitivity to appetitive stimuli. Indeed, 
reductions in fronto-parietal gray matter volume observed in alcoholics have been 
found to correlate with impairments in performance on neuropsychological tests of 
executive functions such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, the Letter Fluency Test, 
the Stroop Task and the Letter-Number Sequencing Test (e.g. Dao-Castellana et al., 
1998; Noël et al., 2001; Demir et al., 2002a, 2002b; Chanraud et al., 2007). 
Chapter 2 will discuss in more detail the ongoing debate over how to define 
impulsivity. Briefly, it does not appear to be a unitary construct; Olmstead (2006), 
for example, has suggested that it incorporates two discrete components: a failure 
of inhibitory control over reward-driven behaviour or pre-potent responses, 
sometimes termed ‘motor impulsiveness’; and impaired decision-making, arising 
from over-sensitivity to immediate rewards and under-sensitivity to delayed 
consequences (‘cognitive impulsiveness’). Patton, Stanford and Barratt (1995) 
separated it into three components: ‘motor impulsiveness’ (action in the absence of 
adequate thought), ‘attentional impulsiveness’ (impaired focus on the task-at-
hand), and ‘non-planning impulsiveness’ (orientation towards the present at the 
expense of the future). There is considerable overlap between Patton et al.’s (1995) 
components of motor and non-planning impulsiveness, and Olmstead’s (2006) 
motor and cognitive impulsiveness components, respectively. People with AUDs 
consistently demonstrate high levels of both cognitive and motor impulsiveness 
(Verdejo-García et al., 2008). Salgado et al. (2009) suggest that elevated attentional 
impulsiveness might be associated with difficulty in avoiding drug-related thoughts, 
or in establishing new patterns of social behaviour during the early phases of 
abstinence. 
Instruments used to assess impulsiveness 
Various instruments have been developed to assess impulsiveness. As with 
measures of CR, they can be broadly divided into subjective (self-report) measures 
and objective behavioural tests which tap specific manifestations of impulsive 
behaviour. There is ongoing debate concerning the relationship between how 
individuals behave and how they report they behave; thus, the correlations 
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between different indices are generally no more than weak to moderate (Reynolds 
et al., 2006a) and they are often completely uncorrelated (Dom et al., 2006b). One 
explanation is that although individual differences in trait impulsiveness are 
relatively stable, levels of state impulsiveness fluctuate (see Chapter 2). Thus, de 
Wit (2009, p. 28) contends that ‘abrupt environmental, physiological or emotional 
events may cause transient ‘state’ changes in either self-control or inhibition’. 
‘Trait’ impulsiveness is typically measured using self-report instruments such as the 
Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995), which ask respondents to rate 
items such as ‘I concentrate easily’ and ‘I act on the spur of the moment’ in relation 
to self-perceptions developed over their lifetime. 
Trait impulsiveness 
Examples of widely-used self-report measures include the BIS-11, the Sensation 
Seeking Scale (SSS; Zuckerman et al., 1964), the EASI-III Impulsivity Scales (Buss & 
Plomin, 1984), the Functional and Dysfunctional Impulsivity Scales (Dickman, 1990), 
the I-7 Impulsiveness Questionnaire (Eysenck et al., 1985a) and the Urgency, 
Premeditation, Perseverance and Sensation Seeking Scales (UPPS; Whiteside & 
Lynam, 2001). With the exception of the SSS, these instruments are all detailed in 
Chapter 2, pages 60-62. Of these, by far the most widely-used to date has been the 
BIS-11. Their subscales do not generally correspond to the two-factor 
conceptualisation advanced by Olmstead (2006), because they have been derived 
from different theoretical models or have been derived from statistical data 
reduction techniques in particular samples. An increasing number of studies using 
such scales have reported greater impulsiveness in both current and former 
alcohol-dependent individuals and abusers compared to healthy controls (e.g. Von 
Knorring, Oreland & Von Knorring, 1987; Hallman et al., 1990; Ketzenberger & 
Forrest, 2000; Bjork et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2007; Von Diemen et al., 2008; 
Cangemi et al., 2010; Tomassini et al., 2012). 
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Behavioural measures 
‘State’ variations in impulsiveness are theoretically likely to be detected via 
performance on behavioural tasks, such as Go/No-Go and Stop Signal tasks. 
However, performance on different behavioural impulsivity tasks intercorrelate 
weakly (de Wit, 2009), suggesting that they may be sensitive to disparate processes. 
The behavioural tendencies tapped by the tasks are, nevertheless, individually of 
interest in terms of their potential relevance to real-life impulsive behaviours 
including alcohol consumption. The ‘Delay Discounting’ procedure measures the 
extent to which behaviour is sensitive to long-term consequences; it is a measure of 
cognitive impulsiveness. Participants are given a choice between a small 
hypothetical reward (e.g. a certain amount of money) delivered immediately or a 
larger hypothetical reward which can only be collected following a delay. A 
preference for relatively small but immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards 
is believed to reflect difficulty in delaying gratification. A number of studies have 
observed greater discounting in alcohol dependent and abusing samples relative to 
controls. Petry (2001) reported that current and former alcoholics both 
demonstrated abnormally high discounting of monetary and alcohol rewards. 
Similar findings have been reported by Bjork et al. (2004), Mitchell et al. (2005, 
2007), Boettiger et al. (2007), Bobova et al. (2009) and MacKillop et al. (2010). 
Negative findings have however been reported by Kirby & Petry (2004) and 
MacKillop et al., 2007). Elevated delay discounting has also been reported in 
smokers (e.g. Baker, Johnson & Bickel, 1997; Fields et al., 2007), cocaine addicts 
(e.g. Coffey et al., 2003; Heil et al., 2006;) and heroin abusers (e.g. Madden et al., 
1997; Bickel & Marsch, 2001). 
Many behavioural tasks tap inhibitory control. For example, the Stop Signal task 
(Logan, 1994) assesses the ability to override a pre-potent ‘go’ response when an 
infrequent ‘stop’ signal is given. Because the difficulty of the task can be adjusted by 
manipulating the delay between the ‘go’ stimulus and the ‘stop’ signal, it is highly 
sensitive to inhibitory deficits. Stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) is estimated for each 
participant, indexing the efficiency of the stopping process. Goudriaan et al. (2006), 
Lawrence et al. (2009) and Schmaal et al. (2013) have all reported significant 
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performance deficits in an alcohol-dependent group compared with controls. The 
Stop Signal Task has also identified inhibitory control impairments in abusers of 
other substances, including cocaine (Lane et al., 2007). Li et al. (2009) tried to 
identify the underlying neural circuits involved in impaired impulse control. Twenty-
four abstinent alcohol-dependent patients and 24 controls underwent fMRI whilst 
they completed the Stop Signal Task. It was found that dysfunctional impulse 
control in the clinical group was associated with low cortical activation in the DLPFC, 
while risk-taking decisions were related to low activation of the medial OFC, 
bilateral parietal cortices and rostral ACC. 
Bjork et al. (2004) used another behavioural assessment of inhibitory control, the 
Continuous Performance Test (CPT; Conners et al., 2003). In this task, the 
participant must respond (e.g. by pressing a button) when specified ‘go’ stimuli are 
presented and inhibit responding when a ‘no-go’ stimulus appears. A ‘commission 
error’ occurs when the participant responds to a no-go stimulus and reflects failure 
to inhibit a pre-potent motor response. Examples of this task are described in detail 
in Chapters 2 (pp. 122-123) and 3 (pp. 177-178). Alcohol-dependent patients in 
Bjork et al.’s (2004) study exhibited higher rates of commission errors, as predicted. 
Similarly, Salgado et al. (2009) found that a sample of 31 AD individuals who had 
been abstinent for between 15 and 120 days made more commission errors in the 
CPT than 30 healthy controls. Another popular measure of inhibitory control, similar 
to the CPT, is the Go/No-Go task; Kamarajan et al. (2005), however, found no 
difference in response inhibition between alcoholics and controls using this task. 
Impulsivity is often measured by tasks assessing decision-making ability. Probably 
the most widely-used such instrument, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 
1994), was developed specifically to simulate real-life decision-making under 
ambiguous conditions. This task is described in detail on pages 178-179. 
Performance on the IGT has been empirically linked with activity in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). Thus, lesion studies have revealed that IGT 
performance is impaired following damage to the VM, but not the dorsolateral, 
region of the PFC (Bechara et al., 1998); positron emission tomography (PET) has 
shown VM activation during IGT performance (Grant, Contoreggi & London, 2000); 
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and electrophysiological studies have likewise shown greater activity in the VM 
during IGT performance, particularly during the period immediately prior to 
decision-making (Adolphs et al., 2000). 
Bechara et al. (2001) tested individuals dependent on either alcohol or stimulants 
(SDs), healthy controls, and patients with bilateral lesions of the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMs) on the IGT. As predicted, SDs performed worse than 
controls: 61% performed within the range of the VM patients, compared with only 
32.5% of the controls. Neither age, sex, level of education, intelligence (IQ) or 
memory, nor performance on standard tasks of executive function, could account 
for these performance differences. IGT performance was best predicted by years of 
abuse, duration of abstinence, number of relapses and number of times in 
treatment. Other evidence has found impaired decision-making in people addicted 
to opiates (Mintzer, Copersino & Stitzer, 2005; Verdejo-García, Perales & Pérez-
García, 2007), psychostimulants (Bechara et al., 2001; Bolla et al., 2003) and 
marijuana (Bolla et al., 2005). Within drinkers, ‘early-onset’ alcoholism has been 
found to be particularly characterised by decision-making impairment (Dom et al., 
2006b; Mazas, Finn & Steinmetz, 2000). 
Heightened impulsiveness may be either a determinant or a consequence (or both) 
of alcohol and other drug use. As indicated previously, there is some evidence that 
chronic drug use causes prefrontal cortical dopaminergic hypofunction and other 
changes in cortical neurobiology which may result in difficulty inhibiting 
inappropriate responses. Conversely, trait impulsivity has been implicated as a risk 
factor for problematic drug use. Longitudinal and cross-sectional studies have 
indicated that high impulsiveness pre-dates chronic drug use. For instance, in a 
sample of 457 young adults, Sher, Bartholow and Wood (2000) found that 
‘behavioural disinhibition’, a trait measured by standardised self-report personality 
instruments, predicted substance use disorder six years later. Habeych et al. (2006) 
reported impairments on an oculomotor response inhibition task, which is sensitive 
to prefrontal dysfunction, in a sample of children at high familial risk for alcohol-use 
disorder. Interestingly, Jones et al. (2011) reported that inducing a state of 
disinhibition in social drinkers led to increased alcohol consumption, relative to a 
42 
 
control manipulation, suggesting a causal effect of disinhibition on alcohol 
consumption. The importance of delay aversion and inhibitory control failures may 
change across the development and course of alcohol dependence. Rubio et al. 
(2008) assessed 384 heavy drinkers and 149 healthy volunteers at baseline and four 
years later. Over the course of this period, 33% of the heavy drinkers developed 
alcohol dependence. Whereas difficulty in delaying reward correlated with baseline 
substance use, impaired inhibitory control at baseline predicted the subsequent 
development of dependence. 
8) Aetiology of mesocorticolimbic dysfunction in substance dependence 
The mechanisms via which a substance user’s MCL system becomes 
hypodopaminergic are at present unclear, though could relate to both chronic 
alcohol intake and genetic factors. Crabbe (2002) has proposed a diathesis-stress 
relationship. 
Numerous family, twin and adoption studies, as well as linkage analyses, have 
estimated the heritability of alcohol dependence as between 50 and 60 percent 
(Stacey, Clarke & Schumann, 2009). Genes which code for DA synthesis, 
degradation, receptors and transporters might mediate this heritability. A number 
of studies have reported a relationship between the DRD4 gene and alcohol abuse. 
Laucht et al. (2007) found that male adolescents carrying the 7-repeat allele of DRD4 
consumed more alcohol per occasion and reported higher rates of lifetime heavy 
drinking than males without this allele. However, the DRD2 TaqI A1 gene has 
generated the most interest in relation to AUDs. In a post-mortem study of 35 
alcoholics and 35 non-alcoholics, Blum et al. (1990) reported that the presence of 
the DRD2 TaqI A1 allele correctly classified 77% of alcoholics, whilst its absence 
classified 72% of non-alcoholics. In this study, however, most of the former died 
due to the effects of alcohol; it may therefore be that the DRD2 TaqI A1 allele is 
related to a particularly severe presentation of alcoholism. A recent meta-analysis 
(Smith et al., 2008) of fifty-four studies collectively including 9,382 participants 
found a more modest association between this allele and alcohol dependence. 
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The presence of the DRD2 TaqI A1 allele has been repeatedly associated with 
reduced D2 receptor density in the striatum (Bowirrat & Oscar-Berman, 2005). 
Noble (2000) has proposed that this gives rise to ‘Reward Deficiency Syndrome’ in 
which compromised DAergic activity produces an anhedonic state which individuals 
seek to reverse by engaging in activities such as use of alcohol and/or other drugs of 
abuse which potentiate midbrain DA activity. The finding that unaffected members 
of alcoholic families have higher-than-normal levels of DA D2 receptors (Volkow et 
al., 2006) adds support to this hypothesis, as do empirical findings that the DRD2 
TaqI A1 allele predicts an individual’s subjective response to alcohol consumption 
(London et al., 2009) and impulsiveness (Eisenberg et al., 2007; Esposito-Smythers 
et al., 2010; Limosin et al., 2003). 
There is some evidence that chronic alcohol consumption can induce dysfunction 
within MCL DAergic circuitry, though many studies have failed to control for 
potential genetic factors. Reviewing preclinical studies, Weiss and Porrino (2002) 
suggest that over the course of chronic ethanol exposure, adaptations develop 
within MCL DAergic circuitry and counteract the sustained stimulation of the system 
by ethanol. Such studies have revealed that withdrawal from chronic ethanol is 
followed by substantial decrements in extracellular NAcc DA levels (Rossetti, 
Hmaidan & Gessa, 1992; Weiss et al., 1996) and VTA DA neuron activity (Diana et 
al., 1992a, 1992b; Shen & Chiodo, 1993). These findings are consistent with the 
view that heavy drinkers may increase their consumption in order to compensate 
for decreasing levels of DA activity. 
The mechanisms via which chronic ethanol intake induces DA hypofunction are 
controversial. Following the observation that pharmacological inhibition of L-type 
calcium channels selectively blocks the withdrawal syndrome, Rossetti et al. (1999) 
suggested that over-activity of such channels may suppress DA release during 
withdrawal. Rats maintained on ethanol show reduced expression of tyrosine 
hydroxylase and elevated levels of DA transporters, suggesting that DA 
hypofunction might result from decreases in DA synthesis and enhanced clearance 
of synaptic DA (Rothblat, Rubin & Schneider, 2001). 
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DA deficits appear to be long-lasting. Bailey et al. (2000) reported changes in NAcc 
DA turnover and synthesis for as long as two months after ethanol withdrawal in 
mice. In human alcoholics, DA transporter (DAT) binding has been found to be 
depressed four days after withdrawal, but appears to recover with continued 
abstinence (Laine et al., 1999). Clinical studies suggest that a slow rate of recovery 
of DA receptor function predicts relapse and poor treatment outcome (Heinz et al., 
1995), possibly because the individual is motivated to reinstate ‘normal’ DA 
function by drinking. 
9) Evidence for biological and behavioural dysfunction in non-dependent ‘social’ 
drinkers 
The vast majority of the aforementioned clinical research has been with long-term, 
chronically relapsing alcohol-dependent samples. Yet since addiction theory (e.g. 
Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2000; Jentsch & Taylor, 1999) conceptualises such 
chronic patterns of addictive behaviour as the ‘end-point’ of a progressive 
development, those with non-dependent patterns of consumption should also 
demonstrate some of the psychological features of addiction. This view has 
increasingly been corroborated by research with non-dependent samples, including 
so-called ‘hazardous’ drinkers (see p. 22) as well as more moderate social drinkers. 
Cue-reactivity (CR) 
When presented with alcohol cues, non-dependent heavy drinkers (HDs) have 
reported greater desire for alcohol than light social drinkers (LDs) (Greeley, Swift, 
Prescott & Heather, 1993; McCusker & Brown, 1990; Walitzer & Sher, 1990). HDs 
have also been reported to show cue-elicited autonomic responses, including 
increases in pulse rate (McCusker & Brown, 1990), salivation, skin temperature 
reactivity and skin conductivity (Walitzer & Sher, 1990). HDs’ automatic cognitive 
processing, like that of dependent drinkers, is affected by alcohol cues. Thus, Cox et 
al. (1999) reported that after being exposed to such cues, HDs were slower in 
colour-naming alcohol-related words than they were after exposure to neutral 
stimuli; LDs were not affected by exposure to such cues. Similar findings have been 
reported by Jones and Schulze (2000). Stroop interference effects have also been 
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documented in non-dependent problem and moderate social drinkers (see pp. 31-
32). These findings suggest that CR is not an ‘all-or-none’ phenomenon which 
occurs only in drinkers with a diagnosis of alcohol dependence. 
Impulsiveness 
There is accumulating evidence that HDs are more impulsive than LDs. This has 
been reported in terms of higher levels of delay discounting of hypothetical 
monetary and alcohol rewards (Field et al., 2007; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998; 
Moreno et al., 2012). Similarly, Kollins (2003) reported a significant positive 
correlation between the number of times college students had ‘passed out’ from 
alcohol use and their scores on a delay discounting task. Amongst 13-17 year olds, 
Rossow (2008) found delay discounting to be positively associated with drinking 
frequency and intoxication frequency even when age, gender, impulsivity and 
disposable income were controlled for. These effects seem to reflect observations 
in ‘real-life’ settings. In a study by Moore & Cusens (2010), 46 male social drinkers 
were breathalysed twice: once as they entered a bar and again when they left. In an 
earlier interview, participants’ delay aversion had been estimated via an 
interviewer-led screening task consisting of 12 questions. Those who discounted 
future rewards more heavily demonstrated a greater degree of alcohol intoxication 
at the end of their drinking session. However, results are conflicting as a few studies 
have reported no association between alcohol consumption and delay discounting 
rate (e.g. MacKillop et al., 2007; Reimers et al., 2009; Fernie et al., 2010). A meta-
analysis by MacKillop et al. (2011) found that although evidence exists for elevated 
delay discounting of future rewards amongst clinical samples dependent on or 
abusing alcohol, this seems much less pronounced in non-clinical samples. It may be 
that the non-clinical samples in such studies do not exhibit increased discounting of 
future rewards because they do not contain enough participants with a substantial 
drinking history (Christiansen et al., 2012); this account is supported by the 
observation that negative findings have often been reported in studies of largely 
undergraduate drinkers (e.g. MacKillop et al., 2007; Fernie et al., 2010). 
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Effects of drinking status have also been reported on measures of response 
inhibition. In the Go/NoGo task, Colder & Connor (2002) reported that in a sample 
of 106 undergraduates, high numbers of commission errors were associated with 
high levels of alcohol use. Similarly, Henges & Marczinski (2012) found that in social 
drinkers aged between 18 and 21, commission errors correlated with the highest 
number of drinks they had consumed on one occasion during the previous month. 
Recent cross-sectional studies have supported this association. Ahmadi et al. (2013) 
found that, compared to light drinkers, heavy drinkers exhibited dysfunction in 
suppressing prepotent responding in the Go/NoGo task as manifested via increased 
reaction times for Go correct-hits and NoGo false alarms. These authors also found 
that during fMRI NoGo correct rejections, light drinkers showed greater BOLD 
response than heavy drinkers in a number of relevant brain regions. Similar results 
have been reported by Murphy & Garavan (2011), and Petit et al. (2012). In the 
Stop Signal task, Smith & Mattick (2013) found that young female heavy drinkers 
exhibited a longer stop-signal reaction time (i.e. the time required to inhibit the 
inappropriate response) than lighter drinking controls. However, results are not 
consistent across studies as Fernie et al. (2010) and Moreno et al. (2012) reported 
no differences in response inhibition between heavy drinkers and controls. As 
suggested above in relation to delay discounting, it may be that inconsistent 
findings are related to the non-dependence of these samples. It is notable in this 
respect that though Yan & Li (2009) reported no performance differences between 
heavy and light drinkers in a Stop Signal Task, they did find heavy drinkers to exhibit 
reduced amygdala activation5 during ‘risk-taking’ in this task (i.e. post-go ‘speeding’ 
versus post-go ‘slowing’) compared to light drinkers. Similarly, Bednarski et al. 
(2012) reported decreased activation in right superior frontal gyrus and left caudate 
nucleus during ‘risk-taking’ trials. Thus, it may be that though behavioural tasks – 
typically developed on clinical samples – are sometimes not sensitive enough to 
distinguish between non-dependent groups, differences in ‘direct’ brain activation 
measures can reflect an underlying inhibitory control dysfunction in heavier social 
drinkers. Using event-related potentials (ERPs), Oddy & Barry (2009) have also 
                                                          
5
 Amygdala activation has previously been shown to be related to the ‘risk-taking’ measure used in 
Yan & Li’s (2009) study (Li, Chao & Lee, 2009). 
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reported differences in brain activity between non-dependent heavy and light 
drinkers in a CPT in the absence of performance differences (for more detail, see 
Chapter 3, pp. 115-116). 
As per observations in dependent samples, a number of cross-sectional and 
longitudinal studies suggest that elevated impulsivity on self-report scales, such as 
the BIS-11 and SSS, correspond with increased alcohol consumption and related 
problems in non-alcohol-dependent adolescents and adults alike (Waldeck & Miller, 
1997; Gunnarsson et al., 2008; McAdams & Donnellan, 2009; Carlson et al., 2010; 
Fernie et al., 2010; Hamilton, Sinha & Potenza, 2012; Henges & Marczinski, 2012; 
Lyvers et al., 2012; Papachristou et al., 2012). Evidence for the association between 
self-report trait impulsiveness and alcohol use has at present been more 
consistently demonstrated than for either measure of behavioural impulsivity. 
More research is needed to elucidate the relationship between impulsiveness and 
the development of heavy or problematic drinking, in particular the chronological 
relationship and the extent to which impulsivity may predict or arise as a 
consequence of chronic heavy social drinking. 
10) The present thesis 
Since research investigating addiction has most commonly recruited chronic and 
physically-dependent individuals, there has been little exploration/testing of 
theory-driven hypotheses concerning the development of heavy drinking and 
addiction. In order to enhance understanding of the mechanisms leading to 
addiction, it is necessary to investigate social drinkers and non-dependent problem 
drinkers. The evidence reviewed in Section 9 adds weight to the notion that 
cognitive and behavioural impairments parallel a continuum of severity of 
maladaptive drinking. 
The present thesis sought to examine the extent putative manifestations of a 
dysfunctional underlying MCL DAergic system are present in non-physically-
dependent social and problem drinkers. The first study developed a new self-report 
measure of state impulsiveness to parallel existing trait measures and to enable 
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subsequent exploration of relationships with alcohol consumption. Study 2 thus 
investigates whether heavy social drinkers demonstrate evidence of greater 
electrophysiological CR and impulsiveness than light social drinkers; and Study 3 
investigates whether social and heavy drinkers are differentially affected by 
‘priming’ doses of alcohol in terms of their performance on tests believed to index 
relevant brain circuitry. 
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Chapter 2: The development of a self-report questionnaire to 
measure recent impulsiveness and an exploration of its 
association with recent alcohol consumption 
Abstract 
Background: Traditionally, impulsiveness has been regarded as a stable construct; 
this view is reflected by widely-used self-report impulsiveness measures. Recently, 
however, behavioural laboratory studies (e.g. Fillmore & Vogel-Sprott, 1999) have 
indicated that, firstly, impulsivity can fluctuate within individuals over time, and 
secondly, that acute increases in impulsivity can be observed following the ingestion 
of a small dose of alcohol. Such studies appear consistent with the view that the 
construct has a state as well as a trait manifestation. Yet whilst traditional 
impulsiveness questionnaires can be said to tap the former, there is not self-report 
instrument to assess recent fluctuations in impulsivity. 
Research aims and design: The present study set out to develop and validate a 
measure of recent impulsivity; part of the validation included an examination of the 
association between this scale and recent alcohol intake. In developing a Recent 
Impulsivity Scale (RIS), traditional impulsiveness questionnaires were examined in 
order to identify items amenable to being converted into a ‘recent’ format. These 
converted items were included in a pilot version of the instrument which was 
administered, along with an accompanying trait version (the Trait Impulsiveness 
Scale; TIS), to two cohorts of first-year Psychology undergraduates on two occasions 
1 month apart. Respondents also completed the BIS-11 (Patton, Barratt & Stanford, 
1995) and gave information concerning their habitual and recent alcohol intake. 
Results: Factor analyses revealed two factors, which were named ‘Cognitive 
Impulsivity’ (CI) and ‘Motor Impulsivity’ (MI). Consistent with the hypothesis that 
recent impulsivity would be less stable than trait impulsivity, correlational analyses 
revealed, firstly, that: i) the TIS correlated more highly than the RIS with the BIS-11; 
and ii) the MI subscale of the RIS showed lower test-retest stability than the MI 
subscale of the TIS. Additional analyses exploring associations between subscale 
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scores and patterns/recency of alcohol use yielded some further evidence that state 
impulsivity was more sensitive than trait impulsivity to factors known to increase the 
likelihood of impulsive behaviour. 
Conclusions: These data offer some, albeit mixed, support for the contention that 
recent changes in alcohol intake are related to real-world recent impulsiveness as 
assessed by self-report. In broad terms, these findings are consistent with laboratory 
studies, such as that of Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott (1999), showing alcohol to induce 
increased impulsivity. 
Introduction and rationale 
Jentsch and Taylor’s (1999) important theoretical framework of addiction contends 
that chronic drug abuse compromises pre-frontal neurobiological integrity with the 
consequence that impulsiveness becomes elevated. Recent research has suggested 
that the tendency to act impulsively is not static but dynamic and that alcohol can 
induce acute fluctuations in impulsiveness in non-addicted individuals. The primary 
purposes of the present study were firstly, to develop a self-report scale to capture 
recent impulsiveness (RI: such a measure does not at present exist), and secondly, 
to examine the associations between scores on this scale and recent alcohol intake. 
Overview of introduction and rationale: To contextualise the principal issues that 
this study was designed to examine, Section 1. i first addresses the facts that (a) 
defining impulsiveness has proved difficult, since it appears to be a multi-faceted 
construct; and (b) there are a variety of methods designed to measure these various 
facets. Section 1. ii considers evidence of little correlation between self-report and 
behavioural laboratory indices of impulsiveness, possibly indicating that it is to 
some extent a dynamic construct, and that behavioural measures are more 
sensitive to state fluctuations than self-report. Self-report measures are quicker and 
easier to administer, yet for recent fluctuations in impulsivity no such measure at 
present exists. Sections 2. i and ii address the relationship between impulsivity and 
alcohol use: alterations in impulsivity following both acute and chronic intake of 
drugs of abuse is a focus of modern theories of alcohol dependence, and alcohol 
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can also induce acute changes in impulsivity in non-dependent social drinkers. The 
aims and hypotheses of the present study are set out in Section 3. 
1. i) Defining and measuring impulsiveness 
Impulsiveness has been defined as ‘a predisposition toward rapid, unplanned 
reactions to internal or external stimuli with diminished regard for the negative 
consequences of these reactions to the impulsive individual or others’ (Moeller et 
al., 2007, p. 1784). It is postulated to be a dimension of normal behaviour, the 
higher end of the continuum being associated with a wide range of maladaptive 
behaviours including inability to wait, difficulty withholding responses, insensitivity 
to negative or delayed consequences (de Wit, 2009) and substance abuse (Koob & 
LeMoal, 2001). 
It appears that impulsivity is a complex, multi-dimensional construct, and a range of 
conceptualisations have been proposed. Currently, there is widespread agreement 
that it consists of at least two different but related components, commonly referred 
to as ‘behavioural disinhibition’ and ‘delay aversion’ (Dom et al., 2006a). 
Behavioural disinhibition is the inability to appropriately inhibit maladaptive 
actions; delay aversion the extent to which immediate rewarding consequences 
have greater control over an individual’s behaviour than do delayed rewards 
(Ainslie, 1975). De Wit (2009) has argued for a third component, ‘attentional 
impulsiveness’: difficulty in focusing attention or concentrating, which is related to 
executive functioning deficits and reduced cognitive flexibility (Stanford et al., 
2009). 
Reflecting the variety of conceptualisations of impulsiveness, a range of measures 
have been developed. The two principal classes of instrument are self-report and 
behavioural laboratory measures. Widely-used self-report measures include the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) and the 
Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS; Zuckerman et al., 1964). These tend to include items 
indexing the diverse behaviours falling under the umbrella of ‘impulsiveness’, and 
when factor analysed give rise to orthogonal subscales; they do not, however, 
always clearly correspond with the currently-favoured two-factor model of 
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impulsiveness. The items of the BIS-11, for example, yield three subscales labelled 
Attentional Impulsiveness, Motor Impulsiveness, and Non-Planning Impulsiveness. 
A recent incarnation of the SSS, the Sensation Seeking Scale-Form V (SSS-V), 
comprises four subscales: Boredom Susceptibility, Experience Seeking, Disinhibition, 
and Thrill and Adventure Seeking. 
Behavioural laboratory measures fall broadly into those measuring either delay 
aversion or behavioural inhibition (Dom et al., 2006b). With respect to the former, 
Delay Discounting tasks (DDTs) tap the respondent’s preference for smaller, more 
immediate rewards compared to larger, more delayed rewards (Rachlin, Raineri & 
Cross, 1991). Impulsive individuals tend to prefer more immediate rewards and, in 
the context of a specified delay, ‘discount’ the greater value of a delayed monetary 
reward relatively quickly (Rachlin & Green, 1972); that is, compared to less 
impulsive individuals, they are prepared to wait less long in order to obtain the 
larger reward. 
Behavioural Inhibition tasks measure the ability to refrain from making a prepotent 
response. During the commonly used Go/NoGo, Stop Signal Task (SST; Logan, 1994), 
and Continuous Performance Task (CPT; Conners et al., 2003), the participant must 
make rapid motor responses in ‘go’ trials but inhibit responses when a ‘no-go’ signal 
is presented. Children with a diagnosis of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD), who are disinhibited and demonstrate poor behavioural control in daily 
life, show impairment on these tasks (Tannock, Ickowicz & Schachar, 1995). For 
more detailed descriptions of these behavioural tests of impulsivity, see Chapter 1 
(pp. 39-40). 
1. ii) Sensitivity of different measures to transient changes in impulsiveness 
There is often little association between self-report and behavioural laboratory 
measures of impulsiveness. For example, Dom et al. (2006b) reported no significant 
correlations between delay discounting rates and any of the subscales of either the 
BIS-11 or the SSS. This may be because different impulsiveness instruments 
measure different aspects of a genuinely multifaceted construct. However, there 
are some important methodological differences inherent to the two forms of 
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measurement. Firstly, self-report questionnaires are sensitive to reporting bias, 
whereas behavioural measures are more objective. Thus, whilst self-report 
measures often have greater face validity, they may be less reliable. Secondly, 
existing self-report questionnaires generally assume that impulsiveness is a stable 
characteristic (i.e. a trait), whereas recent research suggests that it can fluctuate 
within individuals over time (de Wit, Enggasser & Richards, 2002; Shiels et al., 2009; 
Strakowski et al., 2010). The wording of items in trait instruments is, by definition, 
insensitive to transient changes in impulsiveness, asking about general propensities. 
For example, the BIS-11 presents statements such as ‘I plan tasks carefully’, ‘I am 
restless at the theatre or lectures’ and ‘I do things without thinking’, with response 
options referring to overall frequency (‘Rarely/Never’, ‘Occasionally’, ‘Often’ and 
‘Almost Always/Always’). They thus implicitly require the respondent to average 
over an extended period of time, rather than to focus more narrowly on recent 
behaviour. Behavioural measures, by contrast, should be sensitive to transient 
variations in impulsiveness as they measure the individual’s actual responses at that 
precise moment. 
Most individual studies have employed either self-report or behavioural laboratory 
measures. Since behavioural measures often require the use of computer software 
and/or other specialised apparatus, they can be rather hard to administer. A 
potentially easier and quicker method of assessing a person’s current propensity 
towards impulsive behaviour would be a self-report instrument designed to gauge 
recent changes in impulsivity. In the current absence of such an instrument, the 
present study has been designed to develop one and subject it to preliminary 
validation. 
2. i) Altered, dysfunctional impulsiveness is a prominent part of alcohol dependence 
Heightened impulsiveness is a characteristic of a variety of psychiatric disorders and 
is a prominent feature of substance use disorders, including alcoholism (Dougherty 
et al., 2004). In tests of behavioural disinhibition, such as the Continuous 
Performance and Go/No-Go tasks for example, participants with alcohol 
dependence demonstrate greater performance deficits than non-alcohol dependent 
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controls (Bjork et al., 2004; Duka et al., 2003). Those with alcohol dependence also 
tend to discount future rewards relative to immediate rewards at higher than 
normal rates (Bjork et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 2005). 
Recent theories of alcohol use disorders emphasise the importance of heightened 
impulsiveness in the development and maintenance of these disorders. Thus, 
Jentsch and Taylor (1999) have proposed that the neurobiological and 
neurochemical integrity of frontal cortical areas is crucial for ‘normal’ control of 
impulsive responses. Since chronic exposure to drugs of abuse is believed to 
produce neurochemical dysregulation in these areas, it could lead to elevated 
impulsivity, manifesting in impairments of inhibitory control and delay discounting. 
This theory draws upon preclinical evidence that, administered chronically or at 
high doses, drugs of abuse can be neurotoxic to monoaminergic neurons, causing 
loss of dopamine, serotonin and noradrenaline concentrations in the prefrontal 
cortex and striatum (Ridley et al., 1982; Ricaurte et al., 1984). Importantly, these 
reductions appear to be relatively selective for frontal cortical areas. If these 
findings generalise to humans, the dysfunction of orbitofrontal and prelimbic cortex 
could explain the observed tendency of heavy drinkers to discount delayed rewards 
(Damasio, 1996). Inhibitory control deficits may likewise reflect underfunctioning in 
frontal areas including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex, ventromedial and limbic frontal cortex. Jentsch and Taylor (1999) argue that 
hypofunction of the prefrontal regions, which normally modulate the subcortical DA 
responses to salient stimuli, means that behaviour is more strongly stimulus-driven. 
Low prefrontal activity may thus lead to weak inhibition and, indirectly, to elevated 
reward sensitivity. 
The relationship between impulsivity and substance abuse could well be bi-
directional. For example, heightened TI appears to predate dysfunctional drinking 
behaviour, as evidenced by several prospective longitudinal studies. In 457 young 
adults, Sher, Bartholow and Wood (2000) reported subsequent substance use 
disorder to be predicted by ‘behavioural disinhibition’, a trait measured at baseline 
by standardised self-report questionnaires. One interpretation of the findings is that 
individuals higher in impulsiveness are more drawn to the short-term rewards of 
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alcohol and/or less able to control their intake, resulting over time in their 
becoming heavy drinkers. There is some evidence that genetic factors may 
influence vulnerability to dependence. The serotonin system has been associated 
with impulsiveness, and Nordquist et al. (2009) have found female alcoholics to 
have high rates of a functional polymorphism with potential effects on this system. 
Specifically, they found the functional polymorphism of the transcription factor 
TFAP2B to be more common in a sample of female alcoholics than in controls. 
TFAP2B has been shown to be involved in monoaminergic transmission via its 
regulatory effect on genes coding for fundamental elements of this system, such as 
monoamine oxidase type A and the serotonin transporter. 
2. ii) Acute alcohol and transient changes in impulsivity 
Broadly, Jentsch and Taylor’s (1999) theory suggests that impulsiveness may be 
heightened by chronic drug intake. Elsewhere, many studies have demonstrated 
that alcohol acutely increases impulsive behaviour in non-dependent social 
drinkers. Alcohol impairs cognitive control, as evidenced by increased 
aggressiveness, risky driving, risky sexual behaviours and an increase in the 
likelihood of committing suicide (Steele & Southwick, 1985). Figures from the 
United States indicate that alcohol is involved in 45 percent of violent crimes, 45 
percent of episodes of marital violence, 20 percent of non-fatal industrial accidents 
and 15 percent of non-fatal traffic accidents (Sher, 2008). This may simply reflect its 
general sedating effects, but could also reflect its acute effects upon dopaminergic 
systems in regions of the mesocorticolimbic system which are implicated in 
impulsive behaviour (see Chapter 1, pp. 34-36). 
Behavioural laboratory studies have recently begun to elucidate the effects of 
alcohol on impulsiveness. A number of studies have reported that even relatively 
moderate doses of alcohol (approximately 0.4-0.6 g/kg), which produce blood 
alcohol concentrations (BACs) of around 0.06%, can induce behavioural disinhibition 
in procedures such as the Go/No-Go, Continuous Performance and Stop Signal 
Tasks. For example, in a study by Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott (1999), healthy 
undergraduates received either 0.6 g/kg of alcohol or placebo before completing 
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the Stop Signal Task. Alcohol impaired inhibition compared to placebo, but did not 
affect response time. Similar findings using a variety of related methodologies have 
confirmed alcohol’s disinhibiting effect even at low doses (e.g. Fillmore & Vogel-
Sprott, 1998; Dougherty et al., 2000; Abroms & Fillmore, 2004; Easdon et al., 2005; 
Abroms, Gottlob & Fillmore, 2006; Marczinksi, Combs & Fillmore, 2007; Rose & 
Duka, 2008). The effects on disinhibition have been found to be dose-dependent 
(e.g. Dougherty et al., 2008), and alcohol has also been reported to produce 
impairments in inhibitory control over attention (Abroms et al., 2006). In general, 
alcohol does not affect accuracy or speed of responding to ‘go’ cues, suggesting that 
the disruption of inhibitory control is relatively selective rather than part of a global 
disruption of psychomotor performance (Field et al., 2010). 
Neurobiologically, the effects of alcohol appear to be biphasic. Thus at low doses it 
has an activating effect specifically on prefrontal cortex (Sano et al., 1993), whereas 
at higher doses it reduces activity across the whole brain (Levin et al., 1998; 
Söderlund et al., 2007; Van Horn et al., 2006). This generalised depressant effect 
may explain the empirical observations of behavioural disinhibition at moderate to 
high doses. Logically, the stimulant effects of low doses of alcohol should increase 
inhibitory control. However, a literature search revealed no studies testing this 
hypothesis using doses of alcohol below 0.6 g/kg, and it remains an interesting issue 
for future research. 
Steele and colleagues (Steele & Southwick, 1985; Steele & Josephs, 1988, 1990) 
have focused on the effect of alcohol on attentional processes. They contend that 
intoxication restricts the focus of attention to the most salient cues in the 
environment with the consequence that other cues are not fully processed. There is 
some evidence for this. Thus, when participants are told to attend to stimuli in one 
modality whilst ignoring distractor stimuli in another, intoxicated participants (i.e. 
those administered 0.8 millilitres of ethanol per kilogram of body mass) perform 
better than their sober counterparts (e.g. Patel, 1988; Erblich & Earleywine, 1995). 
Similarly, in experimental tasks requiring participants to divide their attention 
across multiple tasks or locations, alcohol impairs performance on those tasks 
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considered to be least important (i.e. secondary tasks), whilst performance on 
primary tasks is relatively unaffected (Fisk & Scerbo, 1987). 
Research investigating the effect of acute alcohol on Delay Discounting (DD) is 
relatively scant and results are inconsistent. For example, Dougherty et al. (2008) 
reported that alcohol doses of 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 (but not 0.2) g/kg increased DD. 
Reynolds et al. (2006b) found that a dose of 0.8 but not 0.4 g/kg of alcohol 
increased impulsive decision-making in a novel Experiential Discounting Task (EDT); 
however, these effects were not apparent on a question-based DD task. Conversely, 
Ortner, MacDonald and Olmstead (2003) reported that following 0.7 g/kg of 
alcohol, participants tended to discount delayed rewards at lower rates than sober 
participants, and that blood alcohol level was inversely correlated with DD. Other 
studies, for instance one by Richards et al. (1999), have reported no relationship 
between intoxication and DD. 
There has been little attempt to systematically investigate the acute effects of 
alcohol on behavioural disinhibition in ‘real-world’ settings. Therefore, the present 
study sought to examine how recent alcohol intake was related to scores on the 
new measure of recent impulsivity. It was hypothesised that recent increases in 
drinking would be reflected in increased impulsiveness in daily life situations. 
3. The present study 
A core theme of this thesis is the way in which variations in impulsiveness might be 
related to responses to alcohol-related stimuli. The present study sought: i) to 
develop and pilot a Recent Impulsivity Scale (RIS); ii) to examine the associations 
between the RIS and a parallel Trait Impulsiveness Scale (the TIS); and iii) to 
examine the relative sensitivities of RIS and TIS to recent and habitual alcohol 
intake. 
The RIS was created by selecting items from a variety of existing self-report 
impulsiveness instruments and rephrasing them to capture the level of impulsive 
behaviour during the preceding two weeks. A trait version was also developed 
which contained the same items as the RIS but asked the respondent about their 
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general behaviour (i.e. without specifying a narrow time-frame). Both of the new 
scales were evaluated with respect to an existing widely-used trait impulsiveness 
scale, the BIS-11 (Patton et al., 1995). 
Hypotheses 
Test-retest stability was investigated by administering the questionnaires on two 
separate occasions one month apart. It was expected that stability would be greater 
for the TIS than the RIS. 
It was hypothesised that recent changes in alcohol consumption would be 
associated with fluctuations in impulsiveness to which the RIS would be more 
sensitive than the TIS. By the same logic, it was also predicted that habitual alcohol 
intake and trait impulsivity would be more strongly associated than habitual intake 
and recent impulsivity. To test this, participants were asked to indicate how their 
intake during the preceding two weeks had compared to their typical consumption 
in the preceding twelve months. 
In summary then, the specific hypotheses were as follows: 
i. The BIS-11 should correlate more highly with the TIS than the RIS; 
ii. The test-retest correlation for the RIS should be lower than for the TIS; 
iii. In all participants, habitual alcohol intake will share a greater correlation 
with the TIS, relative to the RIS; 
iv. Recent changes in alcohol consumption will be reflected in changes in 
impulsiveness in daily life, as tapped by scores on the RIS relative to the TIS. 
For this purpose, participants were categorised as either: 
a) Stable drinkers (SDs; no recent change in consumption compared to the 
preceding twelve months); 
b) Increasing drinkers (IDs; recent consumption greater than in the 
preceding 12 months), or; 
c) Decreasing drinkers (DDs; recent consumption smaller than in the 
preceding twelve months). 
It was predicted that: 
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i. In all participants, recent alcohol intake should correlate more highly 
with the RIS than the TIS; 
ii. Recent increases or decreases in alcohol consumption will be 
associated with corresponding recent changes in impulsivity, 
calculated by subtracting TIS score from current RIS score; 
iii. TIS and RIS scores would be more highly correlated with one another 
in stable drinkers than in IDs or DDs. 
Methods 
Design and procedure: The first part of the study developed two new 
questionnaires based on existing trait impulsiveness inventories. One was another 
trait questionnaire (Trait Impulsiveness Scale; TIS), the other a parallel short-term 
questionnaire (Recent Impulsiveness Scale; RIS). Both were administered to a large 
sample of first year undergraduate psychology students. They were subjected to 
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, and items which did not load strongly 
on the major factors were eliminated. The second part of the study tested the 
hypotheses specified above concerning their psychometric properties and 
associations with alcohol consumption. 
Participants completed the TIS, RIS and the BIS-11, and answered questions 
concerning typical and recent alcohol intake. These were given in fixed order. A 
subgroup of participants repeated the battery after a four-week interval. 
Ethical Approval: Approval for this study was given by the Ethics Committee at 
Goldsmiths College, University of London; participants gave informed written 
consent after reading an information sheet outlining the study. As required by the 
Helsinki Declaration (World Medical Association, 2002), individuals were assured of 
confidentiality and could terminate their participation at any stage. 
Participants: In total, 277 participants were recruited via the first year Psychology 
undergraduate ‘credit system’6 at Goldsmiths College (University of London), and 
                                                          
6
 Credit system: Students received course credit for taking part and, subsequent to their 
participation, writing a reflective commentary on this or another study in which they had been 
involved. 
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were thus relatively homogeneous with respect to age and educational attainment. 
They were drawn from two consecutive first-year psychology cohorts, with 145 
from the first, and 132 from the second. There were no exclusion criteria. 
Developing the new impulsivity scales 
It was decided to use ‘the previous two weeks’ as the frame of reference for 
measuring recent impulsivity because this period: i) is short enough for the 
respondent to recall his/her behaviours and experiences with reasonable clarity; ii) 
is long enough to provide sufficient opportunities for many specific impulsive 
behaviours to have occurred; and iii) it corresponds with the time period employed 
in other mood ‘state’ questionnaires such as the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, 
Steer & Carbin, 1988). 
In developing a measure with the potential to be sensitive to fluctuations in 
impulsive tendencies over relatively short time periods, it was necessary to identify 
behaviours or situations that are likely to occur on a day-to-day basis. The items of 
the widely-used and well-validated trait impulsiveness instruments listed below 
were scanned for items that were amenable to being converted into the ‘two-week’ 
format. 
 The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995; Appendix 1): 
Thirty questions concern control of thoughts and behaviour. Each item is measured 
on a four-point Likert scale, ranging from ‘rarely/never’ through to ‘almost always’. 
Some items are reverse-coded and a score of four indicates the most frequent 
impulsive response; therefore, the higher the subscale score, the higher the level of 
impulsiveness. An overall score is determined by summing the 30 items. The scale 
relates to a three-factor model of impulsivity, yielding indices of: (a) ‘motor 
impulsiveness’, measured by 11 items (e.g. ‘I do things without thinking’); (b) 
‘attentional impulsiveness’, measured by eight items (e.g. ‘I do not pay attention’); 
and (c) ‘non-planning impulsiveness’, measured by 11 items (e.g. ‘I plan tasks 
carefully’; reverse-coded). Patton et al. (1995) reported internal consistency 
coefficients ranging from 0.79 to 0.83. 
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 The EASI-III Impulsivity Scales (Buss & Plomin, 1984; Appendix 2): The EASI-
III is a self-report questionnaire which was designed to reflect Buss and Plomin’s 
(1975) ‘four temperament’ theory of personality: emotionality, activity, sociability 
and impulsivity. Impulsivity comprises four subscales: inhibitory control (e.g. ‘I have 
trouble controlling my impulses’); decision time (e.g. ‘I often say the first thing that 
comes into my mind’); sensation seeking (e.g. ‘I generally seek new and exciting 
experiences’); and persistence (e.g. ‘I generally like to see things through to the 
end’). Braithwaite et al. (1984) have reported reliability coefficients of 0.61, 0.40, 
0.46 and 0.54 for the four subscales, respectively. 
 The Functional and Dysfunctional Impulsivity Scales (Dickman, 1990; 
Appendix 3): Dickman (1990) contended that there are two separate impulsiveness 
traits. The first, ‘Functional Impulsivity’, refers to a tendency towards rapid 
responding in situations where accuracy is not critical, whilst ‘Dysfunctional 
Impulsivity’ refers to rapid responding which may have adverse consequences. 
Functional Impulsivity is assessed by 11 items, such as ‘I like to take part in really 
fast-paced conversations, where you don’t have much time to think before you 
speak’. Dysfunctional Impulsivity is assessed by 12 items, such as ‘I often make up 
my mind without taking the time to consider the situation from all angles’. 
Cronbach’s alphas of 0.83 and 0.86 have been reported for the two subscales 
(Dickman, 1990). 
 The I-7 Impulsiveness Questionnaire (I-7; Eysenck et al., 1985a; Appendix 4): 
The I-7 is a 54-item ‘yes or no’ inventory designed to measure Impulsiveness (e.g. 
‘Do you often buy things on impulse?’), Venturesomeness and Empathy. Only the 
impulsiveness subscale was searched for potential RIS items. Eysenck et al. (1985a) 
reported a reliability coefficient above 0.80 for this scale. 
 The Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance and Sensation Seeking Scales 
(UPPS; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001; Appendix 5): The UPPS is a 45-item self-report 
inventory derived from a factor analysis of several widely-used impulsiveness 
scales. ‘Urgency’ (twelve items) refers to the tendency to experience strong 
impulses, often under conditions of negative affect (e.g. ‘When I am upset I often 
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act without thinking’). ‘Premeditation’ (eleven items) taps the tendency to think 
and consider the potential consequences of an action before engaging in it (e.g. ‘I 
like to stop and think things over before I do them’). ‘Perseverance’ (ten items) is 
concerned with the individual’s ability to remain focused upon a task which may be 
boring or difficult (e.g. ‘I generally like to see things through to the end’). ‘Sensation 
Seeking’ measures the tendency to pursue and enjoy activities which are exciting or 
may be dangerous (e.g. ‘I quite enjoy taking risks’). Verdejo-García et al. (2007) have 
reported α coefficients between 0.77 and 0.91. 
The wording of some items in these trait impulsiveness instruments does not lend 
itself to the ‘previous two weeks’ format. For example, some are attitudinal: for 
example, ‘Would you agree that almost everything enjoyable is illegal or immoral?’ 
and, ‘Do you think an evening out is more successful if it is unplanned or arranged 
at the last moment?’7 Some other items were excluded because of the low 
likelihood of their having occurred within any given two week period – for example, 
‘I change jobs’ and, ‘I change residences’. 
The 68 items that were initially identified related to the existing scales as shown in 
Table 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 Several other scales including the SSS were also considered but the content or format of the 
questions did not lend themselves to re-framing in terms of frequency within the previous two 
weeks. 
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Table 2.1: Number of items drawn from traditional impulsiveness instruments 
Name of instrument Number of preliminary 
items taken 
Attentional Impulsiveness subscale (BIS-11) 4 
Motor Impulsiveness subscale (BIS-11) 5 
Non-Planning Impulsiveness subscale (BIS-11) 6 
I-7 Scale 14 
Urgency subscale (UPPS) 6 
Premeditation subscale (UPPS) 2 
Perseverance subscale (UPPS) 9 
Inhibitory Control subscale (EASI-III) 5 
Decision Time subscale (EASI-III) 4 
Sensation Seeking subscale (EASI-III) 1 
Persistence subscale (EASI-III) 5 
Dysfunctional Impulsivity Scale 7 
 
Narrowing down the preliminary set of items due to item similarity: Amongst the 
preliminary set of 68 items, there were many which although phrased differently, 
were very similar (see Table 2.2 on p. 64). For example, item 17 of the BIS-11 states, 
‘I act “on impulse”’, item 19 of the BIS-11 states, ‘I act on the spur of the moment’, 
item 4 of the I-7 asks, ‘Are you an impulsive person?’, and item 4 of the EASI-III 
Decision Time subscale states, ‘I often act on the spur of the moment’. 
In order to generate a reasonably brief instrument which tapped a wide range of 
the behaviours identified in existing measures but minimised redundancy and 
repetition, the researcher used his judgement to categorise the 68 items shown in 
Table 2.1 into 17 general themes, as set out in Table 2.2, then generating a single 
question which captured the essence of each theme. 
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Table 2.2: The preliminary set of 68 items taken from traditional impulsiveness scales, grouped by their underlying theme and the single RIS 
item which was produced in each case 
General theme of items Source instrument (item number) Resulting RIS item 
1. The tendency to do and 
say things without 
adequate prior thought 
I-7 (5); I-7 (2); I-7 (7); I-7 (17); BIS-11 (2); UPPS Premeditation (4); UPPS 
Premeditation (10); Dysfunctional Impulsivity (1); Dysfunctional 
Impulsivity (6); EASI-III Decision Time (1) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have 
thought carefully before doing and 
saying things’ (R) 
2. The tendency to be 
surprised at people’s 
reactions to things one does 
or says 
 
I-7 (12) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have been 
surprised at people’s reactions to 
things that I have done or said’ 
 
3. The ability to tolerate 
frustration 
 
UPPS Inhibitory Control (2); UPPS Inhibitory Control (3) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have 
become so frustrated when waiting, 
for example in a shop queue, that I 
have left’ 
4. The ability to concentrate UPPS Perseverance (5); BIS-11 (9) ‘In the last two weeks, I have found 
it easy to concentrate’ (R) 
5. The tendency to behave 
impulsively 
BIS-11 (17); BIS-11 (19); I-7 (4); I-7 (6); EASI-III Decision Time (4) ‘In the last two weeks, I have tended 
to act “on impulse”’ 
6. The tendency to work 
quickly at the expense of 
making potential mistakes 
 
I-7 (14) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have tended 
to work quickly, without bothering 
to check’ 
7. The tendency to plan 
things carefully before 
doing them 
 
BIS-11 (1); EASI-III Decision Time (5); Dysfunctional Impulsivity (8) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have 
planned work tasks and activities in 
my free time carefully’ (R) 
Table 2.2 continues over the page 
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Table 2.2 continued 
General theme of items Source instrument (item number) Resulting RIS item 
8. The tendency to think 
ahead to the future 
BIS-11 (27); BIS-11 (30) ‘In the last two weeks, I have found 
it difficult thinking ahead’ 
9. The ease of exercising 
self-control 
BIS-11 (8); I-7 (10); UPPS Urgency (1); UPPS Urgency (2); UPPS Urgency 
(8); UPPS Urgency (11); EASI-III Inhibitory Control (1); EASI-III Inhibitory 
Control (4) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have found 
it easy to exercise self-control’ (R) 
 
10. The tendency to see 
things (e.g. work tasks) 
through to the end 
EASI-III Persistence (1); UPPS Perseverance (1); UPPS Perseverance (2); 
UPPS Perseverance (3); UPPS Perseverance (4); UPPS Perseverance (6); 
UPPS Perseverance (8); UPPS Perseverance (9); UPPS Perseverance 
(10); EASI-III Persistence (3); EASI-III Persistence (4); EASI-III Persistence 
(5) 
 
‘In the last two weeks, I have been 
focused, seeing things through to 
the end’ (R) 
11. The tendency to 
encounter problems due to 
doing things without 
adequate prior thought 
 
I-7 (3); Dysfunctional Impulsivity (7); UPPS Urgency (12); Dysfunctional 
Impulsivity (12) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have 
encountered problems because I did 
things without thinking’ 
12. The tendency to spend 
money impulsively 
BIS-11 (25); Dysfunctional Impulsivity (4); BIS-11 (22); BIS-11 (10); I-7 
(1); EASI-III Inhibitory Control (5) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have spent 
more money than I should have’ 
13. The tendency to become 
restless when sitting (for a 
period of time) 
 
BIS-11 (28); BIS-11 (11) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have been 
restless when watching things, e.g. 
at the cinema / theatre, on 
television, at lectures’ 
Table 2.2 continues over the page 
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Table 2.2 continued 
General theme of items Source instrument (item number) Resulting RIS item 
14. The tendency to become 
involved with things which 
one subsequently either 
does not want to or cannot 
go through with 
 
 
I-7 (8); UPPS Urgency (3); Dysfunctional Impulsivity (3) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have 
become involved with something 
that I later wished I could have got 
out of’ 
15. The tendency to plan 
things well ahead of time 
 
BIS-11 (7); EASI-III Decision Time (3) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have 
planned events and activities well 
ahead of time’ (R) 
16. The tendency to 
frequently change one’s 
interests 
 
BIS-11 (24); I-7 (15); EASI-III Persistence (2) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have tended 
to jump from one interest to 
another’ 
17. The ease with which 
one becomes bored (when 
working) 
 
BIS-11 (18); EASI-III Sensation Seeking (5) 
‘In the last two weeks, I have 
become easily bored when working’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
Ordering of items: Finally, items were put into the pilot RIS questionnaire in an 
order so that conceptually very similar items (e.g. those involving some aspect of 
inhibitory control) were not adjacent. 
The response options of the RIS were the same as used in the BIS-11 and the UPPS 
and related to probability or frequency of acting in the specified way: 
‘Rarely/Never’, ‘Occasionally’, ‘Often’ and ‘Almost always/Always’). Some items 
were reverse-scored (indicated by R in Table 2.2). Responses were converted to 
numbers such that for every item scores from 0 to 3 represented increasing 
impulsivity. Appendix 6 shows the instrument in full. 
 The Trait Impulsivity Scale (TIS; see Appendix 7): This comprised the same 
items as the RIS but rephrased to reflect general response tendencies without 
reference to any specific timeframe. For example, whereas the RIS item would be 
‘In the last two weeks I have thought carefully before doing things’, the 
corresponding TIS item would be, ‘I think carefully before doing things’. The 
response options were the same as for the RIS. 
Alcohol Intake 
As participants were completing these questionnaires as part of a very extensive 
battery for the course credit system, it was unfortunately not possible to gather 
very precise or complex data concerning their background histories or alcohol/other 
substance use. It was therefore decided to restrict the questions to two very 
straightforward questions, namely: 
1) Habitual alcohol intake: Participants were asked to give the number of units of 
alcohol that they had typically consumed within an average week during the 
preceding twelve months. There were nine response options, coded as follows: 0 = 
‘None’; 1 = ‘1-4’; 2 = ‘5-8’; 3 = ‘9-12’; 4 = ‘13-16’; 5 = ‘17-20’; 6 = ‘21-24’; 7 = ‘25-28’; 
and 8 = ‘29+’, and; 
2) Alcohol intake within the previous two weeks (compared to the previous twelve 
months): Participants were asked to indicate how their alcohol intake in the 
preceding two weeks had compared to their alcohol intake over the preceding 
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twelve months. Participants responded on the following 5-point scale: -2 = ‘A lot 
less’; -1 = ‘A bit less’; 0 = ‘No change’; 1 = ‘A bit more’; and 2 = ‘A lot more’. 
In hindsight it would have been desirable to collect more precise information 
concerning recent intake, but this was a preliminary study in which the issue of 
alcohol use was initially only a minor issue. 
Order of tests 
This is shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: Schematic overview of design and order of assessments at Times 1 and 2 
for Cohorts 1 (n = 145) and 2 (n = 132) 
 
Assessments (in order) 
Time 1 (N = 277; 
Cohort 1 = 145, 
Cohort 2 = 132) 
Time 2 (N = 200; 
Cohort 1 = 112, 
Cohort 2 = 88) 
RIS     
Demographics   - 
- 
BIS-11     
Alcohol consumption within the 
preceding 12 months 
  - 
Change in alcohol consumption 
within the previous 2 weeks 
    
TIS     
 
Data analysis 
Examining the composition of the TIS and RIS scales: In order to reduce the data, an 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was first conducted upon participants’ scores for 
the TIS at Time 1. Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFAs) were subsequently 
performed upon the TIS at Time 2 and the RIS at Time 1. Given that the RIS was 
designed to capture fluctuations in impulsivity, it was expected that the CFAs on the 
RIS data at both Times 1 and 2 would indicate a structure similar to, though less 
stable than, the FAs performed upon the TIS at both times. 
Correlations between scales: Pearson’s product-moment correlations (1-tailed) with 
listwise exclusion were carried out between the RIS, TIS and BIS-11 scores. Dunn 
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and Clark’s (1969) Z1
* statistic for comparing two dependent correlations measured 
on the same participants was then used to examine whether the correlations were 
significantly different in size. 
Test-retest reliability of the TIS and RIS scales and subscales: Pearson’s product-
moment test-retest correlations (1-tailed) with listwise exclusion were carried out 
for T1 and T2 scores on each RIS and TIS scale and subscale. Steiger’s (1980) Z 
statistic for comparing two independent correlations in the same participants then 
examined whether the test-retest correlations for corresponding RIS and TIS 
subscales differed in magnitude. 
Sensitivity of the RIS and TIS scales and subscales to changes in alcohol intake within 
the previous two weeks: This was examined in four sets of analyses performed upon 
data from Time 1. These will be explained in the Results section. 
Results 
Number of participants who completed the measures/instruments at Time 1 and 
Time 2: Table 2.4 shows the numbers of participants contributing data on each 
measure at Times 1 and 2. 
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Table 2.4: Numbers (and percentages) of participants with data on each variable at 
Time 1 and Time 2 
 Time 1 
Total N = 277 
 
Time 2 
Total N = 200 
Measure/instrument Number of participants 
with complete data 
Number of participants 
with complete data 
Age (years) 262 (94.58%) n/a 
Gender (male/female) 262 (94.58%) n/a 
Drinking status (social 
drinker/abstainer) 
259 (93.50%) n/a 
Typical weekly alcohol intake 
of social drinkers (units per 
week during previous 12 
months) 
 
259 (93.50%) 
 
n/a 
Alcohol intake during previous 
2 weeks compared to intake 
during previous 12 months (‘A 
lot more’ / ‘A bit more’ / ‘No 
change’ / ‘A bit less’ / ‘A lot 
less’) 
 
 
253 (91.34%) 
 
 
191 (68.95%) 
RIS scale 277 (100%) 200 (72.20%) 
TIS scale 270 (97.47%) 196 (70.76%) 
BIS-11 scale 261 (94.22%) 199 (71.84%) 
 
Demographic and alcohol-related characteristics: Table 2.5 shows the 
demographic and alcohol-related characteristics of the whole sample that 
completed the battery at Time 1. Some participants omitted to provide some 
information, but overall there was relatively little missing data. 
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Table 2.5: Demographic and alcohol-related characteristics of the whole sample of 
participants who completed the whole instrument battery at Time 1 (N = 277) 
Variable Valid N 
Age (years) 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
20.24 (4.85) 
18 – 60 
 
262 
Gender (male: female)                                                                       211:51 262 
Drinking status (social drinkers: 
abstainers)                                          
183:76 259 
Typical weekly alcohol intake of social 
drinkers (units per week during 
previous 12 months) 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
 
 
2.58 (1.52) 
‘1-4’ – ‘29+’ 
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Section 1: Structure of the Trait Impulsiveness Scale (TIS) and the Recent 
Impulsivity Scale (RIS) 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the TIS at Time 1: 
Principal factors extraction with varimax rotation was performed upon the 17 items 
of the TIS. A preliminary principal factors extraction was used prior to the principal 
factors extraction-proper to estimate number of components, and to check for 
presence of multivariate outliers, absence of multicollinearity and factorisability of 
the correlation matrices. 
Using an α = 0.001 cut-off level, eight participants’ scores identified them as 
multivariate outliers. These cases were deleted from the principal factors 
extraction, leaving 262 participants. There was no evidence of multicollinearity. 
Factorisability of the initial correlation matrix was acceptable as: there were 
numerous correlations in the correlation matrix which exceeded 0.3 (see Appendix 
8); Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, indicating that some correlations in 
the original matrix were greater than 0; the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy (MSA) was 0.83 (factorisability is widely considered to be 
acceptable if this figure is above 0.6); and the partial correlations between each pair 
of variables tended to be close to zero. For further details of these issues see 
Tabachnik and Fidell (2007). 
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There were four factors with initial eigenvalues above one (see Table 2.6 and Figure 
2.1). However, two of these factors were each loaded onto by only 2 items, making 
them potentially unstable and incapable of replication in CFA, which requires a 
minimum of three items. It was decided on this basis to select a two-factor solution. 
Table 2.6: Initial eigenvalues, percentages of variance and cumulative percentages 
of variance for first four factors 
 
Factors 
 
Initial eigenvalue 
Percentage of 
variance 
Cumulative 
percentage of 
variance 
1 4.24 24.95 24.95 
2 1.92 11.32 36.27 
3 1.48 8.69 44.96 
4 1.13 6.67 51.63 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Scree Plot of the 17 items of the TIS at Time 1 (N = 262) 
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The data were reasonably well-described by this two-factor solution. Communality 
values (see Table 2.7) tended to be moderate. 
One of the aims was to derive a reasonably concise scale which would be quick to 
administer on repeated occasions. A decision was therefore made to reduce the 
total number of items by retaining only those which loaded highly (> 0.50) on one of 
the two factors and which did not cross-load. In practice, as shown in Table 2.7, the 
0.50 cut-off led to the retention of four items on each factor; no variable loaded at 
more than half this level on the other factor. 
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Table 2.7: Factor loadings, communalities (h2) and percentages of variance and 
covariance explained for exploratory principal factors extraction and varimax 
rotation on the 17 TIS items at Time 1 (N = 262) 
Item Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
Motor 
Impulsivity 
h2 
I plan work tasks and activities in my free 
time carefully. 
0.67 0.05 0.46 
I am focused, seeing things through to 
the end. 
0.67 0.24 0.50 
I plan events and activities well ahead of 
time. 
0.57 0.06 0.33 
I think carefully before doing and saying 
things. 
0.55 0.26 0.37 
    I encounter problems because I do things 
without stopping to think. 
0.20 0.64 0.45 
I become involved with things that I later 
wish I could get out of. 
0.19 0.55 0.34 
I tend to jump from one interest to 
another. 
0.10 0.54 0.30 
I tend to act ‘on impulse’. 0.12 0.50 0.27 
    I find it difficult thinking ahead. 0.45 0.12 0.22 
 I find it easy to exercise self-control. 0.45 0.30 0.29 
 I find it easy to concentrate. 0.43 0.25 0.25 
I tend to work quickly, without bothering 
to check. 
-0.33 0.17 0.14 
I am surprised at people’s reactions to 
things that I do or say. 
-0.01 0.43 0.19 
I become easily bored when working. 0.29 0.40 0.24 
I get restless when watching things, e.g. 
at the cinema / theatre, on television, at 
lectures. 
0.12 0.38 0.16 
I spend more money than I should do. 0.21 0.37 0.18 
I become so frustrated when waiting, for 
example in a shop queue, that I leave. 
-0.04 0.35 0.13 
    Percentage of variance explained 14.94 13.68  
Percentage of covariance explained 52.20 47.80  
 
Based on consideration of the item content, the two factors were provisionally 
labelled ‘Cognitive Impulsivity’ (CI) and ‘Motor Impulsivity’ (MI). All subsequent 
analyses relate to the eight items in these two subscales; total score is the sum of 
these items. 
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Internal reliability: The alpha coefficient of 0.72 for the total TIS score is considered 
acceptable (George & Mallery, 2003). 
Component inter-correlations: Pearson’s product-moment correlations (2-tailed) 
with listwise exclusion were calculated between the two subscale scores and 
between each subscale score and the total score. As shown in Table 2.8, all were 
significant, though that between the two subscales was fairly low, consistent with 
the emergence of orthogonal factors. 
Table 2.8: Pearson’s product-moment correlations (2-tailed) between each pair of 
component subscale scores at Time 1 (N = 270) 
Pair of scales/subscales correlated Correlation (r) p 
CI and MI subscales 0.28 < 0.01 
Total TIS scale and CI subscale 0.80 < 0.01 
Total TIS scale and MI subscale 0.80 < 0.01 
 
Test-retest reliability: In the 191 participants who completed the TIS at both Times 
1 (T1) and 2 (T2), Pearson’s product-moment correlations (2-tailed) with listwise 
exclusion were calculated for the T1 and T2 total score and for each component 
subscale score. As shown in Table 2.9, all test-retest correlations were significant, 
and moderate in size. 
Table 2.9: Pearson’s product-moment correlations (2-tailed) for the total TIS scale 
score and each component subscale score between Time 1 and Time 2 (N = 191) 
Scale/subscale test-retest correlated Correlation (r) p 
CI subscale 0.51 < 0.01 
MI subscale 0.55 < 0.01 
TIS Total scale 0.63 < 0.01 
 
Confirmatory FA (CFA) on the TIS at Time 2: A CFA, based on the T2 data from 196 
participants, was performed through MPlus on the eight items of the newly-
abbreviated TIS. 
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Assumptions: The assumptions of multivariate normality and linearity were 
evaluated. Using Mahalanobis distance, two participants were multivariate outliers 
(p < 0.001), and were thus excluded. There were no missing data. 
Model estimation: Maximum Likelihood Ratio (MLR) estimation was employed to 
estimate the model. χ2 (df = 19) was 34.51 (p = 0.02), indicating that the observed 
covariance matrix did not match the estimated covariance matrix within sampling 
variance. However, there are several problems with using this test alone to estimate 
fit (Hair et al., 2008), and it is therefore important to consider other fit statistics as 
well. In terms of ‘absolute’ fit measures, the value for Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) was 0.07, which indicates a good fit. A second absolute fit 
statistic, the normed χ2, was 1.82 – again considered very good. This measure is the 
chi-square value divided by the degrees of freedom. The most widely-used 
‘incremental’ fit index, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), was 0.94, exceeding the 
recommended cutoff of 0.90 for confirming fit. 
The standardised factor loadings for each item onto its corresponding factor, as well 
as the corresponding Z values, are presented in Table 2.10. All but one (item 16) of 
the standardised loadings exceeded 0.5, and this item loaded at 0.48. No loadings 
were more than 0.1 below those found in the EFA on T1 data. On balance, 
therefore, the CFA suggested a good fit to the data. 
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Table 2.10: Standardised factor loadings (SLs; TIS T1 loadings in parentheses for 
comparison), standard errors (SEs) and Z values for confirmatory factor analysis 
with maximum likelihood ratio estimation on TIS items at Time 2 (N = 194) 
Construct Item SL (T1) SE Z 
value 
 
 
 
Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
 I plan work tasks and 
activities in my free time 
carefully. 
 
0.69 (0.67) 
 
-a 
 
-a 
 I am focused, seeing things 
through to the end. 
0.57 (0.67) 0.17 4.76 
I plan events and activities 
well ahead of time. 
0.66 (0.57) 0.10 9.20 
I think carefully before doing 
and saying things. 
0.64 (0.55) 0.22 4.05 
      
 
 
 
Motor 
Impulsivity 
I encounter problems 
because I do things without 
stopping to think. 
 
0.73 (0.64) 
 
-a 
 
-a 
I become involved with things 
that I later wish I could get 
out of. 
 
0.65 (0.55) 
 
0.15 
 
6.28 
 I tend to jump from one 
interest to another. 
0.48 (0.54) 0.12 4.96 
I tend to act ‘on impulse’. 0.61 (0.50) 0.14 6.30 
a
Not estimated when loading set to fixed value (i.e. 1.0). 
CFA on the RIS at Time 1: 
A CFA, following the same processes as described for TIS-T2, was conducted on the 
RIS at T1. 
Assumptions: The assumptions of multivariate normality and linearity were 
evaluated. Using Mahalanobis distance, one participant was a multivariate outlier, p 
< 0.001 and was excluded. There were no missing data for the remaining 276 
participants. 
Model estimation: Maximum Likelihood Ratio (MLR) estimation yielded a χ2 (df = 19) 
of 27.41 (ns; p > 0.10); thus, the observed covariance matrix matched the estimated 
covariance matrix within sampling variance. Three other measures also confirmed 
the good fit of the model to the TIS T2 data. Thus, two indices of ‘absolute’ fit 
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(RMSEA, 0.04; normed χ2, 1.44) and one of ‘incremental’ fit, the CFI (0.96) all fell 
above or below the cutoffs recommended by Hair et al. (2008). The CFA therefore 
suggested that the measurement model provided a good fit. 
The standardised factor loadings for each item onto its corresponding factor, as well 
as the accompanying Z values, are shown in Table 2.11. Most of the standardised 
loadings were above 0.5, and all were above 0.40; all loadings were significant, as 
indicated by Z values above 1.96. For only one item (‘I have been focused, seeing 
things through to the end’) was the loading markedly lower than in the EFA (0.51 
versus 0.67). The CFA therefore suggested that the measurement model provided a 
good fit to the data. 
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Table 2.11: Standardised factor loadings (SLs; TIS Time 1 loadings in parentheses for 
comparison), standard errors (SEs) and Z values for confirmatory factor analysis 
with maximum likelihood ratio estimation on RIS items at Time 1 (N = 276) 
Construct Item SL (TI) SE Z 
value 
 
 
 
Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
 I have planned work tasks 
and activities in my free time 
carefully. 
 
0.70 (0.67) 
 
-a 
 
-a 
 I have been focused, seeing 
things through to the end. 
0.51 (0.67) 0.14 4.43 
I have planned events and 
activities well ahead of time. 
0.60 (0.57) 0.12 7.13 
I have thought carefully 
before doing and saying 
things. 
 
0.52 (0.55) 
 
0.13 
 
4.59 
      
 
 
 
Motor 
Impulsivity 
I have encountered problems 
because I did things without 
stopping to think. 
 
0.64 (0.64) 
 
-a 
 
-a 
I have become involved with 
things that I later wished I 
could have got out of. 
 
0.44 (0.55) 
 
0.21 
 
3.76 
 I have tended to jump from 
one interest to another. 
0.41 (0.54) 0.21 3.04 
I have tended to act ‘on 
impulse’. 
0.47 (0.54) 0.22 3.51 
a
Not estimated when loading set to fixed value (i.e. 1.0). 
CFAs within each gender: Given the gender imbalance, and for interest, CFAs were 
performed upon the TIS at Time 2 within women and men separately, following the 
same approach as described above. 
a) CFA on the TIS at Time 2 in women (n = 149): 
Using Mahalanobis distance, one participant was a multivariate outlier, p < 0.001 
and was excluded. There were no missing data for the remaining 148 participants. 
Maximum Likelihood Ratio (MLR) estimation yielded a χ2 (df = 19) of 23.34 (ns; p > 
0.10); thus, the observed covariance matrix matched the estimated covariance 
matrix within sampling variance. Three other measures also confirmed the good fit 
of the model to the SIS T1 data. Thus, two indices of ‘absolute’ fit (RMSEA, 0.04; 
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normed χ2, 1.23) and one of ‘incremental’ fit, the CFI (0.98) all fell above or below 
the cutoffs recommended by Hair et al. (2008). 
The standardised factor loadings for each item onto its corresponding factor, as well 
as the accompanying Z values, are presented in Table 2.12. Most of the 
standardised loadings were above 0.5, and all were greater than 0.40; all loadings 
were significant, as indicated by Z values above 1.96. The measurement model thus 
provided a good fit to the data. 
Table 2.12: Standardised factor loadings (SLs; TIS Time 1 loadings in parentheses for 
comparison), standard errors (SEs) and Z values for confirmatory factor analysis 
with maximum likelihood ratio estimation on TIS items at Time 2 in females (N = 
148) 
Construct Item SL (TI) SE Z 
value 
 
 
 
Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
 I plan work tasks and 
activities in my free time 
carefully. 
 
0.69 (0.67) 
 
-a 
 
-a 
 I am focused, seeing things 
through to the end. 
0.61 (0.67) 0.16 5.34 
I plan events and activities 
well ahead of time. 
0.64 (0.57) 0.11 7.82 
I think carefully before doing 
and saying things. 
0.62 (0.55) 0.20 4.29 
      
 
 
 
Motor 
Impulsivity 
I encounter problems 
because I do things without 
stopping to think. 
 
0.82 (0.64) 
 
-a 
 
-a 
I become involved with 
things that I later wish I could 
get out of. 
 
0.65 (0.55) 
 
0.15 
 
5.92 
 I tend to jump from one 
interest to another. 
0.46 (0.54) 0.11 4.53 
I tend to act ‘on impulse’. 0.59 (0.54) 0.13 5.76 
aNot estimated when loading set to fixed value (i.e. 1.0). 
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CFA on the TIS at Time 2 in men (n = 44): 
Using Mahalanobis distance, no participants were multivariate outliers, p < 0.001. 
There were no missing data for the 44 participants. 
Maximum Likelihood Ratio (MLR) estimation yielded a χ2 (df = 19) of 21.17 (ns; p > 
0.10); thus, the observed covariance matrix matched the estimated covariance 
matrix within sampling variance. Three other measures also confirmed the good fit 
of the model to the SIS T1 data. Thus, two indices of ‘absolute’ fit (RMSEA, 0.05; 
normed χ2, 1.11) and one of ‘incremental’ fit, the CFI (0.96) all fell above or below 
the cutoffs recommended by Hair et al. (2008). 
The standardised factor loadings for each item onto its corresponding factor, as well 
as the accompanying Z values, are presented in Table 2.13. Most of the 
standardised loadings were above 0.5, and all were equal to or greater than 0.40; 
with the exception of one item (‘I think carefully before doing and saying things’), all 
loadings were significant, as indicated by Z values above 1.96. The measurement 
model therefore provided a good fit to the data. 
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Table 2.13: Standardised factor loadings (SLs; TIS Time 1 loadings in parentheses for 
comparison), standard errors (SEs) and Z values for confirmatory factor analysis 
with maximum likelihood ratio estimation on TIS items at Time 2 in males (N = 44) 
Construct Item SL (TI) SE Z 
value 
 
 
 
Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
 I plan work tasks and 
activities in my free time 
carefully. 
 
0.40 (0.67) 
 
-a 
 
-a 
 I am focused, seeing things 
through to the end. 
0.51 (0.67) 0.53 2.34 
I plan events and activities 
well ahead of time. 
0.49 (0.57) 0.40 2.80 
I think carefully before doing 
and saying things. 
0.92 (0.55) 1.36 1.78 
      
 
 
 
Motor 
Impulsivity 
I encounter problems 
because I do things without 
stopping to think. 
 
0.47 (0.64) 
 
-a 
 
-a 
I become involved with things 
that I later wish I could get 
out of. 
 
0.64 (0.55) 
 
0.80 
 
2.10 
 I tend to jump from one 
interest to another. 
0.61 (0.54) 0.73 2.08 
I tend to act ‘on impulse’. 0.60 (0.54) 0.83 2.07 
a
Not estimated when loading set to fixed value (i.e. 1.0). 
Multi-group CFA on the TIS at Time 2: 
A multi-group CFA, based on the T2 data from 193 participants, was performed 
through MPlus on the TIS at T2. 
Using Mahalanobis distance, two participants were identified as multivariate 
outliers, p < 0.001, and were excluded. There were no missing data for the 
remaining 191 participants. 
Maximum Likelihood Ratio (MLR) estimation yielded a χ2 (df = 50) of 66.83 (p = 
0.06); thus, the observed covariance matrix did not match the estimated covariance 
matrix within sampling variance. However, given the problems with using this test 
alone to estimate fit (Hair et al., 2008), other fit statistics were also considered. In 
terms of ‘absolute’ fit measures, the value for RMSEA was 0.06, indicating a good 
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fit. A second ‘absolute’ fit measure, the normed χ2, was 1.34 (any value below 2 is 
considered very good). The most widely-used ‘incremental’ fit index, the CFI, was 
0.94, easily exceeding the cutoff of 0.90. 
The standardised factor loadings for each item onto its corresponding factor, 
together with the corresponding Z values, for females and for males, are presented 
in Table 2.14. In females, all but one (‘I tend to act “on impulse”’) of the 
standardised loadings were above 0.50, and even this item loaded at 0.49; and all 
loadings were significant, as indicated by Z values above 1.96. The same pattern was 
observed in males; although ‘I have tended to act “on impulse”’ here loaded 
somewhat lower at 0.38, it was nevertheless significant, as indicated by its Z value 
of 5.26. On balance, therefore, the multi-group CFA suggested a good fit to the 
data.
84 
 
Table 2.14: Standardised factor loadings (SLs; TIS Time 1 loadings in parentheses for comparison), standard errors (SEs) and Z values for 
confirmatory factor analysis with maximum likelihood ratio estimation on TIS items at Time 2 in females and males (N = 191) 
Construct Item SL (TI) SEa Z value 
  Females Males  Females Males 
 
 
 
 
Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
 I plan work tasks and 
activities in my free time 
carefully. 
 
0.65 (0.67) 
 
0.62 (0.67) 
 
-b 
 
-b 
 
-b 
 I am focused, seeing things 
through to the end. 
0.69 (0.67) 0.62 (0.67) 0.27 3.93 3.93 
I plan events and activities 
well ahead of time. 
0.59 (0.57) 0.54 (0.57) 0.14 6.43 6.43 
I think carefully before doing 
and saying things. 
 
0.66 (0.55) 
 
0.63 (0.55) 
 
0.24 
 
4.59 
 
4.07 
        
 
 
 
Motor 
Impulsivity 
I encounter problems 
because I do things without 
stopping to think. 
 
0.62 (0.64) 
 
0.50 (0.64) 
 
-b 
 
-b 
 
-b 
I become involved with things 
that I later wish I could get 
out of. 
 
0.76 (0.55) 
 
0.67 (0.55) 
 
0.18 
 
3.76 
 
6.32 
 I tend to jump from one 
interest to another. 
0.67 (0.54) 0.60 (0.54) 0.20 3.04 5.54 
I tend to act ‘on impulse’. 0.49 (0.54) 0.38 (0.54) 0.12 3.51 5.26 
aEqual across females and males; 
b
Not estimated when loading set to fixed value (i.e. 1.0).
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Section 2: Hypothesis testing 
Table 2.15 summarises the RIS, TIS and BIS-11 scores at T1. 
Table 2.15: Personality characteristics of the whole sample of undergraduate 
participants who completed the whole instrument battery at Time 1 (N = 277) 
Variable Valid N 
RIS CI 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
5.55 (2.01) 
0 – 10 
 
277 
RIS MI 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
5.18 (2.09) 
0 – 11 
 
277 
RIS Total scale 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
10.74 (3.17) 
1 – 20 
 
277 
TIS CI 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
5.42 (2.18) 
0 – 12 
 
270 
TIS MI 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
4.97 (2.19) 
0 – 12 
 
270 
TIS Total scale 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
10.39 (3.49) 
1 – 24 
 
270 
BIS-11 Attentional Impulsiveness 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
16.93 (3.86) 
9 – 30 
 
261 
BIS-11 Motor Impulsiveness 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
22.34 (4.59) 
13 – 37 
 
261 
BIS-11 Non-Planning Impulsiveness 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
26.39 (4.85) 
15 – 40 
 
261 
BIS-11 Total scale 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
65.66 (10.58) 
39 – 100 
 
261 
Values are mean (± SD). 
The subsample of 277 participants was aged between 18 and 60 years; fifteen 
participants did not give their age. It can be seen from the table that only 51 
(19.47%) of participants were male; again, fifteen participants did not provide 
gender data. This gender imbalance is not surprising given the typical over-
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representation of females to males in undergraduate psychology degrees. As 
evident from the table, 76 participants (29.34%) reported abstention from alcohol. 
Table 2.16 summarises female and male participants’ scores on the TIS and RIS 
subscales and scales at Time 1. As demonstrated by the table, there were no 
differences between females and males in terms of scores on any of the TIS and RIS 
subscales and scales. 
Table 2.16: Personality characteristics of female and male undergraduate 
participants who completed the whole instrument battery at Time 1 
 
Variable 
N (females 
versus 
males) 
 
Females 
 
Males  
Females 
versus males 
t p 
TIS CI subscale 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
205:50 
 
5.38 (2.27) 
0 – 12 
 
5.54 (1.67) 
1 – 9 
 
-0.48 
 
ns 
TIS MI subscale 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
205:50 
 
4.96 (2.14) 
0 – 12 
 
4.92 (2.36) 
0 – 9 
 
0.11 
 
 
ns 
TIS Total scale 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
205:50 
 
10.33 (3.44) 
2 – 24 
 
10.46 (3.39) 
1 – 17 
 
-0.24 
 
ns 
RIS CI subscale 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
211:51 
 
5.46 (2.01) 
0 – 10 
 
5.73 (2.08) 
1 – 10 
 
-0.84 
 
ns 
RIS MI subscale 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
211:51 
 
5.11 (2.04) 
0 – 11 
 
5.27 (2.25) 
0 – 10 
 
-0.51 
 
ns 
RIS Total scale 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
 
211:51 
 
10.57 (3.04) 
2 – 20 
 
11.00 (3.52) 
1 – 19 
 
-0.88 
 
ns 
87 
 
TIS and RIS subscales and scales 
Figures 2.2 i) to iii) show the distributions of scores on the TIS and RIS for the whole 
sample of undergraduates at Time 1. It can be seen that all scores were broadly 
normally distributed. 
 
Figure 2.2 i): Histograms showing normality of the TIS and RIS CI subscales at Time 1 
 
 
Figure 2.2 ii): Histograms showing normality of the TIS and RIS MI subscales at Time 
1 
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Figure 2.2 iii): Histograms showing normality of the TIS and RIS total scales at Time 
1 
Figures 2.3 i) to iii) show the distributions of scores on the TIS subscales and scale 
for females and males at Time 1. 
  
Figure 2.3 i): Histograms of the TIS CI subscale in females (left) and males (right) 
  
Figure 2.3 ii): Histograms of the TIS MI subscale in females (left) and males (right) 
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Figure 2.3 iii): Histograms of the TIS Total scale in females (left) and males (right) 
Table 2.17 shows statistics confirming normality for scores on the TIS and RIS for the 
whole sample of undergraduates at Time 1. 
Table 2.17: Mean (SE) skewness and kurtosis statistics for scores on the TIS and RIS 
for the whole sample of undergraduates at Time 1 (N = 277) 
Normality 
statistic 
TIS 
Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
TIS Motor 
Impulsivity 
TIS 
Total 
RIS 
Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
RIS Motor 
Impulsivity 
RIS 
Total 
Skewness 0.11 (0.15) 0.40 (0.15) 0.29 
(0.15) 
0.13 (0.15) 0.07 (0.15) 0.13 
(0.15) 
Kurtosis 0.51 (0.30) 0.26 (0.30) 0.48 
(0.30) 
-0.21 (0.29) 0.03 (0.29) 0.33 
(0.29) 
Valid N 270 270 270 277 277 277 
Missing 7 7 7 0 0 0 
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Alcohol intake within the previous two weeks compared to the previous twelve 
months 
Figure 2.4 shows a histogram of responses concerning ‘Alcohol intake within the 
previous two weeks compared to the previous twelve months’. There was a slight 
negative skew, with participants tending to report an increase in recent drinking, 
but the distribution was not significantly non-normal (skewness = -0.21; kurtosis = -
1.17). 
 
Figure 2.4: Histogram demonstrating normality of the variable ‘Alcohol Intake 
within the Previous Two Weeks (Compared to the Previous Twelve Months)’ 
Hypothesis-testing: Each of the hypotheses set out on pages 58 to 59 is 
recapitulated below, followed by the corresponding analysis/analyses. 
Hypothesis 1: The BIS-11 should correlate more highly with the TIS than the RIS 
In the 254 participants with complete data at Time 1, and excluding data listwise, 
the 1-tailed Pearson’s correlation between BIS-11 Total and TIS Total was 0.75 (p < 
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0.01) and that between BIS-11 Total and RIS Total was 0.68 (p < 0.01). Dunn & 
Clark’s (1969) Z1
* statistic indicates that the former correlation is significantly 
greater than the latter [Z1
* = -2.31; p = 0.01, 1-tailed]. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was 
supported. 
Hypothesis 2: The test-retest correlation for the RIS should be lower than for the 
TIS 
Pearson’s product-moment correlations (1-tailed) with listwise exclusion were 
carried out between each pair of variables (see Table 2.18). There were 191 
participants with complete data for these analyses. 
Table 2.18: Pearson’s product-moment test-re-test correlations for trait and recent 
subscales and scales (N = 191) 
 Test-retest correlations Differences between TIS and 
RIS test-retest correlations 
Scale/subscale TIS STIS Z value p value (1-
tailed) 
Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
0.51* 0.51* 0.00 ns 
Motor 
Impulsivity 
0.55* 0.48* 1.15 0.13 
*Correlation significant at the p < 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
Test-retest correlations were moderate and significant for all scores on both TIS and 
RIS, with the MI correlation being slightly but not significantly higher for the TIS 
than the RIS. There was no difference for Cognitive Impulsivity. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
Hypothesis 3): In all participants, habitual alcohol intake will share a greater 
correlation with the TIS, relative to the RIS 
Amongst the 253 participants with complete data, there were no differences 
between the correlations of: i) habitual alcohol intake and TIS Cognitive Impulsivity 
(r = 0.09, p = 0.08) compared to habitual alcohol intake and RIS Cognitive Impulsivity 
(r = 0.16, p < 0.01) (Z1
* = -1.27, ns), or; ii) habitual alcohol intake and TIS Motor 
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Impulsivity (r = 0.11, p < 0.05) compared to habitual alcohol intake and RIS Motor 
Impulsivity (r = 0.16, p < 0.01) (Z1
*  = -0.98, ns). 
Hypothesis 4): Recent changes in alcohol consumption will be reflected in changes 
in impulsiveness in daily life, as tapped by scores on the RIS relative to the TIS 
In the following analyses, 76 participants who reported no alcohol consumption in 
the preceding 12 months were excluded. 
i) In all participants, recent alcohol intake should correlate more highly with the 
RIS than the TIS 
Pearson’s product-moment correlations (1-tailed) were performed between recent 
alcohol intake and the TIS and RIS subscales in the 178 participants with complete 
Time 1 data (see Table 2.19). Dunn & Clark’s (1969) Z1
* statistic for comparing two 
dependent correlations was used to examine the significance of the differences 
between the correlations. 
Table 2.19: Pearson’s product-moment correlations between recent alcohol intake 
and trait and recent impulsivity subscales and scales (N = 178) 
 Correlation with recent 
alcohol intake 
Differences between TIS and 
RIS test-retest correlations 
Scale/subscale TIS RIS Z1
* value p value (1-
tailed) 
Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
0.09† 0.10† 0.15 ns 
Motor 
Impulsivity 
0.19* 0.36* 2.69 < 0.01 
*Correlation significant at the p ≤ 0.01 level; †Trend – p ≤ 0.10. 
Amongst the 178 participants with complete data, the correlation between recent 
alcohol intake and RIS Motor Impulsivity was significantly larger than that between 
recent alcohol intake and TIS Motor Impulsivity. There was no difference between 
the correlations of recent alcohol intake within the previous 2 weeks and RIS 
Cognitive Impulsivity and recent alcohol intake and TIS Cognitive Impulsivity. 
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ii) Recent increases or decreases in alcohol consumption will be associated with 
corresponding recent changes in impulsivity, calculated by subtracting TIS score 
from current RIS score 
In the 138 participants with complete data at Time 1, and excluding data listwise, 
the 1-tailed Pearson’s correlation between the Motor Impulsivity ‘change’ variable 
and alcohol intake within the previous 2 weeks was 0.24 (p < 0.01); thus, RIS Motor 
Impulsivity increased with greater levels of recent drinking. Whilst this was 
consistent with the hypothesis, the same was not true for Cognitive Impulsivity, 
where the corresponding correlation was 0.03 (ns). 
iii) TIS and RIS scores should be more highly correlated with one another in stable 
drinkers than in increasing drinkers or decreasing drinkers 
Pearson’s product-moment correlations (1-tailed) were conducted on Time 1 data 
between the TIS and RIS separately in 35 participants who maintained that there 
had been no change in their weekly alcohol consumption and 143 who said it had 
either increased or decreased (see Table 2.20). Cohen & Cohen’s (2003) formula for 
comparing two independent correlations was used to examine the significance of 
the differences between the correlations. 
Table 2.20: Correlations between TIS and RIS scales and subscales in participants 
with stable versus changing patterns of alcohol consumption 
  
Correlations in subgroups 
Comparison of correlations 
in stable drinkers versus 
changers 
 
Variables 
Stable 
drinkers  
(n = 35) 
Changers  
(n = 143) 
 
Z value 
p value (1-
tailed) 
TIS Cognitive 
Impulsivity and 
RIS Cognitive 
Impulsivity 
 
0.80 
 
0.59 
 
2.15 
 
0.02 
TIS Motor 
Impulsivity and 
RIS Motor 
Impulsivity 
 
0.57 
 
0.61 
 
-0.31 
 
ns 
All correlations significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
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To summarise, the TIS and RIS Cognitive Impulsivity subscales, as hypothesised, 
were more strongly correlated in those whose alcohol intake had not changed in 
the previous two weeks than in those whose drinking had either increased or 
decreased [Z = 2.15; p = 0.02, 1-tailed]. However, the hypothesis was not borne out 
for the Motor Impulsivity subscale [Z = -0.31; ns, 1-tailed]. 
Discussion 
Overview of Discussion: The primary purpose of this study was to develop and start 
validation of a new instrument to measure impulsiveness, with corresponding trait 
(TIS) and recent (RIS) versions. Over 200 participants completed each version of the 
instrument on two occasions (Time 1 and Time 2) one month apart. 
Exploratory factor analyses (EFAs) revealed a TIS with two factors, labelled Cognitive 
Impulsiveness (CI) and Motor Impulsiveness (MI). Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
(CFAs) subsequently performed upon the TIS at Time 2 and the RIS at Times 1 were 
broadly consistent with this two-factor solution. 
Correlational analyses at Time 1 confirmed that, as expected, the trait version 
correlated more highly with an existing trait impulsiveness measure (the BIS-11) 
than did the recent version. For the MI subscale, test-retest correlation showed a 
trend, albeit a relatively weak one, to being higher in the trait version (TIS) than in 
the recent version (RIS). 
In order to explore the notion that recent changes in alcohol consumption should 
be reflected in changes in impulsiveness in daily life, as measured by the RIS 
compared to the TIS, correlations were performed between the TIS and RIS 
subscales and recent alcohol intake as a non-categorised variable. These revealed 
the correlation between RIS MI and recent alcohol intake to be greater than that 
between TIS MI and recent alcohol intake (though there was no equivalent 
difference for CI). Similarly, there was a positive and significant correlation between 
changes in Motor MI (but not CI) and changes in alcohol intake within the previous 
two weeks. Finally, correlations between TIS and RIS subscales were performed 
separately within participants who had indicated a recent change in their alcohol 
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consumption and within those who had indicated no recent change. The correlation 
between the TIS and RIS CI subscale was, as predicted, greater amongst those who 
had indicated no recent change compared to those who had indicated a change; 
however, this was not the case for the MI subscale. 
The following discussion first focuses on the structure of the newly-developed TIS 
and RIS scales, and then considers the relationships between scores on these scales 
and participants’ recent alcohol intake. 
1) The structure and content of the newly-developed TIS and RIS scales 
The exploratory and confirmatory FAs of the TIS revealed that eight items loaded 
evenly on two factors. The MI factor reflected the respondent’s tendency to behave 
rashly, without considering potential negative consequences. This is illustrated by 
the top-loading two items, ‘I encounter problems because I do things without 
stopping to think’ and ‘I become involved with things that I later wish I could get out 
of’. In contrast, the CI subscale appeared to tend towards planfulness and greater 
control, as illustrated by its two highest-loading items: ‘I plan work tasks and 
activities in my free time carefully’ and ‘I am focused, seeing things through to the 
end’. CI and MI were relatively independent of one another, with a low to moderate 
correlation of 0.28. 
Nine additional items had loadings between 0.3 and 0.5 on these or other (smaller) 
factors. Although items with loadings of at least 0.32 can be included in the 
interpretation of a factor (Comrey & Lee, 1992), the aim here was to create a short 
scale which would be quick to administer. 
In terms of content, the CI and MI subscales resemble certain of the subscales of 
the source measures. Thus, the CI subscale is similar to the Non-Planning 
Impulsiveness subscale of the BIS-11 (Patton et al., 1995), the Premeditation 
subscale of the UPPS (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001), and the Decision Time subscale of 
the EASI-III (Buss & Plomin, 1975). Likewise, the MI subscale resembles the Motor 
Impulsiveness subscale of the BIS-11, the Urgency subscale of the UPPS, and the 
Inhibitory Control subscale of the EASI-III. 
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Relatedly, the two subscales do not correspond simply to conceptualisations of 
behavioural inhibition and delay aversion. The MI, including the items ‘I encounter 
problems because I do things without stopping to think’ and ‘I tend to act “on 
impulse”’, appears to incorporate elements of both behavioural disinhibition as well 
as delay aversion. The CI subscale likewise includes elements of forward planning 
and impulse control. 
For questionnaire development, a sample of 262 is considered to lie somewhere 
between ‘fair’ (i.e. 200) and ‘good’ (i.e. 300; Comrey & Lee, 1992), and as such 
might be considered to have represented a strength. Also, for the CFAs, there was a 
relatively high participant-to-variable ratio of around 200:8, making the sample size 
rather robust. However, the sample was clearly not representative of the general 
population: All were first year Psychology undergraduates, and predominantly 
female (c. 4:1). Consequently, the question of generalisability needs to be 
addressed, especially since males tend to score higher than females on measures 
pertaining to impulsiveness (e.g. Cyders, 2011). CFAs were therefore conducted in 
female and male subgroups separately, and revealed a very similar factor structure. 
This is consistent with data recently reported by Cyders (2011), in which the five 
subscales of the UPPS were found to be structurally invariant across gender. 
Furthermore, men and women did not differ in their mean scores on the TIS CI and 
MI subscales. 
Given the homogeneity of the present sample, its psychometric properties in the 
general population are unknown and need further investigating. However, the 
primary objective of the present study was to produce an instrument potentially 
sensitive to transient fluctuations in impulsivity, in order to explore associations 
with other variables hypothetically influencing or influenced by Recent Impulsivity. 
The utility of the RIS in this regard is addressed in the following sections. 
2) Investigating the validity of the TIS and RIS scales 
Hypothesis 1, that the well-established trait impulsiveness measure, the BIS-11, 
would correlate more strongly with the BIS-11 Total score than the RIS Total score, 
was supported. Since the only difference between the TIS and RIS was the time-
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frame within which the items were contextualised, this confirms the more trait-like 
nature of the former, and adds weight to the thesis that the RIS is relatively more 
sensitive to fluctuations in state. 
Hypothesis 2, that the test-retest correlation for the TIS would be greater than for 
the RIS, was not supported. There was a suggestion of a trend for the greater test-
retest correlation of the TIS MI subscale compared to that of the RIS MI subscale, 
but this was relatively weak. The lack of support for Hypothesis 2 may have derived 
from the majority of people within the whole sample being relatively stable across 
the test-retest interval. In order to explore this possibility, future studies should 
therefore aim to recruit a larger sample in order to detect differences in stability of 
the TIS and RIS subscale scores. The observation that those whose drinking had 
recently changed also showed shifts in MI (though not CI) (Hypothesis 3. iii, see 
Section 3 below) would appear to support such notions. 
It would have been interesting and highly relevant to test participants on 
behavioural measures of impulsivity alongside the self-report measures. The recent 
measure would be predicted to correlate more strongly than the trait measure with 
such indices. Correlational analyses between the TIS and RIS and, for example, 
Go/NoGo and Continuous Performance Tasks, would thus have acted as further 
tests of validity. Although it was not practical to do so, given limited time and 
resources, it would be desirable for future studies to explore such associations. 
It must be acknowledged that the RIS questionnaire is limited in its ability to tap 
moment-to-moment variations in state impulsivity, since its items relate to 
behaviours which occur over somewhat extended time periods. It may not be 
possible to construct a truly ‘state’ impulsivity instrument; whilst it is relatively 
straightforward to indicate how anxious one is feeling at a certain moment, for 
example, it is by definition rather more difficult to reflect on one’s tendency to be 
impulsive. 
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3) The relationship between the TIS and RIS scales and habitual alcohol intake 
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that in all participants, habitual alcohol intake would 
share a greater correlation with the TIS than the RIS, was not supported. Thus, in 
the sample as a whole, and in line with expectations, the TIS and RIS MI subscales, 
as well as the RIS CI subscale, shared positive and significant correlations with 
habitual alcohol intake; although the positive correlation between TIS CI and 
habitual alcohol intake did not reach statistical significance, it nevertheless showed 
a clear trend. It is unclear why there were no differences between the scales’ 
respective correlations with habitual intake, although given the large degree of 
overlap between the TIS and RIS scales, and the relatively modest sample size for 
such correlational analyses, to become statistically significant any differences would 
have had to have been large indeed. Further studies with larger samples are 
therefore needed. 
4) The relationship between the TIS and RIS scales and recent alcohol intake 
Hypothesis 4. i), which predicted that in all participants, there would be a stronger 
association between recent alcohol intake and the RIS than between recent alcohol 
intake and the TIS, was borne out for Motor Impulsivity but not Cognitive 
Impulsivity. A recent increase in alcohol intake, compared to habitual intake, was 
therefore more associated with an increase in ‘rash’ behaviour. Similarly, 
Hypothesis 4. ii), predicting that recent changes in alcohol consumption would be 
associated with recent changes in impulsivity, was also supported for MI but not CI. 
Thus, participants who had increased their alcohol intake within the previous two 
weeks, compared to their habitual intake, reported higher than normal levels of MI 
within the previous two weeks. 
Hypothesis 4. iii), predicting that TIS and RIS scores would be more highly correlated 
with one another in stable drinkers than in those whose consumption had recently 
changed, was confirmed for CI but not for MI. Thus, a recent change in alcohol 
intake was associated with a change in the extent to which participants were able to 
demonstrate forethought, plan activities in their life and concentrate. This is 
consistent with the present theses that, firstly, ‘real-world’ impulsiveness fluctuates 
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over time, and secondly, that alcohol consumption can influence such fluctuations. 
It is not clear why MI was not similarly related to changes in alcohol consumption. 
Taken at first glance, this finding appears to represent the converse of those 
observed in relation to Hypotheses 4. i) and 4. ii). However, the positive correlations 
observed between recent (change in) MI and recent (change in) alcohol intake 
indicated direct relationships within the whole sample. By contrast, Hypothesis 4. 
iii) related to the relationships between recent alcohol intake and recent impulsivity 
in separate subgroups of stable drinkers and changers; accordingly, although the 
correlation between CI scores on the TIS and RIS was lower in participants whose 
drinking level had recently changed, we cannot be sure that this was attributable to 
or caused by the change in their drinking; there could have been other relevant but 
unmeasured differences between the groups. 
At a general level, the findings relating to Hypothesis 4. iii) appear to conflict with 
research, such as that described by Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott (1999), which 
suggests that alcohol given acutely increases the tendency towards impulsive 
actions. However, there are important differences between the studies, which may 
account for their apparently contradictory findings. Firstly, Fillmore and Vogel-
Sprott observed the effect of alcohol administration upon clearly defined 
operational outcomes (i.e. rates of commission error in response to no-go stimuli) in 
a laboratory setting, whereas the present study correlated participants’ alcohol 
intake with their ‘real-world’ self-reported impulsiveness. Secondly, Fillmore and 
Vogel-Sprott measured the effect of alcohol upon these outcomes at a particular 
moment in time, whereas the present study looked at associations over a two-week 
period. 
Seventy-six participants (more than a third of the sample) denied consuming any 
alcohol within the previous 12 months. This unexpectedly high figure may have 
been a result of individuals who were adhering to orthodox religious lifestyles, for 
example Islam which, given the diversity of students at London Universities in 
general and possibly Goldsmiths College in particular, would probably have been 
relatively well-represented in the sample. 
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The present data therefore offer some, albeit mixed, support for the contention 
that recent changes in alcohol intake are related to real-world recent impulsiveness 
as assessed by self-report. In broad terms, therefore, these findings are consistent 
with laboratory studies, such as that of Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott (1999), showing 
alcohol to induce increased impulsivity. 
Since all of the present analyses were correlational, it cannot be concluded that 
recent increases in alcohol intake caused increases in impulsivity. It is quite 
plausible that the relationship between these variables is bi-directional. As has been 
set out by Jentsch and Taylor (1999), high levels of impulsivity are thought to 
contribute to chronic levels of drug intake. Also, longitudinal prospective studies 
have indicated that young adults higher in trait impulsiveness are subsequently 
more likely to present with substance use disorders (e.g. Sher et al., 2000). Clearly, 
individuals high in trait impulsiveness are more likely to be high in RI at any given 
time, and therefore more likely to engage in a higher frequency of impulsive 
behaviours, including alcohol and other drug use, over an extended period. 
Even assuming that increased alcohol intake did lead to increased recent impulsivity 
in the present study, there would still be many questions concerning whether this 
could be attributed to the same process(es) as observed in behavioural laboratory 
studies. It remains unknown how long an alcohol-induced elevation in impulsivity 
lasts for or, relatedly, whether the heightened recent impulsivity observed here 
reflected single episodes of drinking or a collection of discrete episodes. This may 
well have varied between participants. It is possible that repeated bouts of heavy 
drinking engender longer-lasting increases in impulsivity, but the present data do 
not enable this to be tested. These are important issues which could, in practice, be 
addressed by future research. 
It is important that laboratory studies are complemented by research utilising self-
report questionnaires and adopting a correlational approach, since it remains 
unclear to what extent their findings generalise to more naturalistic settings. Thus, 
the acute increases in behavioural impulsivity following alcohol consumption in 
laboratory situations may not reflect what happens in real-world contexts. 
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Chapter 3: Examining electrophysiological and subjective cue-
reactivity and electrophysiological and behavioural 
impulsiveness in non-dependent heavy social drinkers 
Abstract 
Background and aims: Previous studies have reported non-dependent heavy social 
drinkers to show heightened impulsiveness and cue-reactivity to alcohol-related 
stimuli, but there has been little investigation of these variables in lighter drinkers. 
The present study compares subjective and electrocortical cue-reactivity and self-
report, behavioural and electrocortical indices of impulsiveness in samples of 12 
non-dependent heavy drinkers (HDs) and 10 light drinkers (LDs). 
Hypotheses: Compared to LDs, HDs will: i) show greater electrocortical reactivity 
(larger P3 amplitudes) to alcohol-related stimuli than to neutral stimuli; ii) report 
greater craving for alcohol following exposure to alcohol-related than to neutral 
stimuli; iii) assign higher arousal ratings to alcohol-related than neutral stimuli; iv) 
self-report higher impulsiveness; v) show higher behavioural impulsiveness on a 
Continuous Performance Task (CPT); and vi) show reduced no-go P3 and no-go N2 
amplitudes and increased no-go P3 and no-go N2 latencies whilst they perform the 
CPT. In addition, electrophysiological cue-reactivity will correlate significantly with 
subjective cue-reactivity and with ratings of stimulus arousal; and recent 
impulsiveness will correlate more strongly than trait impulsiveness with: i) 
electrophysiological and subjective measures of cue-reactivity and; ii) behavioural 
and ERP measures of impulsiveness. 
Methods: EEG was recorded during (a) exposure to alcohol-related and neutral 
words and (b) the CPT. Participants rated their craving for alcohol immediately 
following exposure to each type of word stimulus, and at the end of the study they 
rated all words for arousal. 
Results: HDs but not LDs showed greater P3 amplitudes to alcohol-related words 
than to neutral words, and gave higher arousal ratings to alcohol-related than 
neutral words. By contrast, there were no differences in subjective craving.  Neither 
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were there any differences between the groups in terms of self-report, behavioural 
or electrocortical indices of impulsivity. It did not appear that recent impulsiveness 
was more strongly associated than trait impulsiveness with: i) electrophysiological 
and subjective measures of cue-reactivity and; ii) behavioural and ERP measures of 
impulsiveness. 
Conclusions: The electrocortical cue-reactivity data were partially consistent with 
previous findings in non-dependent drinkers and with Robinson & Berridge’s 
contention that repeated drug administration leads to drug-related cues acquiring 
incentive salience. That this was not reflected in between-groups differences in 
subjective cue-reactivity or impulsiveness may indicate that in non-dependent 
drinkers, these phenomena can occur somewhat independently of one another. 
Introduction and rationale 
Current theoretical frameworks of addiction contend that drug abuse is associated 
with increases in the salience of drug-associated stimuli, as manifested in 
characteristic subjective, physiological and electrophysiological responses when 
dependent individuals are presented with drug-associated stimuli (‘cue-reactivity’; 
Drummond et al., 1995), and increases in aspects of impulsivity (Vuchinich & 
Simpson, 1998). Recent research has revealed that non-physically dependent social 
drinkers (i.e. those who do not experience a withdrawal syndrome upon cessation 
of drinking and metabolism of alcohol) sometimes demonstrate subjective and 
electrophysiological changes when presented with alcohol-relevant stimuli 
(Herrmann et al., 2001), as well as heightened behavioural (Colder & Connor, 2002) 
and electrophysiological (Oddy & Barry, 2009) impulsiveness. The questions of 
whether social drinkers exhibit similar subjective and electrophysiological correlates 
of cue-reactivity and impulsiveness as their alcohol-dependent counterparts remain 
open ones; answering them may help to elucidate the mechanisms involved in the 
development of problematic alcohol consumption. The primary purposes of the 
present study were to examine subjective and electrophysiological cue-reactivity 
and behavioural and electrophysiological impulsiveness in non-dependent heavy 
social drinkers (HDs). 
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Overview of introduction and rationale: In the pages which follow, brief summaries 
will firstly show that: research has consistently reported appetitive responses to 
alcohol-related stimuli in alcoholics, which can be explained by current models of 
alcohol addiction (Section 1. i); and that non-dependent HDs also demonstrate 
these physiological and subjective responses to alcohol-related stimuli (Section 1. 
ii). It will then be argued that electrophysiological measures such as event-related 
potentials represent a promising means of studying the brain correlates of cue-
reactivity (Section 1. iii), and that alcohol-dependent individuals demonstrate 
characteristic electrophysiological waveforms when presented with alcohol-related 
stimuli (Section 1. iv). Despite theoretical reason to expect that non-dependent HDs 
might similarly exhibit electrophysiological cue-reactivity, only one study has at 
present examined this. Although it reported positive results, its conclusions appear 
rather questionable (Section 1. v). 
Sections 2.i and 2.ii briefly present research which has consistently reported 
heightened impulsiveness in alcoholics, as measured by behavioural inhibitory 
tasks, as well as the small but promising literature documenting similar patterns in 
non-dependent HDs. As well as having impaired behavioural inhibition, it appears 
that alcohol-dependent individuals also demonstrate abnormal event-related 
potentials whilst they perform such tasks (Sections 2. iii and 2. iv). As with 
electrophysiological cue-reactivity, only one study appears to have investigated 
deficient electrophysiological correlates of inhibitory control in non-dependent 
social drinkers (Section 2. v), and more research is therefore needed. The 
theoretical association between cue-reactivity and heightened impulsiveness is 
discussed in Section 3, prior to the aims and hypotheses of the present study 
(Section 4). 
1. Appetitive responses to alcohol-related stimuli in problem drinkers 
1. i) Appetitive responses to alcohol-related stimuli in alcohol-dependent individuals 
As detailed in Chapter 1 (pp. 26-34), individuals who engage in problematic drinking 
behaviour demonstrate characteristic responses to alcohol-related stimuli, a 
phenomenon known as ‘cue-reactivity’ (CR). These CR effects have been interpreted 
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within different theoretical models. Tiffany (1990) interpreted CR in the context of a 
cognitive-processing framework (Cox et al., 1999). This theory contends that 
through repeated alcohol or other drug use, cognitive processes associated with 
alcohol or other drug procurement – termed ‘action schemata’ – become 
increasingly automatic. Tiffany argues that non-automatic cognitive processes can 
become engaged during exposure to alcohol/other drug-related cues and are 
experienced by the individual as a desire for alcohol/other drugs. 
A related model, ‘incentive sensitisation theory’ (Robinson & Berridge, 1993; 2000), 
asserts that the repeated administration of drugs of abuse leads to the sensitisation 
of dopamine activity within the mesocorticolimbic pathways which mediate 
responses to motivationally salient stimuli. Consequently, intense craving for the 
drug develops and drug-associated environmental cues acquire conditioned 
incentive properties: that is, they develop ‘incentive salience’. Behaviourally, 
therefore, drug-paired cues act as intense conditioned incentives which ‘grab 
attention, become attractive and “wanted”, and guide behaviour to the incentive’ 
(Robinson & Berridge, 1993, p. 261). This increased salience is likely to play a role in 
the development and maintenance of substance use disorders, since repeated 
involuntary attentional orienting to drug-related cues is likely to lead to further drug 
use; thus, there may be a reciprocal causal relationship between incentive salience 
and drug use. It follows that individuals engaging in frequent, albeit non-dependent, 
drinking behaviours should also display CR, albeit to a lesser extent than dependent 
drinkers. If CR develops linearly as a function of drinking experience, heavier 
drinkers should show stronger CR than lighter drinkers. 
1. ii) Cue-reactivity in non-dependent heavy drinkers: the evidence 
Chapter 1 (pp. 44-45) presented evidence that upon exposure to alcohol cues, 
heavy drinkers (HDs) have been reported to demonstrate CR via both self-report 
and behavioural and physiological measures. Thus, CR appears to occur not only in 
those with a diagnosis of alcohol dependence but also in less severe drinkers. 
Understanding of the mechanism(s) by which increased incentive salience relates to 
increased alcohol intake is, however, far from complete. The elucidation of brain 
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mechanisms associated with CR may contribute to this understanding; 
electrophysiological measures provide one means of doing this. 
1. iii) Event-related potentials as a useful means of examining cue-reactivity 
Electrophysiological indices, such as event-related brain potentials (ERPs), are a 
potentially valuable means by which to investigate the biological substrates of CR. 
ERPs are time-locked electrical potentials which reflect synchronous neural activity 
in specific brain areas and have been reliably associated with neurosensory and 
cognitive processing (Handy, 2005). Participants are presented with stimuli in some 
modality, and the electroencephalogram (EEG) over the period of observation is 
averaged to produce a series of waves of differing polarity and amplitude – that is, 
‘components’ (Ehlers et al., 2003). The particular components elicited in a given 
ERP, and its particular scalp distribution, differ depending on the sensory modality 
in which stimuli are presented (Handy, 2005). Figure 3.1 depicts an idealised ERP 
wave recorded over the posterior of the scalp and elicited by a visual stimulus. 
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of an idealised ERP wave recorded over the posterior of the 
scalp elicited by a visual stimulus, showing the components P1, N1, P2, N2 and P3, 
and the times at which they each approximately tend to appear following stimulus 
presentation (image taken with permission from Handy, 2005). The names of each 
component peak are given according to whether the peak is positive or negative 
(hence ‘P’ or ‘N’) and its position relative to other peaks of the same polarity (hence 
‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’). For example, ‘P3’ is the third positive component peak (peaking at 
around 0.4 seconds). (Note that in this figure, the y axis locates its negative values 
above the point at which it transects the x axis, and its positive values below. 
However, it is also common for this positioning to be reversed. Either presentation 
is considered acceptable.) 
Convincing data suggest that the amplitude and latency of particular ERP 
components can be related to awareness processes (Brandeis & Lehmann, 1986) 
and to the processing of emotional stimuli (Schupp et al., 2000). Studies examining 
the electrophysiological correlates of CR have tended to focus upon one particular 
‘cognitive’ component of the ERP wave: the P3 (also called P300, but referred to 
throughout this chapter as P3 for consistency). This is a positive deflection in 
voltage – amplitude measured in microvolts (µV) – with a latency (i.e. delay 
between stimulus and response) of between 300 and 600 milliseconds (Hansenne, 
2000). It has been related functionally to stimulus evaluation (Kutas, McCarthy & 
Donchin, 1977) and ‘context updating’ (Donchin, 1981). Thus, for example, in the 
‘oddball’ task participants show greater P3 amplitudes in response to novel or 
unexpected stimuli which differ in some important way (e.g. semantic category) 
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from the standard, repetitive stimuli to which they are attending (Gaeta et al., 
1998). 
The P3 is elicited by emotionally-salient stimuli and not by neutral stimuli, and is 
widely distributed across left and right lateral recording sites (Palomba, Angrilli & 
Mini, 1997; Cuthbert et al., 2000; Schupp et al., 2000; Carretie et al., 2001), making 
it especially relevant for examining CR. Johnson (1986) proposed that P3 amplitude 
is contingent on the value and/or significance of the stimulus to the particular 
individual, as opposed to its physical attributes. Thus stimuli of high emotional 
salience elicit a high-amplitude P3 (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997). Importantly, 
amplitude is influenced similarly by emotional cues of both positive and negative 
valence (e.g. pleasant and unpleasant; Lang et al., 1997; Rozenkrants & Polich, 
2008). Furthermore, studies in clinical groups have revealed that disorder-specific 
stimuli evoke increased P3 amplitudes compared to neutral stimuli: for example, 
individuals with combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder show elevated P3s in 
response to trauma-relevant combat stimuli (Stanford et al., 2001), as do panic-
disordered individuals exposed to anxiety-related words (Pauli et al., 1997). It 
therefore follows that the magnitude of social drinkers’ P3 responses to alcohol 
stimuli, relative to neutral stimuli, is likely to be an indicator of the degree of 
motivational salience such stimuli have acquired. It is accordingly predicted that 
HDs will show greater P3 reactions to alcohol stimuli than will LDs. 
Another commonly investigated ERP component is the N2 – the second negative 
peak following stimulus presentation (see Figure 3.1 on p. 106). This component is 
discussed in Section 3 of this chapter. 
1. iv) Greater P3 responses to alcohol-related stimuli in those with alcoholism 
In one of the first studies to investigate ERPs within an alcohol-dependent sample, 
Genkina and Shostakovich (1987) reported that the P3 potential was greater during 
presentations of the word ‘vodka’ than during neutral words. A limitation of this 
study, however, is that the alcohol-related and neutral word stimuli were presented 
within a single session in a ratio of 1:5. Semantic category was therefore 
confounded with frequency. This is critical, since infrequent or ‘alerting’ stimuli 
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themselves elicit an increased P3 component (Pontifex, Hillman & Polich, 2009).  
This is thought to reflect the selection of stimulus information governed by 
attentional orienting (Rushby, Barry & Doherty, 2005); put differently, Squires, 
Squires, & Hillyard (1975) have suggested that it reflects attentional focus being 
disengaged from routine information and shifted to an unexpected stimulus. The 
observed elevation of P3 amplitude to alcohol cues in Genkina and Shostakovich’s 
study may therefore index attentional orienting to relatively infrequent stimuli 
rather than a response specifically to their alcohol-related content. 
Subsequent studies have remedied this confound by presenting equal numbers of 
alcohol-related and neutral stimuli. Herrmann et al. (2000) presented nineteen 
male alcoholics and nineteen healthy male controls with fifteen alcohol-related and 
fifteen neutral word cues. At the posterior electrode (Pz) location, alcoholic 
participants but not controls demonstrated significantly higher P3 amplitudes to the 
alcohol-related words than to the neutral words. Furthermore, within the alcoholic 
participants those who rated the alcohol stimuli as more pleasant exhibited higher 
electrophysiological responses, consistent with the notion that the amplitudes 
reflect the strength of subjectively-experienced appetitive/approach processes. 
Namkoong et al. (2004) presented six alcohol-related and six neutral pictures to 
twelve control participants and sixteen abstinent alcoholics. In alcoholics but not 
controls, P3 responses to the alcohol-related pictures were significantly larger than 
those to the neutral pictures. Since the pictorial stimuli were carefully matched for 
dimensions and visual content (e.g. a colour photograph of a bottle of alcoholic 
beverage versus a colour photograph of a milk bottle), it is likely that their 
contingent P3 amplitudes reflected the motivational significance of the stimuli, 
rather than their physical properties. Finally, the alcoholic participants but not the 
controls reported greater craving following the alcohol pictures than the neutral 
pictures, and there were significant correlations between cue-elicited craving and 
cue-elicited P3 amplitudes. The findings therefore strongly suggest that P3 
amplitudes are an electrophysiological correlate of craving. Similarly, Heinze, 
Wolfling and Grusser (2007) exposed ten detoxified alcoholics and ten healthy 
controls to complex alcohol-associated sounds (e.g. opening of a beer can) and 
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neutral sounds (e.g. opening a door); alcoholics demonstrated significantly higher 
craving and higher amplitude P3 responses to alcohol cues than did controls. 
The results of the above studies indicate ERP CR in alcohol-dependent individuals. 
This is consistent with findings in users of other addictive substances including 
nicotine (Warren & McDonough, 1999; McDonough & Warren, 2001), cocaine (van 
de Laar et al., 2004; Franken et al., 2008) and heroin (Franken et al., 2003). These 
studies tend to report significant positive correlations between self-reported CR and 
P3 amplitudes, though there are exceptions; McDonough & Warren (2001), for 
instance, found no correlation. 
An alternative possible explanation relates to Johnson’s (1995) finding in a retrieval 
paradigm that stimuli which are more familiar than others elicit stronger late 
positive potentials, most clearly at around 600 msec. All of the alcohol CR studies 
mentioned above observed P3 effects at a latency less than 500 msec; although 
familiarity effects are maximal at 600 msec, they could still be evident at earlier 
latencies. However since the control stimuli in these studies were either pictures of 
everyday items or word stimuli matched with alcohol words for lexical frequency 
there is no reason to expect them to be relatively less familiar. This explanation is 
thus not persuasive. 
1. v) ERP cue-reactivity in non-dependent social drinkers 
The evidence reviewed in the preceding sections has indicated that alcoholics and 
non-dependent HDs demonstrate autonomic arousal and subjective urge to drink in 
response to alcohol-related cues, and that alcoholics also demonstrate CR as 
measured by ERP responses. However only one published ERP study has examined 
CR to alcohol stimuli in HDs. Herrmann et al. (2001) presented fifteen HDs and 
fifteen LDs – all male and matched for family history of alcohol use disorders – with 
forty alcohol-relevant pictures (e.g. a bottle of brandy) and forty non-alcohol-
related neutral pictures (e.g. a bottle of water). Participants rated the stimuli on a 5-
point scale ranging from ‘-2’ (‘very unpleasant’) to ‘+2’ (‘very pleasant’). HDs but not 
LDs demonstrated greater P3 amplitudes at the frontal electrode (Fz) in response to 
alcohol stimuli, and also rated alcohol-related pictures as more pleasant than 
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neutral pictures. In the whole sample, but not within each group individually, cue-
elicited craving correlated significantly with peak P3 amplitude at the electrode 
locations Fz and Cz. These findings suggest that non-dependent HDs, but not LDs, 
attribute greater motivational salience to alcohol-related stimuli than to non-
alcohol-related stimuli, as revealed by their electrophysiological as well as self-
report responses, and that this reflects drinking behaviour rather than pre-existing 
genetic differences. 
There are, however, methodological limitations to Herrmann et al.’s (2001) study. 
Participants in the two groups were not recruited on the basis of specified levels of 
habitual alcohol consumption; rather, they were categorised on the basis of a post-
hoc median split. The principal problem with a median split is that often the 
resulting groups do not necessarily correspond with more formal taxonomies or 
diagnostic classifications. Indeed, Herrmann et al.’s so-called ‘heavy drinkers’ 
consumed an average of only about 15 units per week; this is hardly representative 
of heavy social drinking, given that the UK government currently considers 21 units 
per week to be reasonable. Furthermore, there was a large standard deviation (+/-
36.80 units per month), meaning that some of the ‘HDs’ would have been drinking 
markedly below even this level. That differences between the groups were 
nevertheless observed is interesting. However, in terms of validity (both internal 
and external) and replication, it is preferable to specify parameters for heavy and 
light drinking groups prior to recruitment. 
Importantly, although Herrmann et al. (2001) reported a significant correlation 
between ‘emotional cue-reactivity’ and electrophysiological CR, their measure of 
the former is atypical: participants rated the alcohol-related and neutral stimuli for 
pleasantness/unpleasantness rather than rating their desire to consume alcohol 
immediately following exposure to both alcohol-related stimuli and neutral stimuli. 
The study described in the present thesis therefore includes self-report measures of 
subjective alcohol desire as well as ratings of affective salience analogous to those 
used by Herrmann et al. 
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Finally, it is possible that Herrmann et al.’s results might be explained by personality 
differences rather than level of alcohol consumption. Vollrath and Torgersen (2008), 
among others, have reported higher extraversion in ‘risky’ drinkers. If the HDs in 
Herrmann et al.’s study were more extraverted than controls, it is possible that they 
responded more appetitively to alcohol-relevant pictures because their association 
with social rewards is more salient to extraverts than introverts. This is plausible 
given the inherently social nature of most alcohol consumption. More than almost 
any other drug (with the possible exception of caffeine) alcohol consumption takes 
place predominantly in the presence of others. The current study therefore 
additionally explored whether extraversion was associated with the amplitude of 
the P3 response to alcohol-related stimuli. Relatedly, another potentially relevant 
personality factor is impulsivity, one of the key themes of the present thesis. This is 
considered in the following section. 
2) Impulsiveness and behavioural disinhibition in problem drinkers 
2. i) High impulsiveness in alcohol-dependent individuals 
There is much evidence that problem drinkers are high in ‘impulsiveness’ or 
‘impulsivity’. As has already been discussed (see Chapter 2, pp. 51-52), there is 
considerable debate concerning how to define impulsivity. Briefly, it does not 
appear to be a unitary construct (Reynolds et al., 2006a), and is often suggested to 
incorporate two (discrete) components (de Wit, 2008): i) a failure of inhibitory 
control, or failure to inhibit reward-driven behaviour or pre-potent responses, 
sometimes termed ‘motor impulsiveness’ (Olmstead, 2006); and ii) impaired 
decision-making, arising from over-sensitivity to immediate rewards and under-
sensitivity to delayed consequences (‘cognitive impulsiveness’; Olmstead, 2006). 
Accordingly, a range of self-report and behavioural measures have been used to 
index impulsiveness (see Chapter 1, pp. 37-41). 
2. ii) Evidence for heightened impulsiveness in HDs 
As related in Chapter 1 (pp. 45-47), accumulating evidence suggests that HDs are 
more impulsive than LDs in terms of behavioural delay discounting and inhibitory 
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control tasks and self-report measures. Further research is needed to examine the 
relationship between impulsiveness and the development of heavy or problematic 
drinking, and specifically, whether impulsivity may predict or arise as a consequence 
of chronic heavy social drinking. 
2. iii) Heightened behavioural impulsiveness and abnormal electrophysiology in 
problem drinkers 
In addition to alcoholics’ more impulsive performance on tests of inhibitory control, 
they also tend to demonstrate characteristic abnormalities in electrophysiology 
during the response inhibition, or no-go, conditions of these tasks. Two major ERP 
components have been implicated as markers for response inhibition: first, the P3 
(‘no-go P3’), an augmented positive-going component usually peaking between 300 
and 600 msec post-stimulus, and the same as that associated with emotional 
responding/CR; and second, the N2 (‘no-go N2’), a negative voltage deflection 
which tends to peak frontocentrally at around 200-300 msec post-stimulus (see 
Figure 3.1 on p. 106; Eimer, 1993; Pfefferbaum et al., 1985; Jodo & Inoue, 1990; 
Jodo & Kayama, 1992). 
According to conflict control theory, the Go/NoGo task involves conflict monitoring 
and attentional control processes (Botvinick, Cohen & Carter, 2004). Conflict arises 
in the no-go condition as motor response expectancy is violated (Bekker, Kenemans 
& Verbaten, 2004). No-go P3 is considered to relate to attentional control 
processes, and no-go P3 with frontocentral distribution correlates with inhibition 
control (Bokura, Yamaguchi & Kobayashi, 2001). No-go N2 seems to reflect 
monitoring in the conflict situation (Bruin, Wijers & van Staveren, 2001), with 
source location analysis indicating that no-go N2 is generated in anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) and prefrontal cortex (PFC). This converges with findings from 
neuroimaging studies which suggest that ACC activation reflects conflict detection 
(Botvinick et al., 2004). 
Oddy & Barry (2009) suggest that the N2 might be more associated than the P3 with 
response inhibition, since the latter occurs relatively late in the stimulus processing 
chain and is therefore more likely to be associated with finalisation or closure of the 
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mental process than with the process itself (Falkenstein, Hoormann & Hohnsbein, 
1999). Nevertheless, since it appears that both components reflect some aspect of 
inhibition in cognitive processing significant abnormalities in either component 
might relate to a degree of inhibitory deficiency (Kaiser et al., 2003). 
Research into ERP inhibitory abnormalities in those with a diagnosis of alcohol 
dependence has focused almost exclusively upon the no-go P3, as discussed in the 
following section. A literature search did not return any studies comparing the N2 in 
alcoholics versus controls. 
2. iv) P3 responses during inhibitory control tasks in alcoholics versus controls 
The go and no-go conditions of inhibitory tasks are associated with different forms 
of P3: the P3a and the P3b. The P3b component is typically produced during 
response production to target stimuli (i.e. the go condition) whilst the P3a is 
thought to reflect the orienting response to unexpected non-target stimuli and is 
larger to novel or rare non-targets (i.e. the no-go condition; Rodríguez Holguín et 
al., 1999a). 
The P3a may be a response to intrusive or ‘novel’ stimuli such as dog barks, abstract 
colour forms, etc (Rodríguez Holguín et al., 1999a). The P3a occurs earlier, and is 
sometimes confused with the later P3b peak (Squires, Squires & Hillyard, 1975). P3a 
is typically larger in amplitude than the P3b over the frontal and central electrode 
sites and is thought to reflect an alerting process which originates in the frontal 
cortex (Courchesne, Hillyard & Galambos, 1975). It appears that P3a generation 
depends upon the stimulus context within which novel stimuli are presented 
(Comerchero, Katayama & Polich, 1997; Katayama & Polich, 1998). For example, the 
P3a component is elicited when infrequently-presented novel stimuli interrupt 
attentional mechanisms engaged in performance of the primary task (Rodríguez 
Holguín et al., 1999a). Since the present research focuses specifically on inhibition, 
the following review is concerned only with studies which have examined the P3a.  
This component is henceforth referred to simply as the no-go P3. 
114 
 
There is evidence that no-go P3 components are abnormal in alcoholics, though the 
precise nature of this abnormality is at present equivocal. For example, Rodríguez 
Holguín et al. (1999a) required forty-four male alcoholics and twenty-eight controls 
to make a difficult perceptual discrimination between frequently occurring vertical 
lines (80% of trials) and infrequent ‘target’ lines that were tilted 2o to the right of 
the vertical (10% of trials). In addition, infrequent horizontal lines occurred on 10% 
of trials. Participants were required to respond, by a button press, only to the tilted 
‘targets’. Alcoholic participants produced smaller no-go P3 amplitudes than healthy 
controls, but there were no differences in its latency. Similar results have been 
reported by Hada et al. (2000) and Realmuto et al. (1993) in auditory Go/No-Go 
paradigms. Rodríguez Holguín et al. (1999a) suggest that given the relationship 
between the no-go P3 and frontal lobe activity, this component might represent an 
electrophysiological correlate of alcoholics’ well-documented frontal lobe 
dysfunctions (see Chapter 1, pp. 34-36). 
However, other studies have reported increased no-go P3 latencies but no 
differences in no-go P3 amplitude. In a similar ‘three-stimulus’ visual paradigm to 
that used by Rodríguez Holguín et al. (1999a), Fein and Chang (2006) presented 
‘standard’ stimuli (which appeared 210 times), target stimuli (which appeared 35 
times), and novel rare non-target stimuli (which also appeared 35 times) to chronic 
alcoholics and healthy controls, with participants similarly being instructed to 
respond only to target stimuli. Alcoholics did not display no-go P3 amplitude 
reductions compared to controls, but their no-go P3 components were delayed. 
Biggins et al. (1995) have reported similar findings in three-stimulus visual and 
auditory paradigms. 
The apparently contradictory findings reported by Rodríguez Holguín et al. (1999a) 
and Hada et al. (2000) on the one hand, and Fein and Chang (2006) and Biggins et 
al. (1995) on the other might reflect sample characteristics. The former studies 
tested active alcoholics undergoing treatment whilst the latter recruited abstinent 
alcoholics: indeed, Biggins et al.’s (1995) participants had been abstinent for 
between six months and two years. Thus reductions in no-go P3 amplitude might 
reflect recent levels of alcohol consumption. 
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There may also be a degree of genetic influence on no-go P3 effects, though 
findings are again mixed. For example, whilst Rodríguez Holguín et al. (1999b) 
reported that high-risk participants (that is, offspring and siblings of people with 
alcohol dependence) demonstrated reduced no-go P3 amplitudes but no latency 
effects compared to low-risk participants, the same researchers have elsewhere 
reported increased latency of no-go P3 in a high-risk group, but no abnormality of 
no-go P3 amplitude (Rodríguez Holguín, Corral & Cadaveira, 1998). 
Some studies reporting a reduced no-go P3 in alcoholics or their children have not 
observed parallel performance abnormalities. For example, a series of studies by 
Kamarajan et al. (2004, 2005a, & 2005b) reported reduced no-go P3s but found no 
significant differences from healthy controls in terms of response time or 
proportion of errors. One possible explanation is that the no-go P3 reflects less 
efficient inhibitory processing but that the relatively undemanding level of the tasks 
means that the behavioural responses themselves are not compromised. In order to 
address this, future studies should ensure that the inhibitory tasks are sufficiently 
difficult to be discriminative. 
2. v) ERP research examining inhibitory control in non-dependent social drinkers 
Only one published study has examined the electrophysiological correlates of 
response inhibition/impulsiveness in non-dependent social drinkers. Oddy and 
Barry (2009) required thirteen light and thirteen heavy socially drinking 
undergraduate psychology students to perform a visual CPT whilst their EEG was 
recorded. On no-go trials, P3 amplitude was considerably reduced globally in the 
heavy social drinkers, and their no-go N2 was slightly smaller centrally. The 
magnitude of the P3 but not of the N2 reduction on no-go trials was negatively 
correlated with alcohol consumption. However, in line with the studies of 
Kamarajan et al. (2004, 2005a & 2005b), there were no differences between the 
groups in terms of behavioural performance: error rates in both groups were 
negligible and they did not differ in response time. Oddy and Barry concluded that 
HDs did not show impaired inhibitory control and that the electrophysiological 
group difference instead reflected impairment of the involuntary orienting response 
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(OR). They argue that the reduced no-go P3 reflected impaired aspects of reflexive 
stimulus processing rather than dysfunctional inhibition. However, given the 
relative paucity of such research in alcohol abusers generally and non-dependent 
drinkers specifically, such conclusions are perhaps premature. More research in 
non-dependent social drinking groups is therefore needed. 
3. The present study: Design considerations 
There is virtually no research examining the relationships between 
electrophysiological and subjective indices of alcohol CR in non-dependent HDs. 
However, ERPs are an important tool for understanding CR, since they provide 
information on the extent to which cues provoke physiological responses known 
elsewhere to correlate with emotional reactions. Studying them within social 
drinkers who, though non-dependent, are drinking in a dysfunctional manner which 
puts them at risk of future problematic alcohol consumption may provide insight 
into mechanism(s) involved in the progression from heavy social drinking to 
problematic consumption. If heightened P3 amplitudes to alcohol-related stimuli 
are present in non-dependent HDs, this would be consistent with such responses 
preceding the development of alcohol use disorders, rather than simply being 
symptomatic of them. 
This study of heavy and light social drinkers was therefore designed to: i) replicate 
and extend previous findings that heavy social drinkers and alcoholics show 
elevated late positive potentials (such as the P3) in response to alcohol-related 
stimuli; and ii) to explore the interrelationships between self-reported subjective 
CR, arousal ratings of alcohol-related stimuli, and ERP indices. In order to avoid the 
diagnostic issues noted in relation to Herrmann et al.’s (2001) study, clear criteria 
for heavy and light social drinking were specified prior to recruitment. An additional 
issue explored here was the potential mediating role of personality traits, in 
particular extraversion and impulsivity. Participants completed the self-report Trait 
and Recent Impulsivity Scales developed for this thesis, and also a modification of 
the classic CPT, a behavioural index of impulsiveness. The Recent Impulsiveness 
Scale (RIS) asks respondents about their behaviour during the previous two weeks. 
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As demonstrated in Study 1, this measure of recent impulsiveness correlates only 
moderately with its trait equivalent (TIS), and theoretically could share greater 
variance than the TIS with CR and impulsivity because it reflects very recent/current 
functioning. Participants’ ERPs were recorded whilst they completed the CPT, to 
examine whether HDs demonstrate inhibitory-related ERP abnormalities on no-go 
trials similar to those reported in alcoholics. 
If any of these measures are elevated in heavy compared to light drinkers, there are 
at least three possible interpretations: (1) Impulsiveness might pre-exist and 
predispose individuals to heavy alcohol use; (2) it might develop as a consequence 
of heavy social drinking; or (3) it could be non-causally correlated with drinking 
level, though shared relationships with a third factor (e.g. social modelling, genetic 
disposition). Whilst it is beyond the scope of this cross-sectional study to distinguish 
between different causal relationships, it is nevertheless of interest to investigate 
the patterns of association in order to provide a basis for future longitudinal 
research. 
As noted earlier, the ERP P3 component may reflect different aspects of cognitive 
processing depending on the context in which it is produced. To maximise the 
likelihood of eliciting no-go N2s and no-go P3s, the present study utilised Oddy & 
Barry’s (2009) version of the CPT in which relative to go stimuli, non-target no-go 
stimuli occurred infrequently in a ratio of 9:1. In order to focus specifically on the 
effect of stimulus emotional salience, equal numbers of alcohol-related and neutral 
words were presented within separate viewing conditions. This removed the 
possibility that P3s would be explained by an ‘oddball’ effect (i.e. responses to novel 
or low-frequency stimuli). 
Participants were all undergraduate students from Goldsmiths, University of 
London. The sample was thus relatively homogeneous with respect to age and 
educational attainment. Potential participants completed a modified version of the 
Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ; Mehrabian & Russell, 1978); if they fell into the 
diagnostic ‘light’ or ‘heavy’ drinker categories, they were invited to take part in the 
cue reactivity (CR) procedure. This involved measuring their electrophysiological 
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responses whilst they were presented with alcohol-related (AR) and household-
related (HR) control word stimuli. Equal numbers of AR and HR word stimuli were 
presented in separate trials. Participants rated all word stimuli for arousal. 
In addition, they completed a modified version of the Continuous Performance Test 
(CPT), various measures of their personal and family history of alcohol use, and 
personality questionnaires tapping extraversion, (EPQ-R), recent impulsivity (RIS) 
and trait impulsiveness (TIS). 
Prior to testing, participants were required to abstain from alcohol for 12 hours and 
from nicotine and caffeine for three hours, to exclude the possibility of acute drug 
effects influencing results. 
Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
[A] Personality variables:  Compared to LDs, HDs will: 
1) Have higher EPQ-E scores 
2) Show higher impulsiveness as indexed by (i) subjective ratings (TIS and RIS 
scores), and (ii) more commission errors in the CPT 
[B] ERPs during the CPT:  Compared to LDs, HDs will: 
3) Show reduced no-go P3 amplitude and increased no-go P3 latency in the CPT 
4) Show reduced no-go N2 amplitude and increased no-go N2 latency in the CPT 
[C] Cue reactivity:  
Within the combined sample of HDs and LDs: 
5) Recent Impulsiveness (RIS scores) will correlate more strongly than Trait 
Impulsiveness (TIS scores) with scores for: i) subjective and ERP cue reactivity 
(CR) and; ii) behavioural and ERP measures of impulsiveness in the CPT 
6) ERP CR will correlate significantly with (i) subjective CR and (ii) subjective 
ratings of stimulus arousal 
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And compared to LDs, HDs will: 
7) Assign higher arousal ratings to alcohol-related (AR) stimuli, relative to 
household-related (HR) stimuli 
8) Report greater subjective alcohol desire after presentation of the AR stimuli 
9) Show a pronounced P3 amplitude response specifically to AR stimuli 
Methods 
DESIGN:  This study comprised two parts. 
Part 1 examined subjective and electrophysiological responses to alcohol-related 
(AR) and control (household-related; HR) word stimuli. It employed a 2 x 2 mixed-
measures design, with the independent-measures factor of Drinking Group (two 
levels: heavy drinkers (HDs) vs. light drinkers (LDs)), and the repeated-measures 
factor of Word-Type (two levels: AR vs. HR). Participants’ ERPs were recorded whilst 
they were shown a block of 17 AR words and a block of 17 HR words during a single 
testing session; order of the two conditions (word blocks) was counter-balanced, 
and in each block the set of 17 words was repeated eight times in random order. 
Participants rated their subjective alcohol desire prior to and immediately following 
each word condition. The two word blocks were separated by an interval of thirty 
minutes, during which participants completed: (i) a series of personality 
questionnaires in fixed order; and (ii) the second part of the research design. At the 
end of the session, participants rated each word stimulus for arousal. 
Part 2 examined event-related potentials (ERPs) during completion of a Continuous 
Performance Test (CPT). The 2 x 2 mixed-measures design had the independent-
measures factor of Drinking Group (two levels: HDs vs. LDs), and the repeated-
measures factor of Word-Type (two levels: ‘go’ vs. ‘no-go’). Participants’ ERPs were 
recorded whilst they were presented with go (animal-related) and no-go 
(stationery-related) words; they were required to press a button in response to the 
former and to withhold responding following the latter. A total of 280 CPT trials 
comprised go and no-go stimuli randomly presented in a ratio of 9:1. 
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Ethical approval: Approval for this study was given by Goldsmiths Ethics Committee 
Participants gave informed written consent after reading an information sheet 
outlining the study. As required by the Helsinki Declaration (World Medical 
Association, 2002), individuals were assured of confidentiality and could terminate 
their participation at any stage. 
Participants: Twenty-six students at Goldsmiths College took part in this study. 
Fifteen were recruited via the undergraduate psychology first-year credit system. 
The other eleven, also undertaking degree programmes, were paid £20 for their 
participation. 
Inclusion/exclusion criteria: Potential participants were excluded if they had a 
current or previous addictive disorder, as indicated by a score of 3 or more on the 
Drug Abuse Screening Test (DAST-10; Skinner, 1982). All had to fall into one of the 
following categories: Light Drinkers (LDs), with average weekly alcohol consumption 
over the previous twelve months being between 1-6 standard units (men) or 1-2 
units (women); or Heavy Drinkers (HDs), with weekly alcohol consumption over the 
preceding year being over 26 standard units (men) or 16 units (women). Volunteers 
drinking at levels between these two bands were excluded from the study. These 
cut-offs have previously been used by Cox et al. (1999), who reported a significant 
difference in interference on the modified alcohol Stroop task between heavy and 
light drinkers. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. 
ASSESSMENTS 
[A]  Demographic and substance use information 
 Modified Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ; Mehrabian & Russell, 1978; Appendix 
9): This 12-item self-report scale asks the respondent about their alcohol 
consumption in a typical week over the preceding six months. This was adapted 
here to twelve months in order to ensure that differences between HDs and LDs 
were stable and long-lasting. Participants are asked to indicate, in relation to their 
consumption of three types of drink (wine; beer, lager and cider; spirits) the 
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average number of days per week over the last twelve months they have consumed 
it, the average quantity consumed on each occasion, and the average quantity 
consumed in a ‘typical’ week. 
 Family Tree Questionnaire (FTQ; Mann et al., 1985): This 14-item self-report 
instrument lays out first-degree (parents, siblings) and second-degree 
(grandparents) blood relatives in the style of a family tree. The respondent 
categorises each of their relatives as either ‘1’ (‘never drinks/drank’), ‘2’ (‘social 
drinker’), ‘3’ (‘possible problem drinker’) or ‘4’ (‘definite problem drinker’). 
 Drug Abuse Screening Test (DAST-10; Skinner, 1982; Appendix 10): This was used 
to identify and exclude participants with current or previous drug abuse or 
dependence. It is a 10-item self-report instrument that can be used in clinical and 
non-clinical settings to screen for potential abuse and dependence on a variety of 
substances other than alcohol. The respondent answers questions (in a 
dichotomous ‘Yes’/‘No’ format) about their use and experiences of drugs other than 
alcohol, nicotine and caffeine in the previous 12 months. The respondent is 
informed that the term ‘drug’ includes recreational use of both prescription drugs 
and other illicit drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, LSD, ecstasy, etc. The total score 
can thus range from 0-10, with scores of 3 or higher indicating potential drug abuse 
or dependence. Cronbach’s alpha for the DAST-10 has been reported at 0.69 
(McCabe & Teter, 2007). 
[B] Personality measures 
 Extraversion: The Adult Eysenck Personality Questionnaire – Revised (EPQ-R; 
Eysenck et al., 1985b; Appendix 11): This 100-item self-report personality inventory 
measures psychoticism, extraversion, and neuroticism. Extraversion is the only trait 
of interest here, and refers to the propensity to be energised by active involvement 
in events via 23 items (e.g. ‘Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a 
lively party?’). Participants rate each item as ‘Yes’ (1) or ‘No’ (0) depending on 
whether or not the question represents the respondent’s typical feelings or 
behaviour, independent of current mood. Scores can range from 0 (highly 
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introverted) to 23 (highly extraverted). The scale has good test-retest reliability 
(alpha = 0.88; Eysenck et al., 1985). 
 The Recent Impulsivity Scale (RIS; Appendix 12): As described fully in Chapter 2, 
the RIS is an 8-item self-report questionnaire, concerned with the respondent’s 
frequency of specific instances of impulsive behaviour (e.g. ‘I have thought carefully 
before doing and saying things’) over the previous two weeks. Each item is rated on 
a four-point (0-3) Likert scale (‘never’, ‘rarely’, ‘quite often’ or ‘very often’). The 
items are summed into two subscales: Cognitive Impulsivity (CI) and Motor 
Impulsivity (MI). 
 The Trait Impulsivity Scale (TIS; Appendix 13): This 8-item questionnaire taps the 
respondent’s general propensity towards impulsive behaviour. It is structurally 
identical to the RIS, the only difference being the temporal context within which the 
items are framed. For example, where a SIS item would be ‘Within the last two 
weeks I have thought carefully before doing and saying things’, the corresponding 
TIS item would be simply ‘I think carefully before doing and saying things’. The 
response options are the same as for the RIS, and the items also sum into CI and MI 
subscales. 
[C] Experimental measures 
 Modified Continuous Performance Test (CPT: Conners et al., 2003): This taps 
sustained attention and response inhibition. The version used here presents 
participants with a sequence of animal-related and distractor (stationery-related) 
words on a computer screen; the participant is instructed to press a button in 
response to all animal-related words and not to respond to distractors. Responses 
to distractors are thus ‘commission errors’. Details of the stimuli are given in 
Appendix 14. 
Using e-prime, words were presented individually one after another in random 
sequence, in the centre of a computer screen, in ‘Courier New’ bold black 18-point 
font against a white background. Each was preceded by a 500 msec fixation 
stimulus (‘+’), and was presented for a maximum of 1300 msec or until the 
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participant responded by pressing the ‘go’ button. There were 252 ‘go’ (animal) and 
28 ‘no-go’ (stationery) stimuli (a ratio of 9:1). 
Participants were given the following instructions, both on-screen and verbally: ‘You 
are going to be presented with a series of words. Each word will appear at the 
centre of the screen and will be preceded by a fixation cross, ‘+’. Please keep 
looking at the ‘+’ until the word appears. When the word appears, press the left-
most button on the box, as quickly as you can, if it represents an animal. If the word 
does not represent an animal, you should withhold responding by not pressing the 
button.’ They were instructed to press the button to begin the task when they felt 
ready, at which point recording began. 
Before a participant completed the CPT ‘proper’, they became familiar with the 
procedure by completing a 42-trial practice version. The details of the practice 
version were identical to those given above, with the exception that the go to no-go 
stimulus word ratio was 2:1. 
The dependent variables (DVs) were the total number of commission errors (i.e. 
responses to no-go stimuli) and the average response time for accurate go 
responses. 
 Cue-Reactivity: As described on page 119, participants were exposed to a block 
of AR and a block of HR words in counter-balanced order during which their ERPs 
were recorded. Ratings of subjective craving were given following exposure to each 
block of words. 
The words were selected on the basis of a pilot study in which a preliminary set of 
78 alcohol-related and household-related words were rated for arousal and 
familiarity by a separate group of 16 undergraduate students who reported drinking 
at or above the UK recommended weekly limits for alcohol consumption (14 units 
for women and 21 for men). It was important to match the two types of word list 
for these characteristics since ERPs are influenced by level of emotional arousal 
(Carretie et al., 2001) and novelty (Ruhnau et al., 2010). The arousal scale ranged 
from ‘-10’ (‘extremely negatively arousing’) through ‘0’ (‘neither positively nor 
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negatively arousing’) to ‘+10’ (‘extremely positively arousing’). The familiarity scale 
ranged from ‘1’ (‘not at all familiar’) to ‘7’ (‘extremely familiar’). Respondents were 
instructed not to think too hard about each answer, and to give their first, ‘gut-
level’ response. The words were presented in a quasi-random order, so that the 
same category of word did not appear more than twice consecutively. Subsets of 17 
alcohol-related and household-related words were then matched for word length, 
number of syllables, arousal, familiarity and frequency in the English language as 
indexed in the CELEX database (Baayen, Piepenbrock & Gulikers, 1995; see Table 
3.1). 
The final AR words were: beer; whisky; scotch; rum; vodka; liqueur; bourbon; wine; 
bitter; brandy; sherry; cider; booze; gin; cocktail; alcopops; and lager. The final HR 
words were: roof; balcony; bath; lamp; floor; fence; chimney; alcove; carpet; tap; 
fireplace; patio; bench; porch; towel; kitchen; and rug. 
Table 3.1: Mean (standard deviations) characteristics of the final alcohol-related 
and household-related word stimuli 
Characteristic AR words  
(n = 17) 
HR words  
(n = 17) 
t value p 
value 
Word length (no. of letters) 5.53 (1.50) 5.30 (1.57) 0.45 (df = 32) ns 
Number of syllables 1.65 (0.61) 1.65 (0.79) 0.00 (df = 32) ns 
Arousal 1.67 (1.58) 1.39 (1.18) 0.59 (df = 32) ns 
Familiarity 5.54 (0.77) 5.76 (0.74) -0.86 (df = 32) ns 
Word frequency 
(appearances per million 
words) 
 
16.4 (22.2) 
 
 
38.2 (46.6) 
 
 
-1.69 (df = 31) 
 
 
ns 
 
Note = word frequency data for ‘alcopops’ was not available in the CELEX database; 
therefore, the independent-measures t-test for word frequency was conducted without this 
item (hence df = 31). 
The computer program ‘e-prime’ was used to generate the task, which entailed 
presenting the words sequentially on a monitor. Within each condition, the words 
were presented individually one after another in random sequence, in the centre of 
the screen; words were typed in ‘Courier New’ 18 font, in white against a black 
background. Participants were instructed to fixate on a ‘+’ in the centre of the 
screen; this appeared for 700 msec and was then immediately replaced by a word 
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stimulus for 200 msec; crosses and words alternated with these same durations of 
exposure and no inter-stimulus intervals until all 17 words had been presented 
eight times (i.e. 134 items in total). 
Participants were given the following instructions, both on-screen and verbally: 
‘When you press the left-most button on the button-box, you will be presented with 
a set of words. Your job is to keep looking at the centre of the screen, where the 
words will flash up individually one after another, and to read the word (in your 
head, not aloud) that is presented each time.’ In order to ensure that participants 
attended to the words, they were also instructed: ‘Please make sure you focus your 
attention upon reading the words, as you will be asked some questions about them 
at the end of the experiment.’ The participant was instructed to press the button to 
begin the first presentation when they felt ready, at which point ERP recording 
began. 
Within each experimental condition (AR or HR), each of the 17 words was then 
displayed once before ERP recording stopped for around thirty seconds; the same 
words were then presented again in a different order. This procedure was repeated 
eight times, yielding eight ERP datasets. The AR and HR conditions were separated 
by an interval during which participants completed the RIS, EPQ-E, CPT, DAST-10, 
FTQ and TIS. Order of ERP stimulus conditions was counter-balanced within both 
groups (LDs and HDs). In total, each condition lasted around eight minutes. 
Prior to and immediately following each word condition, participants were asked to 
rate ‘How strong is your desire to have a drink right now?’ by placing a mark on a 
10-centimetre Visual Analog Scale (VAS) anchored by the statements ‘Not at all’ and 
‘The most I’ve ever felt’. The score was derived by measuring the distance (in mm) 
from the ‘Not at all’ end of the VAS to the point marked by the participant; 
therefore, higher scores indicated greater desire. 
At the end of the testing session, participants rated the word stimuli using the 
arousal scale described above; they were instructed to give their first response and 
not to think too hard about each answer. The words were presented in a quasi-
random order, so that the same category of word did not appear more than twice 
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consecutively. The variable of interest here was the intensity of participants’ 
emotional response to the words and not the direction (positive or negative) of that 
response. Their ratings were therefore recoded to remove direction and to instead 
form a simple measure of deviation from centrality (i.e. deviation from ‘0’). That is, 
a score of ‘-6’, for example, was re-coded to ‘6’. 
PROCEDURE 
At the start of the session, participants provided a breath alcohol sample on a Lion 
Alcometer 500 (Lion Laboratories Ltd., Barry, UK) and were excluded if their breath 
alcohol level (BAL) exceeded zero (this did not in fact occur). 
The ERP suite comprises a central room off which are two testing booths. 
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair in a darkened, air-conditioned and 
sound-proofed booth, which was separated from the recording equipment. The 
door to the room remained closed throughout. Participants were seated 100 cm 
from the monitor. A response button-box was placed on the table in front of them, 
within easy reach of their dominant hand. 
Overall order of tests: The sequence of assessments was fixed across all 
participants, as follows: 
1. Subjective and ERP Cue-Reactivity – Condition I 
2. Recent Impulsiveness Scale 
3. EPQ-R 
4. CPT 
5. DAST-10 
6. FTQ 
7. Trait Impulsiveness Scale 
8. Subjective and ERP Cue-Reactivity – Condition II 
9. Ratings of cue arousal 
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CPT and Cue-Reactivity EEG data acquisition and segmentation: EEG data were 
recorded using BioSemi, an EEG-recording system. EEG was DC-recorded with a low-
pass filter of 100 Hz, a high-pass filter of 0.16 Hz, and a sampling rate of 512 Hz. 64 
active electrodes were mounted in an elastic cap in accordance with the 10-20 
system. Horizontal eye movements (HEOG) were measured bipolarly from a pair of 
electrodes placed at the outer canthi of the eyes. After data acquisition, EEG was 
digitally re-referenced to the average of the left and right earlobes. A low-pass filter 
of 40 Hz was applied, along with a high-pass filter of 0.53 Hz. ERP data were taken 
from 37 channels across anterior (FP1, FP2, AF3, AF4, Fz, F1, F2, F3, F4, F7, F8), 
central (FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, FC5, FC6, Cz, C1, C2, C3, C4, CP1, CP2, CP3, CP4, T7, T8) 
and posterior regions (Pz, P1, P2, P3, P4, PO3, PO4, O1, O2), and represented an 
even spread of electrodes by scalp region and by hemisphere. 
For the stimulus presentation interval, the EEG was epoched off-line into 900 msec 
periods, starting 100 msec before stimulus onset, until 800 msec following the 
onset of the visual stimulus for both ERP cue-reactivity and ERP inhibition stimuli. A 
100 msec pre-stimulus baseline correction was applied. Epochs containing blinks 
(automatic detection: ± 80 µV at Fpz) or other artifacts (automatic detection: ± 80 
µV at all other electrodes), which can contaminate the EEG record, were eliminated 
from further analyses. Remaining trials were averaged offline separately for AR and 
HR (ERP cue-reactivity) stimuli, and for no-go (ERP inhibition) stimuli, for each 
participant. Because the major purpose of the present study was to evaluate no-go 
P3 differences between the groups, ERP data from only the no-go word stimuli are 
presented here. 
Determining time segments for ERP CR stimuli: In order to determine the time 
segments for the statistical analyses in a data-driven manner, the grand mean time 
course of the ERPs (calculated using participants’ electrophysiological responses to 
all eight sets of stimuli presentations) was calculated for all participants, in both 
conditions at the twenty-four electrode locations. The resulting ERP waves for AR 
and HR words were visually inspected and appeared to correspond well with ERP 
waves typically observed in response to visual stimuli (see Figures 3.8-3.10 on p. 
142 for representations of the separate AR and HR waves in heavy and light 
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drinkers). P3 was defined as the largest positive peak following the N1-P2-N2 
complex (that is, the series of characteristic successive negative and positive peaks 
which, at around 300 msec, typically begin to give way to the P3 component; see 
Figure 3.1 on p. 106) and in this case was measured as occurring between 390 and 
470 msec post-stimulus. Following McDonough and Warren’s (2001) procedure for 
quantitative analysis of stimulus processing within this time window (that is, 390-
470 msec post-stimulus), mean amplitudes (i.e. the mean voltages occurring 
throughout this interval relative to the pre-stimulus baseline), were measured 
separately for AR and HR words. 
Determining time segments for ERP inhibitory control stimuli: The grand mean time 
course of the ERP responses to all 28 no-go stimuli presentations was calculated for 
all participants at the 31 electrode locations. The resulting ERP waves for no-go 
stimuli were visually inspected and again appeared to correspond well with ERP 
waves typically observed following no-go visual stimuli (see Figures 3.2-3.6 on p. 
134 for representations of the no-go waves in heavy and light drinkers); the 
paradigm elicited the no-go N2 and no-go P3 components. No-go N2 was defined as 
the second negative peak and was here measured as occurring between 250 and 
400 msec post-stimulus, whilst no-go P3 was measured as occurring between 400 
and 600 msec (i.e. again following the N1-P2-N2 complex). Following Holguín 
Rodríguez et al.’s (1999a, 1999b) protocol for quantitative analysis of stimulus 
processing within the time windows 250–400 and 400–600 msec post-stimulus, 
mean peak amplitudes were measured for no-go N2 and no-go P3 components in 
heavy and light drinkers separately: these are the highest voltages occurring during 
each time-frames relative to a pre-stimulus baseline. Mean latency – the amount of 
time taken for each participant to reach no-go N2 and no-go P3 peak amplitudes – 
was also recorded. 
Data reduction for ERP P3 CR: Following Franken et al.’s (2008) approach to 
simplifying interpretation of the results, and to reduce the number of analyses (Dien 
& Santuzzi, 2005), ERP cue-reactivity data were aggregated to yield P3 indices for 
three regions in each cerebral hemisphere: anterior (F1/2, F3/4, AF3/4), central 
(FC1/2, FC3/4, C1/2, C3/4, CP1/2, CP3/4), and posterior (P1/2, P3/4, PO3/O4). The 
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index of electrophysiological cue-reactivity was computed as the difference 
between the mean P3 amplitudes during AR and HR stimuli (i.e. AR minus HR). 
Data reduction for ERP no-go N2 and no-go P3 inhibitory responses: Following 
Rodríguez Holguín et al. (1999a, 1999b), no-go N2 and no-go P3 measurements 
were each organised into five regional electrode groupings: frontal (FP1, FP2, AF3, 
AF4, Fz, F3, F4, F7, F8), central (FC1, FC2, FC5, FC6, Cz, C3, C4), parietal (CP1, CP2, 
Pz, P3, P4), temporal (T7, T8, CP5, CP6, P7, P8) and occipital (PO3, PO4, O1, O2). 
Data analysis  
All statistical analyses were carried out using SPSS version 16. 
Results 
Data screening: Prior to analysis, variables were screened for accuracy of data 
entry, missing values, and fit between their distributions and the assumptions of 
multivariate analysis. There was no evidence of any clear non-linearity or 
curvilinearity. 
Participant characteristics: 
ERP data from four participants were excluded from all analyses because of 
excessive artifacts or noise. This left 22 (9 male and 13 female) participants; of 
these, 12 were HDs and 10 were LDs. One of the HDs with full ERP data lacked data 
for all other variables. There were one or two participants with missing data on 
other variables, as shown in Table 3.2, which displays the socio-demographic, 
personality and alcohol-related characteristics of participants in the two groups, 
and the results of between-groups comparisons. 
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Table 3.2: Socio-demographic, personality and alcohol-related characteristics of 
heavy versus light drinkers 
Variable 
N 
(HDs: 
LDs) 
Heavy 
drinkers 
Light 
drinkers 
HDs vs. LDs 
t or 
χ2 
p d 
Age (years) 10:10 22.7 (5.2) 21.3 (3.2) 0.73 ns - 
Gender (M:F) 12:10 5:7 4:6 0.01 ns - 
Typical weekly alcohol 
intake (units per week 
during previous year) 
12:10 44.3 (18.0) 2.13 (2.76) 7.67 0.00 
 
3.28 
Family history of 
alcohol use disorders 
(present/ absent) 
9:10 3:6 4:6 0.10 ns 
 
- 
Extraversion (EPQ-E) 11:9 16.0 (3.87) 10.44 (5.43) 2.67 0.02 1.27 
Psychoticism (EPQ-P) 11:10 8.36 (3.47) 6.90 (3.73) 0.93 ns - 
Neuroticism (EPQ-N) 11:10 
15.18 
(4.81) 
11.60 (6.98) 1.38 ns - 
 
Lie (EPQ-L) 11:9 5.45 (3.27) 7.33 (3.00) -1.33 ns - 
Anxiety (HADS-A) 11:9 8.27 (2.70) 5.56 (4.03) 1.74 0.10 0.85 
Depression (HADS-D) 11:9 4.09 (2.91) 4.22 (4.09) -0.08 ns - 
Trait Cognitive 
Impulsivity (TIS-CI) 
11:10 4.82 (2.56) 5.50 (1.84) -0.69 ns - 
Trait Motor 
Impulsivity (TIS-MI) 
11:10 5.91 (1.22) 4.60 (1.96) 1.86 0.08 0.85 
Recent Cognitive 
Impulsivity  (RIS-CI) 
11:10 5.91 (2.55) 5.40 (1.78) 0.53 ns - 
Recent Motor 
Impulsivity (RIS-MI) 
11:10 5.09 (2.21) 5.20 (2.39) -0.11 ns - 
Commission errors 
(CPT) 
11:10 4.27 (6.23) 3.90 (3.45) 0.17 ns - 
Values are mean +/- SD; p values are two-tailed. 
The ten light drinkers were aged between 18 and 28 years. Two of the heavy 
drinkers did not give their age; the remaining ten were between 18 and 33 years.  
As evident from the table, the two groups did not differ in age, gender ratio, level of 
current reward motivation, or family history of alcohol use disorders. Reflecting the 
differences in alcohol consumption required for categorisation as a light or heavy 
drinker, there was a highly significant difference between the groups for self-
reported weekly alcohol intake. 
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Seven individuals reported having a biological parent with a ‘possible’ or ‘definite’ 
history of alcohol problems (three HDs did not provide this information); the 
likelihood of this did not differ between LDs and HDs, suggesting no difference in 
their genetic predisposition towards alcohol use disorders. 
ERP data quality in LDs and HDs: 
 ERP CR data: For heavy drinkers, the mean number of artifact-free (or ‘good’) 
trials for AR stimuli was 120.73 (SD = 13.53), and for HR stimuli, the mean was 
119.09 (SD = 14.02). For light drinkers, the mean number of good trials for AR 
stimuli was 116.33 (SD = 18.91), and for HR stimuli, the mean was 115.44 (SD = 
24.92). The numbers of good trials for AR words and HR words did not differ 
significantly between heavy and light drinkers (F (1, 18) < 1, ns, in both cases). 
 ERP no-go data: For heavy drinkers, the mean number of artifact-free trials for 
no-go stimuli was 22.63 (SD = 3.20), and for light drinkers the mean was 23.60 (SD = 
3.56). The number of good trials did not differ significantly between the groups (F 
(1, 18) < 1; ns). 
Hypothesis-testing: Each hypothesis is recapitulated below, followed by the 
corresponding analysis/analyses. 
[A] Personality variables 
Hypothesis 1: Compared to LDs, HDs will have higher EPQ-E scores 
There were 11 HDs and 9 LDs for this analysis. As predicted, an independent-
measures t-test revealed HDs were more extraverted than LDs (see Table 3.2 on p. 
130). 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to LDs, HDs will show higher impulsiveness as indexed by 
(i) subjective ratings (TIS and RIS scores), and (ii) more commission errors in the 
CPT 
Independent-measures t-tests were performed on 11 heavy and 10 light drinkers’ 
TIS and RIS sub-scale scores, and on commission errors. As shown in Table 3.2, there 
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were no differences between LDs and HDs on any of these indices; thus, the 
hypothesis was not supported. 
[B] ERPs during the CPT 
Hypothesis 3: Compared to LDs, HDs will show reduced no-go P3 amplitude and 
increased no-go P3 latency in the CPT 
Hypothesis 4: Compared to LDs, HDs will show reduced no-go N2 amplitude and 
increased no-go N2 latency in the CPT 
For both these hypotheses, the relevant ERP components were analysed separately 
for amplitude and latency via 2 x 5 mixed-measures ANOVAs with the independent-
measures factor of DRINKING GROUP (HDs versus LDs) and the repeated-measures 
factor of ELECTRODE REGION (frontal vs. central vs. parietal vs. temporal vs. 
occipital). For these analyses there were 10 HDs and 10 LDs. All variables were 
screened for univariate outliers (i.e. cases having an extreme value on one variable, 
with standardised scores exceeding 3.29 (p < 0.001, 2-tailed); Tabachnik & Fidell, 
2007). Only the theoretically relevant main effects of DRINKING GROUP and the 
ELECTRODE REGION x DRINKING GROUP interaction effects are reported (although 
main effects of ELECTRODE REGION are presented in Appendix 15 for 
completeness). 
Hypothesis 3 – The no-go P3: Amplitude and latency scores are shown in Table 3.3, 
for HDs and LDs separately in the different brain regions. 
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Table 3.3: Means and SDs (µV) for the peak amplitude and latency of the no-go P3 
component, among heavy and light social drinkers, across frontal (FP1, FP2, AF3, 
AF4, Fz, F3, F4, F7, F8), central (FC1, FC2, FC5, FC6, Cz, C3, C4), parietal (CP1, CP2, 
Pz, P3, P4), temporal (T7, T8, CP5, CP6, P7, P8) and occipital (PO3, PO4, O1, O2) 
electrode regions 
 No-go P3 amplitude No-go P3 latency 
 
Electrode region 
Heavy 
drinkers  
(n = 10) 
Light 
drinkers  
(n = 10) 
Heavy 
drinkers  
(n = 10) 
Light 
drinkers  
(n = 10) 
Frontal 3.34 (2.62) 3.53 (2.44) 0.54 (0.03) 0.54 (0.03) 
Central 6.11 (2.39) 7.33 (2.21) 0.52 (0.05) 0.54 (0.02) 
Parietal 6.90 (2.18) 8.11 (2.23) 0.53 (0.04) 0.54 (0.03) 
Temporal 3.85 (1.23) 3.80 (1.37) 0.54 (0.02) 0.55 (0.03) 
Occipital 5.73 (2.08) 5.80 (2.82) 0.52 (0.03) 0.53 (0.04) 
Grand mean 
(collapsed across 
all electrode sites) 
 
5.19 (1.43) 
 
5.71 (1.38) 
 
0.53 (0.03) 
 
0.54 (0.02) 
 
Figures 3.2-3.6 illustrate the grand mean ERP curves in response to no-go words for 
frontal (FP1, FP2, AF3, AF4, Fz, F3, F4, F7, F8), central (FC1, FC2, FC5, FC6, Cz, C3, 
C4), parietal (CP1, CP2, Pz, P3, P4), temporal (T7, T8, CP5, CP6, P7, P8) and occipital 
(PO3, PO4, O1, O2) electrode regions in heavy and light drinkers. These figures 
show amplitudes and latencies for the no-go N2 (that is, the second negative peaks, 
occurring here between 250 and 400 msec post-stimulus) and the no-go P3 (that is, 
the third positive peaks, occurring here between 400 and 600 msec post-stimulus).
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Figure 3.2: ERPs elicited by no-go words at frontal electrodes (FP1, FP2, AF3, AF4, 
F3, F4, F7 and F8) in heavy drinkers (n = 10) and in light drinkers (n = 10) 
 
Figure 3.3: ERPs elicited by no-go words at central electrodes (FC1, FC2, FC5, FC6, 
Cz, C3 and C4) in heavy drinkers (n = 10) and in light drinkers (n = 10) 
 
Figure 3.4: ERPs elicited by no-go words at parietal electrodes (CP1, CP2, Pz, P3 and 
P4) in heavy drinkers (n = 10) and in light drinkers (n = 10) 
 
Figure 3.5: ERPs elicited by no-go words at temporal electrodes (T7, T8, CP5, CP6, 
P7 and P8) in heavy drinkers (n = 10) and in light drinkers (n = 10) 
 
Figure 3.6: ERPs elicited by no-go words at occipital electrodes (PO3, PO4, O1 and 
O2) in heavy drinkers (n = 10) and in light drinkers (n = 10) 
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(a) No-go P3 amplitudes: There were no univariate outliers. The main effect of 
DRINKING GROUP was non-significant [F (1, 18) = 0.71; ns], as was the ELECTRODE 
REGION x DRINKING GROUP interaction [F (4, 72) = 0.55; ns]. 
(b) No-go P3 latency: Again, there were no univariate outliers. The main effect of 
DRINKING GROUP was non-significant [F (1, 18) = 0.93; ns], as was the ELECTRODE 
REGION x DRINKING GROUP interaction [F (4, 72) = 0.87; ns]. 
Hypothesis 3 was therefore not supported. 
Hypothesis 4 – The no-go N2: Amplitude and latency scores are shown in Table 3.4, 
for HDs and LDs separately in the different brain regions. 
Table 3.4: Means and SDs (µV) for the amplitude and latency of the no-go N2 
component, among heavy and light social drinkers, across frontal (FP1, FP2, AF3, 
AF4, Fz, F3, F4, F7, F8), central (FC1, FC2, FC5, FC6, Cz, C3, C4), parietal (CP1, CP2, 
Pz, P3, P4), temporal (T7, T8, CP5, CP6, P7, P8) and occipital (PO3, PO4, O1, O2) 
electrode regions 
 No-go N2 amplitude No-go N2 latency 
 
Electrode region 
Heavy 
drinkers 
(n = 10) 
Light 
drinkers 
(n = 10) 
Heavy 
drinkers 
(n = 10) 
Light 
drinkers 
(n = 10) 
Frontal -3.41 (2.28) -3.75 (3.19) 0.35 (0.02) 0.36 (0.01) 
Central -4.85 (2.18) -4.84 (2.33) 0.34 (0.02) 0.35 (0.02) 
Parietal -3.10 (1.67) -3.71 (1.85) 0.31 (0.05) 0.30 (0.03) 
Temporal -3.39 (1.70) -3.94 (1.82) 0.32 (0.03) 0.31 (0.03) 
Occipital -1.39 (2.26) -3.44 (2.71) 0.30 (0.05) 0.30 (0.03) 
Grand mean 
(collapsed across 
all electrode sites) 
 
-3.23 (1.48) 
 
-3.94 (1.65) 
 
0.32 (0.02) 
 
0.32 (0.02) 
 
(a) No-go N2 amplitude: There were no univariate outliers. Table 3.4 shows the 
mean ERP values for no-go N2 amplitude as well as no-go N2 latency. The main 
effect of DRINKING GROUP was non-significant [F (1, 18) = 1.02; ns], as was the 
ELECTRODE REGION x DRINKING GROUP interaction [F (4, 72) = 0.96; ns]. 
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(b) No-go N2 latency: Again, there were no univariate outliers, nor were there 
significant effects of DRINKING GROUP [F (1, 18) = 0.00; ns] or ELECTRODE REGION x 
DRINKING GROUP [F (4, 72) = 1.17; ns]. 
Hypothesis four was therefore not supported. 
[C] Cue reactivity 
Hypothesis 5: Within the combined sample, Recent Impulsiveness (RIS scores) will 
correlate more strongly than Trait Impulsiveness (TIS scores) with scores for: i) 
subjective and ERP cue-reactivity (CR) and; ii) behavioural and ERP measures of 
impulsiveness in the CPT 
Dunn & Clark’s (1969) Z1* statistic was used to test the significance of differences 
between the magnitude of RIS and TIS correlations with subjective and ERP CR and 
behavioural and ERP measures of impulsiveness in the CPT, within the whole 
sample. The data are shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: Spearman correlations between RIS and TIS subscales and: i) subjective 
and electrophysiological CR and; ii) behavioural and ERP measures of impulsiveness 
in the CPT, in the combined sample of HDs and LDs 
Variable 
Cognitive Impulsivity Motor Impulsivity 
TIS 
(r) 
RIS 
(r) 
TIS vs. RIS 
(Z1*) 
TIS 
(r) 
RIS 
(r) 
TIS vs. RIS 
(Z1*) 
Subjective CRa 0.30† 0.39* 0.75 -0.21 -0.05 0.72 
Electrophysiological CRb -0.05 -0.07 0.16 0.16 0.47* 1.55†  
Commission errors (CPT)b -0.08 -0.02 -0.47 0.04 0.14 -0.46 
Nogo P3 amplitude (CPT)a 0.31† 0.25 0.43 0.04 0.05 -0.05 
Nogo P3 latency (CPT)a -0.40* -0.35† -0.37 0.08 0.29 -1.00 
Nogo N2 amplitude 
(CPT)a 
-0.59** -0.54** -0.43 -0.11 0.05 -0.73 
Nogo N2 latency (CPT)a -0.07 -0.15 0.55 -0.20 -0.31† 0.52 
aN = 20; bN = 21. 
**p≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05; † trend - p ≤ 0.10.  All tests one-tailed. 
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(a) Subjective CR: There was no difference in the extent to which subjective cue 
reactivity (ratings of desire for a drink) correlated with the RIS and the TIS, for either 
the Cognitive Impulsivity or the Motor Impulsivity subscales. 
(b) Electrophysiological CR: There was a strong trend for this to correlate more 
strongly with RIS Motor Impulsivity than TIS Motor Impulsivity, though it fell short 
of significance. There was however no hint of any difference between its 
correlations with the RIS and TIS Cognitive Impulsivity subscales. 
(c) Behavioural and ERP measures of impulsiveness in the CPT: There were no hints 
of any differences between these measures’ respective correlations with the RIS 
and TIS Cognitive and Motor Impulsivity subscales. 
Overall, hypothesis five was not supported. However, the strong trend for ERP cue-
reactivity to correlate more strongly with RIS than with TIS Motor Impulsivity 
echoes the finding of Study 1 in which, amongst those who had reported a recent 
change in their alcohol intake, there was a significant correlation between the 
Motor Impulsivity ‘change’ variable and alcohol intake within the previous two 
weeks.  This issue will be considered further in the Discussion. 
Hypothesis 6: Within the combined sample, ERP cue reactivity (CR) will correlate 
significantly with (i) subjective CR and (ii) subjective ratings of stimulus arousal 
Spearman correlations explored the interrelationships between cue-elicited 
electrophysiological and subjective responses, and stimulus arousal. 
Electrophysiological CR was computed as mean P3 amplitudes to alcohol-related 
(AR) words minus mean P3 amplitudes to neutral (household-related; HR) words.  
Similarly, the index of subjective CR was mean self-reported desire for alcohol 
following AR words minus mean self-reported desire following HR words. The 
relative arousal rating of AR words was computed by subtracting from these ratings 
the arousal ratings of HR words. 
Correlations within the combined sample are shown in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6: Spearman correlations (p value, 1-tailed) between mean 
electrophysiological CR at all electrode locations and mean self-reported subjective 
CR and arousal ratings in the whole sample 
Self-report variable Correlation with mean ERP CR 
Subjective CRa -0.08 
Relative arousal rating of AR wordsb    0.37* 
aN = 20; bN = 21.  *p ≤ 0.05 
ERP CR correlated significantly with the relative arousal rating of AR words, as 
predicted, but not with subjective CR. Hypothesis six was therefore partially 
supported. 
Exploratory analyses also examined these correlations within each group 
separately; although the groups are too small to give sufficient power to detect 
anything other than very large associations, it was of interest to see whether there 
were any trends. However, the correlations between ERP CR and subjective CR were 
very small in both the 9 LDs (r = -0.25, ns) and the 11 HDs (r = 0.15, ns). There was a 
trend in the LDs, but not in the HDs, for ERP reactivity to be greater towards the 
more arousing AR cues (LDs: r = 0.39, p = 0.13; HDs, r = -0.09, ns). 
Hypothesis 7: Compared to LDs, HDs will assign higher arousal ratings to AR 
stimuli, relative to HR stimuli 
Table 3.7 and Figure 3.7 illustrate the mean arousal ratings for the AR and HR word 
stimuli for the 11 HDs and 10 LDs. 
Table 3.7: Means and SDs for arousal ratings of the AR and HR words in heavy 
drinkers, light drinkers and the whole sample 
Word-type Heavy drinkers  
(n = 11) 
Light drinkers  
(n = 10) 
Whole sample  
(N = 21) 
AR 3.12 (1.38) 2.35 (1.24) 2.75 (1.34) 
HR 1.06 (1.17) 2.24 (2.30) 1.62 (1.85) 
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Figure 3.7: Mean (+/- 1 SE) arousal ratings in heavy and light drinkers 
Arousal ratings were analysed via a 2 x 2 mixed-measures ANOVA with the 
independent-measures factor of DRINKING GROUP (HDs vs. LDs) and the repeated-
measures factor of WORD-TYPE (AR vs. HR). There were no univariate outliers. 
Significant effects were examined by means of Bonferroni-corrected post hoc t-
tests. 
There was a significant main effect of WORD-TYPE [F (1, 19) = 10.01; p = 0.01; ηp
2 = 
0.35]: AR words were rated higher for arousal than HR words. Although there was 
no main effect of DRINKING GROUP [F (1, 19) = 0.11; ns], there was a significant 
WORD-TYPE by DRINKING GROUP interaction [F (1, 19) = 8.06; p = 0.01; ηp
2 = 0.30]. 
Bonferroni-corrected independent-measures t-tests revealed no significant 
differences between heavy and light drinkers in their ratings of either AR or HR 
words [t (19) = -1.35 and 1.46; ns]. However, whilst for LDs there was no difference 
between ratings of AR and HR words [t (9) = 0.18; ns], HDs rated AR words as 
significantly more arousing than HR words [t (10) = 6.68; p < 0.01; d = 2.02]. 
Hypothesis seven was thus partially supported. 
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Exploratory analyses examined HDs’ and LDs’ affective valence ratings (i.e. taking 
account of the direction of the emotional reaction – positive or negative), again via 
a 2 x 2 mixed-measures ANOVA. Table 3.8 shows the mean valence ratings for the 
AR and HR word stimuli for the 11 HDs and 10 LDs. Scores could range between -10 
and +10. 
Table 3.8: Means and SDs for valence ratings of the AR and HR words in heavy 
drinkers and light drinkers 
Word-type Heavy drinkers (n = 11) Light drinkers (n = 10) 
AR 1.58 (1.86) 1.22 (1.41) 
HR 0.93 (0.94) 1.48 (1.71) 
 
There were no main effects for either WORD-TYPE or DRINKING GROUP [F (1, 19) = 
0.34 and 0.03 respectively; both ns], nor a WORD-TYPE by DRINKING GROUP 
interaction [F (1, 19) = 1.87; ns]. Thus, the groups did not differ in their ratings of 
the emotional valence of terms of AR or HR words. 
Hypothesis 8: Compared to LDs, HDs will report greater subjective alcohol desire 
after presentation of the alcohol-related stimuli 
Subjective alcohol desire was analysed via a 2 x 2 mixed-measures ANOVA with the 
independent-measures factor of DRINKING GROUP (HDs vs. LDs) and the repeated-
measures factor of WORD-TYPE (AR vs. HR). There were no univariate outliers. 
Table 3.9 shows mean desire ratings in response to the AR and HR word stimuli for 
the 11 HDs and 9 LDs. 
Table 3.9: Means and SDs for subjective alcohol desire in response to AR and HR 
words in heavy drinkers, light drinkers and the whole sample (N = 20) 
Word-type Heavy drinkers  
(n = 11) 
Light drinkers  
(n = 9) 
Whole sample  
(N = 20) 
AR -4.18 (11.74) -0.67 (8.59) -2.60 (10.34) 
HR 0.41 (15.62) 7.17 (11.32) 3.45 (13.94) 
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There was a significant main effect of WORD-TYPE [F (1, 18) = 6.83; p = 0.02; ηp
2 = 
0.28], AR words eliciting greater subjective desire for alcohol in both groups. 
However, the main effect of DRINKING GROUP was non-significant [F (1, 18) = 1.06; 
ns], as was the WORD-TYPE by DRINKING GROUP interaction [F (1, 18) = 0.47; ns]. 
Hypothesis 8 was therefore not supported. 
Hypothesis 9: Compared to LDs, HDs will show a pronounced P3 amplitude 
response specifically to AR stimuli 
P3 amplitudes were analysed via a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 mixed-measures ANOVA with the 
independent-measures factor of DRINKING GROUP (12 HDs vs. 10 LDs) and the 
repeated-measures factors of WORD-TYPE (AR vs. HR), HEMISPHERE (left vs. right) 
and CAUDALITY (anterior vs. central vs. posterior). There were no univariate 
outliers. 
Significant multivariate effects were examined by means of Bonferroni-corrected 
post-hoc t-tests. Only the theoretically relevant main effects of DRINKING GROUP 
and WORD-TYPE, as well as the DRINKING GROUP by WORD-TYPE interaction, are 
presented here (though all main and interaction effects are presented in Appendix 
16 for completeness). 
Figures 3.8-3.10 illustrate the grand mean ERP curves for AR and HR words for 
anterior (F1, F2, F3, F4, AF3 and AF4), central (FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, C1, C2, C3, C4, 
CP1, CP2, CP3 and CP4), and posterior (P1, P2, P3, P4, PO3 and PO4) electrodes in 
heavy and light drinkers. These figures demonstrate that in HDs but not LDs, P3 
amplitudes (that is, the third positive peaks, occurring between 390 and 470 msec 
post-stimulus) following AR words were larger than those following HR words. 
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Figure 3.8: ERPs elicited by AR and HR words at anterior electrodes (F1, F2, F3, F4, AF3 and AF4) in heavy drinkers (n = 12; left panel) and in 
light drinkers (n = 10; right panel) 
 
Figure 3.9: ERPs elicited by AR and HR words at central electrodes (FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, C1, C2, C3, C4, CP1, CP2, CP3 and CP4) in heavy drinkers 
(n = 12; left panel) and in light drinkers (n = 10; right panel) 
 
Figure 3.10: ERPs elicited by AR and HR words at posterior electrodes (P1, P2, P3, P4, PO3 and PO4) in heavy drinkers (n = 12; left panel) and in 
light drinkers (n = 10; right panel) 
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Table 3.10 and Figure 3.11 show the mean ERP values. 
Table 3.10: Mean amplitude and SDs (µV) in the P3 time window on the AR and HR 
stimuli across anterior (F1/2, F3/4, AF3/4), central (FC1/2, FC3/4, C1/2, C3/4, CP1/2, 
CP3/4) and posterior electrodes (P1/2, P3/4, PO3/O4) in each hemisphere 
 
Region 
 
Hemisphere 
 
Stimulus 
Heavy 
drinkers  
(n = 12) 
Light 
drinkers  
(n = 10) 
 
Anterior 
Left AR -0.18 (1.46) -0.39 (1.25) 
HR -0.61 (1.32) -0.59 (1.55) 
Right AR -0.30 (1.28) -0.64 (1.41) 
HR -0.83 (1.27) -0.54 (1.59) 
 
Central 
Left AR 0.45 (1.34) 0.28 (1.34) 
HR -0.29 (1.31) 0.33 (1.31) 
Right AR 0.15 (1.12) -0.11 (1.42) 
HR -0.67 (1.21) 0.11 (1.41) 
 
Posterior 
Left AR 1.11 (1.24) 1.21 (1.28) 
HR 0.30 (0.98) 1.06 (1.10) 
Right AR 0.67 (0.99) 0.43 (1.11) 
HR -0.10 (0.99) 0.71 (1.08) 
Grand mean (collapsed 
across all electrode sites) 
AR 0.32 (0.93) 0.13 (0.98) 
HR -0.37 (0.87) 0.18 (1.02) 
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Figure 3.11: Mean (+/- 1 SE) P3 amplitude in heavy and light drinkers 
The main effect of DRINKING GROUP was non-significant [F (1, 20) = 0.24; ns]. The 
main effect of WORD-TYPE demonstrated a strong trend towards significance [F (1, 
20) = 3.63; p = 0.07], owing to greater mean P3 amplitudes in response to AR words, 
compared to HR words. 
The WORD-TYPE x GROUP interaction was significant [F (1, 20) = 4.89; p = 0.04; ηp
2 = 
0.20], but there were no further interactions with caudality or laterality. Bonferroni-
corrected independent-measures t-tests revealed that although the groups did not 
differ in their P3 amplitudes to either AR or HR words [t (20) = -0.46 and 1.36, 
respectively], HDs but not LDs showed significantly greater P3 responses to AR 
words than HR words [HDs: t (11) = 2.35, p = 0.04; d = 0.67; LDs: t (9) = -0.52, ns]. 
Whilst consistent with the hypothesis, it is notable that this difference between the 
groups largely reflected an unexpected tendency for HDs to show somewhat 
blunted amplitudes to neutral (HR) words as well as a slightly greater positive 
amplitude to AR words. 
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Given the significant difference between the groups’ EPQ-E scores (Hypothesis 1), 
and the significant CUE AROUSAL x DRINKING GROUP interaction (Hypothesis 6), a 2 
x 2 analysis of covariance was conducted to explore whether these variables could 
explain the observed P3 effect. However, the WORD TYPE x DRINKING GROUP 
interaction remained significant after co-varying these factors [F (1, 16) = 4.37; p = 
0.05; ηp
2 = 0.21]. Thus, neither differences in extraversion nor differences in self-
reported arousal contributed to the higher P3 cue-reactivity in HDs. 
Exploratory analyses examined the ERP CR values for individual participants. 5/10 
LDs and 9/12 HDs individually demonstrated ERP CR as indicated by greater P3 
amplitudes to AR than to HR words. However, this difference between the groups 
was not statistically significant [χ2 = 0.33; p = 0.28, 1-tailed]. 
Discussion 
The main findings of the present study were as follows. Heavy drinkers but not light 
drinkers demonstrated greater P3 amplitudes to alcohol-related (AR) than to 
neutral (household-related; HR) words, albeit that the groups did not differ in terms 
of the absolute level of P3 amplitude following AR words. A corresponding pattern 
was seen for their ratings of the words’ arousal. Within the combined sample, there 
was a positive and significant correlation between ERP responses to, and subjective 
affective salience of, the cues. There were no differences in terms of subjective cue-
reactivity, and there was no relationship between ERP and subjective cue-reactivity. 
Heavy drinkers were more extraverted than light drinkers, but this did not explain 
their greater P3 amplitudes in response to AR words compared to HR words. The 
groups did not differ in terms of their impulsiveness as measured by the subjective 
trait (TIS) or recent (RIS) subscales, by commission errors on the CPT, or by P3 or N2 
amplitudes and latencies during the no-go trials of the CPT. There was a strong 
trend for recent Motor Impulsivity (RIS-MI) to be more strongly associated than trait 
MI (TIS-MI) with ERP cue-reactivity; however, there was no hint of any such recent-
trait difference for the Cognitive Impulsivity (CI) subscale. Subjective cue-reactivity 
was not differentially associated with recent or trait impulsivity, for either subscale. 
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None of the behavioural and ERP measures of impulsivity in the CPT shared stronger 
correlations with recent relative to trait impulsivity.  
The following discussion first focuses on ERP CR and self-reported 
affective/appetitive responses to the AR words; these data are considered in the 
broader context of cue-reactivity theory. It then considers the possible relevance of 
impulsiveness and the ERPs elicited by no-go trials of the CPT. 
1) Appetitive responses to alcohol-related word stimuli in HDs 
i) Appetitive responses to alcohol-related word stimuli in HDs as revealed by ERPs 
Hypothesis 9, that compared to LDs, HDs would show a more pronounced P3 
amplitude response specifically to AR stimuli, was partially supported. HDs but not 
LDs showed greater P3 amplitudes in response to AR words than to HR words 
(Figure 3.11 on p. 144), though the groups did not differ in absolute levels of 
amplitude to either type of word. Unexpectedly however, this interaction was partly 
explained by the HDs showing a somewhat blunted amplitude to HR word 
presentation. 
HDs’ blunted reactivity to HR words may reflect a pre-existing lack of interest in and 
engagement by everyday stimuli, which could have contributed to these 
participants’ heavy alcohol consumption. For example, Ziervogel et al. (1997) 
reported that amongst a sample of male adolescents, one factor which predicted 
higher consumption of alcohol was boredom; and Malmberg et al. (2010) have 
reported that adolescents who scored highly on trait measures of sensation-seeking 
(which may reflect low responsivity to stimulation) were at higher risk for early 
onset of alcohol use. Conversely, regular heavy alcohol consumption may reduce 
the extent to which attention and interest can be captured by relatively run of the 
mill, everyday stimuli such as household-related items. Such issues of causality are 
beyond the scope of the current cross-sectional study. However, it is interesting to 
speculate on whether heavy drinkers would show abnormal ERP responses to other 
non-alcohol-related stimuli – for example, to those with higher intrinsic levels of 
interest or motivational significance. Future studies could address this by including a 
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third category of word stimuli relating to powerful ‘natural’ reinforcers such as food 
and/or sex. 
The findings of the present study differ from those of Herrmann et al. (2001), who 
found HDs to show significantly greater P3 amplitudes to alcohol-related stimuli 
than light drinkers. However, direct comparison between the two studies is limited 
by some important procedural and analysis differences. Firstly, the heavy and light 
drinkers here were classified on the basis of a priori assessment of their weekly 
alcohol intake, whereas Herrmann et al.’s (2001) heavy and light drinkers group 
were classified via median split. Thus the HDs in Herrmann et al. (2001) consumed 
an average of 15.3 units per week, markedly less than the average of 44.3 units 
consumed by the present HDs. Although it might normally be expected that heavier 
drinkers would show any such effects more strongly, it seems likely that in fact 
Herrmann’s findings were a statistical artifact. Thus the present study analysed P3 
data from an even spread of electrode sites over the scalp and across hemispheres, 
and found no effects either in aggregate or as a function of spatial location.  
Herrmann et al. (2001) reported a difference only at the frontal electrode location 
Fz, despite having recorded from 21 scalp sites. In another study with alcoholic 
participants, Herrmann et al. (2000) again recorded from 21 electrode sites but 
reported an effect only at the posterior site Pz. This pattern, inconsistent between 
their two studies, suggests that their observed P3 differences may well have been 
spurious. 
Selecting participants based upon pre-specified drinking criteria, as the present 
study did, is preferable to conducting a median split. Averaging data across an even 
spread of scalp electrodes within anterior, central and posterior regions, rather than 
reporting effects at just one or two locations, may be a more robust method of 
examining electrophysiological response. In these respects, therefore, the present 
study was methodologically stronger than that conducted by Herrmann et al. 
(2001). Nevertheless, despite the differences between the two studies, in both, the 
P3 response to alcohol-related stimuli varied depending on an individual’s typical 
weekly alcohol intake. The precise nature of this difference remains uncertain and 
further research is needed. Broadly, however, the electrophysiological results of the 
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present study are consistent with previous studies which have reported ERP CR in 
users of other addictive substances, such as those examining nicotine (Warren & 
McDonough, 1999; McDonough & Warren, 2001), cocaine (van de Laar et al., 2004; 
Franken et al., 2008) and heroin (Franken et al., 2003). 
Another methodological strength of the present study was the procedure by which 
the AR and HR word stimuli were presented. Having equal numbers of each word 
type and presenting them within separate conditions reduced the likelihood of a 
confound with stimulus novelty. This has complicated previous research with similar 
findings: thus for example Genkina and Shostakovich (1987) presented their word 
stimuli in the form of an oddball task, meaning that their observed P3 responses 
may have reflected a novelty effect. As it is, the most plausible explanation for the 
greater P3 amplitude elicited by AR words in HDs observed here is that they elicited 
were more emotionally salient than HR words. 
Interestingly, there was a trend for greater P3 amplitudes in response to AR words 
compared to HR words across both HDs and LDs. Additional exploratory analyses 
found that 5/10 LDs and 9/12 HDs individually demonstrated electrophysiological 
cue-reactivity as indicated by higher P3s to AR than HR words. That 50% of LDs and 
75% of HDs showed ERP CR is consistent with its development being in part a 
consequence of drinking experience, though it is notable that not all HDs 
demonstrated ERP CR. It is thus not a precondition or necessary consequence of 
heavy drinking. Nevertheless, it may be the case that LDs who are more responsive 
to AR stimuli are more likely to progress to heavier alcohol intake (i.e. that elevated 
ERP CR represents a vulnerability factor). It would be interesting to follow 
participants up in a few years time to see whether such differential progression has 
in fact occurred, though the present sample is probably too small and under-
powered for detecting real effects. 
These findings are consistent with those of Greeley et al. (1993), who found some 
level of CR to be present in LDs as well as HDs. Cue-reactivity therefore appears to 
occur (to decreasing extents) in alcohol abusers, heavy social drinkers and light 
social drinkers. 
149 
 
ii) Heightened extraversion in HDs and ERP CR 
Hypothesis 1 was supported: HDs had an EPQ-E score of 16.0, significantly higher 
than LDs’ score of 10.4. This is consistent with Vollrath and Torgersen’s (2008) 
finding that those who engage in more risky alcohol consumption are more likely to 
be extraverted. However, the difference in extraversion did not account for the 
difference in ERP cue-reactivity. Thus the heightened CR of the HDs probably does 
not reflect greater sensitivity to the social connotations of the AR stimuli. 
iii) Self-reported appetitive responses to alcohol-related word stimuli, and 
associations between these measures and ERP P3 responses 
Hypothesis 7, which predicted that compared to LDs, HDs would rate AR words 
higher for arousal, was also partially supported. Thus HDs but not LDs rated AR 
words as more arousing than HR words. However, the groups did not differ from 
each other in the arousal they attributed to either AR or HR words separately. 
For HDs, the higher arousal ratings of AR, relative to HR words, mirrors their greater 
P3 amplitudes to AR than HR words. It is possible that both forms of response 
reflect the development of incentive salience through frequent alcohol-associated 
experiences. However, there are some important differences between 
electrophysiological and self-report data. Firstly, electrophysiological data are 
objective and less susceptible to subjective bias than self-report measures. 
Secondly, electrophysiological data indexed the arousal elicited by AR words at the 
moment they were presented, thereby serving as a conventional index of cue-
reactivity. By contrast, subjective arousal ratings were given at the end of the 
session: these scores (unlike the desire ratings, discussed below) were thus not 
necessarily an accurate index of participants’ momentary emotional reactions when 
the words were presented. It is interesting, therefore, that despite these differences 
the EEG CR and self-reported arousal indices showed similar patterns. 
Exploratory analyses which took account of the direction, as well as the strength, of 
the affective response (i.e. positive or negative) found no difference between HDs 
and LDs. However, in equivalent analyses, Herrmann et al. (2001) reported that 
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alcohol-related stimuli received higher pleasantness ratings (i.e. a greater positive 
emotional response) from HDs than LDs. The reason for this anomaly is unclear, 
particularly as the present HDs reported drinking considerably more heavily than 
those in Herrmann et al.’s study. On the other hand, the potentially greater number 
and intensity of unpleasant effects related to the (even) heavier drinking (e.g. 
hangovers) in the present HDs may have rendered alcohol a more ambiguous 
concept compared to its perception in Herrmann et al.’s HDs. However, this 
discrepancy between the studies is tempered by the fact that both HDs and LDs in 
Herrmann et al.’s study rated the neutral stimuli as more pleasant than the alcohol-
related stimuli. Here, by contrast, neither HDs nor LDs rated AR words as more 
pleasant than HR stimuli. 
The present groups did not differ in terms of age, gender or impulsiveness; thus 
these demographic and personality variables do not explain the observed 
differences in cue-reactivity. Furthermore, since the LDs and HDs did not differ in 
their family histories of alcohol use disorders, it is unlikely that the observed ERP 
and arousal rating differences emanated from genetic factors. This corresponds 
with Herrmann et al.’s (2001) findings of differential electrophysiological and 
subjective cue responses in the absence of differences in family history of 
alcoholism. Taken together, the two studies are consistent with emotional arousal 
to alcohol-related stimuli developing as a function of alcohol consumption rather 
than being the manifestation of an underlying genotype or other demographic 
factors. 
Hypothesis 6, that in the combined sample there would be a significant correlation 
between ERP CR and self-reported appetitive responses to AR stimuli, was partially 
supported. The Spearman correlation between ERP CR and arousal ratings was 
positive and significant; that between ERP CR and subjective CR, however, was not. 
Thus participants who rated AR words as more arousing than HR stimuli showed 
greater P3 cue-reactivity to them. This reflects the greater CR in HDs than LDs and is 
consistent with Herrmann et al.’s (2001) findings in a combined group of heavy and 
light drinkers that stimulus ‘pleasantness’ correlated 0.40 and 0.50 with ERP CR 
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recorded at electrode positions Fz and Cz, respectively. As in the present study, 
there was no correlation within either subgroup. 
The lack of correlation between ERP CR and subjective CR mirrors the finding, 
against prediction (hypothesis 8), that HDs and LDs showed similar levels of 
subjective CR. Taken together, these findings indicate that ERP CR is not simply an 
electrophysiological correlate of subjective CR and reflect previous observations 
that subjective and physiological measures of CR can be desynchronised (e.g. Niaura 
et al., 1988). The stronger association of electrophysiological CR with ratings of 
stimulus arousal than with subjective CR may be of theoretical interest. In rating 
arousal participants were asked to give their ‘immediate, gut-level’ responses; this 
may have oriented them to physiological sensations to which ERPs were similarly 
sensitive. By contrast subjective desire for alcohol – the index used in the cue-
reactivity paradigm – is likely to be affected by other factors such as beliefs and 
expectancies. 
The lack of correlation found here may, however, be spurious. Some similar studies 
in abusers of alcohol and other drugs have reported significant positive correlations 
between subjective and ERP CR (e.g. McDonough & Warren, 2001; Franken et al., 
2003; Namkoong et al., 2004; van de Laar et al., 2004; Heinz et al., 2007; Franken et 
al., 2008). This has not been universally the case though; for example, Warren & 
McDonough (1999) did not observe such an association. Most of the studies with 
positive findings tested samples of physically dependent or addicted substance 
users, so it is possible that with increasing levels of alcohol (or other drug) intake, 
subjective and physiological responses become more aligned. At any rate, it is clear 
that more research is needed to explore the relationship between ERP CR and 
subjective craving in non-dependent social drinkers. 
Overall, the results of the current study, together with those discussed in the 
literature review, demonstrate that differential processing of alcohol-related stimuli 
compared to neutral stimuli is not confined only to those who have a diagnosis of 
physical dependence, but are also present in lighter drinkers. Secondly, they suggest 
that the degree to which a non-dependent social drinker displays CR varies to some 
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extent as a function of the individual’s experience with alcohol consumption. This is 
consistent with theories relating to CR, such as those of Robinson and Berridge 
(1993; 2000) and Tiffany (1990), which assert that repeated administration of drugs 
of abuse leads to associated environmental cues progressively acquiring incentive 
salience. However, a large proportion of variance in participants’ CR was left 
unaccounted for here: thus the partial η2 (i.e. the contribution of each factor or 
interaction to the variance in a DV, taken as if it were the only variable; Tabachnik & 
Fidell, 2007) for the interaction effect was relatively small at 0.20. This raises the 
question of what other factors might be involved in CR. 
2) Impulsiveness and its association with ERP CR 
Hypothesis 2, that HDs would be more impulsive than LDs as indicated by higher TIS 
and RIS scores and by more commission errors and reduced response speed in the 
Continuous Performance Test (CPT), was not supported. 
A literature search did not retrieve any previous published studies examining 
differences between heavy and light non-dependent social drinkers on the CPT. 
However, Colder and Connor (2002) reported in a sample of social drinkers that 
those who drank more frequently made more errors of commission in the Go/NoGo 
task (another test of behavioural inhibition and theoretically related to the CPT) and 
scored more highly on Carver & White’s (1994) Behavioural Approach System (BAS) 
self-report scales. A number of studies have reported similar findings (e.g. Henges 
and Marczinski, 2012; Ahmadi et al., 2013). These data contrast with the present 
null findings. 
The findings of the present study suggest that impulsivity is not a major influence 
on drinkers’ ERP cue-reactivity, but confidence in this conclusion is limited by the 
small sample sizes; replication in larger samples is needed. 
The present findings were inconsistent with Hypotheses 3 and 4 that during the 
CPT, relative to LDs HDs would show lower no-go P3 amplitude and higher no-go P3 
latency and lower no-go N2 amplitude and higher no-go N2 latency. The negative 
findings for P3 and N2 amplitude contradict those obtained by Oddy and Barry 
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(2009), the only published study to examine ERPs during performance of an 
inhibitory control task in 26 non-dependent social drinkers. These authors found 
HDs to show lower global no-go P3 and central no-go N2 amplitudes than LDs, 
though, as here, the groups did not differ in terms of behavioural performance. 
The Go/NoGo task employed by Oddy and Barry (2009) was very similar to the CPT 
used here. Their participants were instructed to press a button when one class of 
stimulus appeared and to inhibit this response following presentation of a different 
class of stimulus. As in the CPT, participants received no indication as to which 
stimulus would occur next. The only meaningful difference between the tasks was 
that Oddy and Barry (2009) presented equal numbers of go and no-go trials, 
whereas here, in order to induce prepotency of the go response, there was a 9:1 
ratio of go to no-go trials. Theoretically, this should have increased task difficulty 
and made it more sensitive to deficient inhibitory control in the HDs. 
The two studies tested similar numbers of participants but the HDs in Oddy and 
Barry’s study consumed much less alcohol per week than those here (approximately 
100g versus more than 400g). It therefore seems anomalous that Oddy and Barry 
(2009) reported an effect whilst the present study did not. Further research is 
therefore needed to determine brain activity during inhibitory control tasks is 
abnormal in non-dependent social drinkers. However, it should be noted that 
deficient inhibitory-related electrophysiology in alcoholics is still not well-
characterised, with some studies reporting low no-go P3 amplitudes but normal 
latencies (Realmuto et al., 1993; Rodríguez Holguín et al., 1999a; Hada et al., 2000), 
but others the converse pattern (Biggins et al., 1995; Fein & Chang, 2006). 
In any event, the lack of association between ERP no-go responses and ERP CR 
contradicts Hypothesis 5, that ERP CR in the combined sample would be at least 
partially explained by self-report measures of impulsiveness, CPT commission errors 
and response speed, and no-go P3 and no-go N2 amplitude and latency. None of 
the correlations approached significance, and the data are thus inconsistent with 
theories which suggest that impulsiveness is a vulnerability factor for substance use 
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disorders (e.g. Sher et al., 2000). However, the present study was very small and 
cross-sectional, and thus of limited power to detect causal relationships. 
There is likewise no indication that relatively heavy social drinking sustained for at 
least a year had given rise to prefrontal dysfunction and deficits of inhibitory 
control, as Jentsch and Taylor have argued can occur in chronic substance misuse.  
It is, of course, possible that drinking histories in the present sample were simply 
not severe enough to have produced deficits of sufficient magnitude to be detected 
by the tasks used here. Nevertheless, these participants’ alcohol consumption does 
appear to be associated with electrophysiological CR, and this in itself may plausibly 
be associated with increasing desire to consume alcohol and hence with escalation 
of drinking behaviour. 
3) Subjective and ERP CR and behavioural and ERP impulsivity: Relationships with 
self-reported Recent and Trait Impulsivity 
There was partial support for Hypothesis 5. i), that within the combined sample ERP 
and subjective CR would correlate more strongly with the self-report index of recent 
impulsiveness (RIS) than with the corresponding index of trait impulsiveness (TIS). 
This pattern was indeed observed for the RIS/TIS Motor Impulsivity (MI) subscale: 
the higher participants’ recent MI, the greater their electrophysiological CR (r = 
0.47; p = 0.02). This is the first study to have reported an association between 
recent impulsiveness and cue-reactivity. However, there were no such recent-trait 
differences for Cognitive Impulsivity (RIS/TIS CI) correlations with ERP CR or for 
either subscale with subjective CR. 
Interestingly, however, subjective CR did correlate significantly with the CI subscale 
of the RIS, and showed a trend to correlating likewise with TIS-CI. Thus, the higher 
participants’ cognitive impulsivity, the greater their subjective cue-reactivity. This is 
consistent with the view that cue-reactivity and impulsivity have partially shared 
biological substrates. 
There was likewise a modest correlation between subjective CR and TIS MI (r = -
0.21), though it failed to reach significance in the present small sample. However, 
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there was no hint of association between ERP CR and TIS/RIS CI. These 
discrepancies may be a genuine reflection of the MI and CI constructs. Containing 
somewhat abstract items such as ‘In the last two weeks I have planned events and 
activities well ahead of time’, the CI subscale may not be as sensitive as the MI 
subscale to short-term behavioural changes. Thus the MI subscale focuses more on 
explicit behaviours which are perhaps more likely to change from week to week 
(e.g. ‘In the last two weeks I have encountered problems because I have done 
things without stopping to think’). 
The present findings for trait and recent motor impulsiveness are consistent with 
those revealed in the first study of this thesis in suggesting that recent MI might 
either mirror or influence the way in which an individual responds to reward-related 
– or more specifically alcohol-related – stimuli, and that it is more relevant than 
longer-term ‘trait’ MI. Thus in Study 1 for participants reporting a recent change in 
their alcohol consumption, recent MI correlated more strongly than did trait MI 
with alcohol intake during the previous two weeks. 
In terms of behavioural and ERP measures of impulsivity in the CPT (Hypothesis 5. 
ii)), there was no suggestion that correlations were greater with recent compared to 
trait impulsivity; thus, this part of the hypothesis was not supported. 
Even without applying the Bonferroni correction, only 3 out of 20 correlations (the 
negative rs between TIS CI and NoGo P3 latency and TIS and RIS CI and NoGo N2 
amplitude) reached statistical significance; none of these remained significant when 
the correction was applied. Furthermore, one of these (the negative correlation 
between TIS CI and NoGo latency) was in the opposite direction to that expected. 
Similarly, two of the observed trends (the positive r between TIS CI and P3 NoGo 
amplitude and the negative r between RIS MI and N2 NoGo latency) were in the 
opposite directions to those expected. Overall, therefore, these findings are 
conflicting and possibly spurious; further research with larger samples is needed. 
The absence of association between any of the TIS and RIS subscales and CPT 
commission errors might be related to the ceiling effects observed in terms of CPT 
performance, thereby reducing the spread of scores in the task. The lack of any 
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association between the TIS and RIS scales which occurred in eleven out of the 20 
correlations might be further related to the poor (and often complete lack of) 
correlations commonly reported between different indices of impulsivity (Dom et 
al., 2006b). The lack of correlation observed in five out of ten of the correlations 
between the RIS subscales and the behavioural and ERP impulsivity measures in 
particular may have additionally been related to the time interval over which RIS 
items are measured: since this is relatively long at two weeks, this may have 
rendered it temporally indistinct from the TIS scale, compared to the ‘right now’ 
time-scale of the behavioural and ERP measures. Further research is needed to 
explore whether, compared to its trait equivalent, the RIS shares greater 
correlations with ‘state’ (behavioural) impulsivity measures. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the present study found that a group of heavy social drinkers but not a 
demographically well-matched group of light drinkers demonstrated greater P3 
amplitudes to alcohol-related words than to neutral words. Paralleling this, heavy 
drinkers but not light drinkers rated the alcohol-related words as more arousing 
than neutral words. Qualitatively, the heightened electrophysiological responses of 
the heavy drinkers appeared to reflect a combination of abnormal response to 
neutral stimuli as well as slightly elevated responses to alcohol-related words. These 
observations offered partial support for existing reports of cue-reactivity in non-
dependent drinkers. However, the light and heavy drinkers did not differ in self-
report, behavioural or electrophysiological correlates of impulsiveness. These 
findings indicate that cue-reactivity in non-dependent drinkers can be observed in 
the absence of heightened impulsiveness. Interestingly, and consistent with Study 
1, recent motor impulsivity was found to be more strongly associated than trait 
motor impulsivity with ERP cue-reactivity. However, the cross-sectional design and 
small sample sizes of the study limit the conclusions which can be drawn and 
further research is needed. 
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Chapter 4: Exploring the Effects of a Small Dose of Alcohol on 
Sensitivity to Non-Alcohol-Related and Alcohol-Related 
Reinforcers, Subjective Cue-Reactivity and Inhibitory Control 
and Decision-Making in Healthy Social Drinkers and Acutely 
Abstinent Non-Dependent Problem Drinkers 
Abstract 
Background: Previous studies have consistently reported increased craving and 
attentional bias in heavy social drinkers (HDs) administered small to moderate doses 
of alcohol. Impairments of inhibitory control have also been reported at these doses. 
These ‘priming’ effects have been accounted for principally in terms of the acute 
selectively disinhibiting effects of alcohol and drinking-induced alterations in 
mesocorticolimbic (MCL) dopamine (DA) systems such that a) these regions are 
‘sensitised’ to the acute effects of alcohol and b) alcohol-related stimuli are imbued 
with heightened incentive salience (Field et al., 2010). It is at present unclear 
whether priming effects are detectable via behavioural testing in more moderate 
drinkers, whose dopaminergic (DAergic) MCL pathways, relative to those of heavy 
and problem drinkers, should i) be well-toned (i.e. neither hypofunctioning nor 
sensitised to acute alcohol effects) and ii) be less reactive to cues associated with 
alcohol. 
Research and design: A repeated-measures design examined whether, compared to 
placebo, a small (sub-sedative) dose of alcohol administered to social drinkers (SDs) 
would be associated with increases in i) sensitivity to cues with motivational 
salience; and ii) decision-making and inhibitory control. In addition, eleven problem 
drinkers (PDs) were assessed under the same conditions to explore i) whether during 
acute abstinence they would demonstrate less sensitivity than SDs to cues with 
motivational salience and impairments of inhibitory control and decision-making; 
and ii) whether their responses would be normalised by a ‘priming’ dose of alcohol. 
Methods: All participants completed a modified Stroop task, a cue-elicited craving 
procedure, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), and a Continuous Performance Test (CPT) 
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twice: once during acute abstinence and once following alcohol administration. They 
completed the RIS and TIS at baseline only. 
It was further hypothesised that the RIS would predict performance on the 
experimental indices of reward sensitivity and impulsiveness during acute 
abstinence, more strongly than the TIS. 
Results: In SDs, a ‘priming’ dose of alcohol had no discernible effect on sensitivity to 
cues with motivational salience or on decision-making or inhibitory control. 
However, on the Stroop task, PDs responded to alcohol priming with an increase in 
sensitivity to appetitive words, and a decrease in sensitivity to aversive words; there 
was also a tendency for their cue-elicited craving to be reduced. Neither the RIS nor 
the TIS predicted any aspect of task performance during acute abstinence. 
Conclusions and limitations: While SDs did not show effects of priming by alcohol, 
these data provide tentative evidence that salience attribution processes are 
dysfunctional in PDs and may be normalised by small doses of alcohol. The lack of 
effects on inhibitory control and decision-making conflict with previous data but 
may reflect the small N and low power. 
Introduction and rationale 
Neurochemical ‘priming’ studies have revealed that ingestion of alcohol acutely 
increases dopaminergic (DAergic) activity within mesocorticolimbic (MCL) circuitry. 
Such neurochemical reports have been complemented by self-report and 
behavioural studies showing that alcohol can prime social drinkers’ desire to drink 
(de Wit & Chutuape, 1993; Duka et al., 1999) and increase the likelihood of their 
choosing an alcohol rather than an alcohol-free beverage (de Wit & Chutuape, 
1993). Previous priming studies have tended to administer 2 to 3 units of alcohol to 
relatively heavy social drinkers; it is thus at present unknown whether in moderate 
drinkers smaller doses enhance MCL DAergic activity as indicated by their 
performance in behavioural tests of incentive salience and impulsivity. 
There is also consistent evidence that during abstinence alcohol dependent 
individuals demonstrate an attenuation of activity within and throughout DAergic 
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MCL circuitry (see Chapter 1, pp. 23-25 and pp. 34-36). While this may reflect 
homeostatic neuroadaptation to chronic alcohol consumption, it is also possible 
that constitutionally ‘sluggish’ MCL system may constitute a vulnerability factor for 
chronic alcohol consumption and possible dependence. Dysfunctional DAergic MCL 
circuitry may explain some of the central phenomena of addiction, in particular 
under-responsiveness to natural reinforcers (or ‘anhedonia’), high reactivity to 
alcohol-related stimuli, and impulsiveness. When addicts are acutely abstinent, it 
has been argued that their hypodopaminergic state manifests in reduced sensitivity 
to cues associated with not only drugs but also other reinforcers, and heightened 
impulsiveness. Relatedly, compulsive drug use may in part be driven by the effect of 
acute drug ingestion in temporarily elevating DA activity and thus normalising 
psychological and cognitive functions. Zack et al. (2011) note that individuals who 
do not meet the criteria for physical dependence, but whose drinking is 
nevertheless dysfunctional (‘problem drinkers’; PDs), demonstrate signs of MCL 
hypodopaminergic function and of psychological dependence (e.g. difficulty in 
controlling drinking, craving for alcohol, disruption of normal daily activities and 
responsibilities). Studies of their functioning during abstinence may therefore offer 
insight into the aetiology of dependence. 
If non-dependent PDs develop, or are constitutionally characterised by, underlying 
hypoactivity in MCL circuitry, they should be relatively more anhedonic and 
impaired on measures of cue-reactivity and inhibitory control when acutely 
abstinent. If alcohol retains its ability to induce an increase in MCL DA activity even 
in dependent drinkers, a priming dose should improve performance deficits 
observed in abstinence. As yet, no study testing these predictions in drinkers has 
been published; however, Dawkins et al. (2006, 2007b) found that in smokers a 
small dose of nicotine reversed abnormalities observed during acute abstinence. 
While corresponding effects are predicted in PDs, it is less clear whether healthy 
social drinkers will be sensitive to priming doses of alcohol. It is assumed that most 
such individuals have normally-functioning MCL pathways, and that they will be 
unaffected by abstinence. However, it may nevertheless be the case that a small 
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dose of alcohol will produce changes in neural activity that subtly affect 
performance. 
The primary purposes of the present study were thus two-fold: i) to examine the 
effects of a small ‘priming’ dose of alcohol on SDs’ sensitivity to non-alcohol-related 
natural reinforcers, reactivity to alcohol-related stimuli and decision-making and 
inhibitory control; and ii) to examine the effects of acute abstinence and small 
‘priming’ doses of alcohol on these same variables in PDs, in comparison to the SDs. 
1) Effects of a dose of alcohol on cognition and motivation in non-dependent 
social and problem drinkers 
1. i) Apparent ‘priming’ effects of a dose of alcohol in healthy social drinkers 
So far, the present thesis has focused principally upon the effect of exteroceptive 
alcohol-related cues on cognition and motivation, yet the presence of ethanol may 
likewise be an interoceptive stimulus for conditioned responses such as orienting 
towards alcohol-associated stimuli or the urge to drink. Thus, Duka and Townshend 
(2004) found that a dose of alcohol given to social drinkers increased their 
subsequent alcohol consumption. Stewart, de Wit and Eikelboom (1984) termed 
such effects ‘priming’, though it has subsequently been noted that such phenomena 
can be inconsistent and are often desynchronised (Schoenmakers & Wiers, 2010). 
Initially recorded in alcohol-dependent individuals, priming effects are nicely 
illustrated in a study by Hodgson, Rankin and Stockwell (1979). Severely and 
moderately dependent alcoholics’ craving was recorded after they had consumed a 
high dose (150 ml of vodka), a low dose (15 ml of vodka) and no dose of alcohol, 
within a repeated-measures design. Craving was measured via self-report, pulse 
rate and the time taken to consume an alcoholic drink. Pulse rate was found to 
increase significantly in both groups after consumption of the high dose compared 
to both the low dose and no dose. The severely dependent group consumed the 
drink in fewer sips after the high dose compared to the low dose; this pattern was 
not observed in moderately dependent participants. Importantly, the severely 
dependent group also consumed the drink faster following the high dose than in the 
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other two conditions, whereas this pattern was reversed in the moderately 
dependent group. A limitation of this study, however, was that participants were 
informed on each occasion of the drink they were about to receive; thus, 
expectancy effects may have played a role. Similar findings have also been reported 
by Ludwig and Wikler (1974) and Bigelow, Griffiths & Liebson (1977), though null 
effects were reported by Merry (1966), Marlatt, Demming and Reid (1973) and 
Engle and Williams (1972) (for a review see Stockwell, 1991). 
Priming effects have also been reported in non-dependent social drinkers, with 
increases in subjective craving reported following doses ranging from low (0.3 g of 
alcohol per kg bodyweight) to high (0.8 g/kg), with subjective craving being larger 
for larger doses (Schoenmakers, Wiers & Field, 2008; Chutuape, Mitchell & de Wit, 
1994; de Wit & Chutuape, 1993; Duka et al., 1999; Rose & Duka, 2006; Schulze & 
Jones, 2000). However, not all studies have confirmed such effects: Duka and 
Townshend (2004) and Schulze and Jones (1999) reported craving to be unaffected. 
Prime effects on other indices of drink desire have also been reported, including 
‘wanting more alcohol’ (Kirk & de Wit, 2000), the consumption of more alcohol (de 
Wit & Chutuape, 1993; Duka, Tasker & Stephens, 1998), choosing alcohol over an 
alcohol-free beverage (de Wit & Chutuape, 1993) and choosing alcohol over money 
(Chutuape et al., 1994). However, Kirk and de Wit (2000) were unable to replicate 
this latter finding. 
Most of the above studies have been in relatively heavy social drinkers, that is, 
individuals drinking at or above UK recommended weekly limits of 14 units for 
women and 21 for men (e.g. Duka et al., 1998; Duka & Townshend, 2004; Rose & 
Duka, 2006; Schoenmakers et al., 2008). Neuroadaptations and alcohol-related 
associative learning should be strong in such individuals, increasing the likelihood of 
detecting effects of priming doses on behavioural indices. However, Field et al.’s 
(2010) model predicts that such effects should also be present to a greater or lesser 
extent in all of those with some experience of alcohol consumption. 
In those studies which have included lighter and/or more moderate drinkers, these 
participants have tended to either: i) be part of a sample also including heavier 
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social drinkers (e.g. Duka et al., 1999; Duka & Townshend, 2004); ii) include a 
disproportionately large number of individuals who reported regular use of other 
psychoactive drugs such as marijuana (e.g. Chutuape et al., 1994); or iii) include 
participants with a regular binge-like pattern of alcohol consumption, that is, 
frequently consuming at least 4 drinks in a session (e.g. de Wit & Chutuape, 1993). 
Thus, the existence of explicit priming effects in more moderate drinkers has not 
been adequately explored to date. 
A growing number of studies have indicated that in social drinkers, alcohol also 
acutely influences less conscious processes, that is, attentional bias. However, this 
literature is relatively small and data are conflicting. Nevertheless, it appears that 
the effects of acute alcohol appear to be influenced by i) the dose of alcohol 
administered, ii) the task administered and iii) the drinking status of participants. In 
terms of alcohol dose, Duka & Townshend (2004) and Schoenmakers, Wiers & Field 
(2008) both found a moderate dose of alcohol (0.3 g/kg) to increase attentional bias 
in the visual probe task. However, Duka & Townshend (2004) found that a higher 
alcohol dose (0.6 g/kg) did not increase attentional bias relative to placebo; thus, 
attentional bias may peak at moderate doses (0.3-0.4 g/kg) but decline at higher 
doses. Consistent with this, Schoenmakers & Wiers (2010) reported that in binge-
drinkers, there was a negative correlation between the number of drinks consumed 
immediately prior to testing and the extent of attentional bias as measured by a 
modified flicker paradigm. 
Concerning the task administered, Miller & Fillmore (2011) reported no dose-
dependent effect of 0.32 g/kg or 0.64 g/kg doses of alcohol on time spent fixating 
on alcohol-related compared to neutral images in the visual probe task. However, 
using the modified Stroop task, Duka & Townshend (2004) observed greater 
interference at a 0.6 g/kg dose of alcohol than a 0.3 g/kg dose. More recently, 
Adams et al. (2012) have reported that 0.13 g/kg and 0.4 g/kg doses of alcohol 
(relative to placebo) had no effect on an alcohol Stroop task, but that a moderate 
dose of alcohol (0.4 g/kg) produced greater attentional bias in a visual probe task. 
This led Adams et al. (2012) to suggest that different indices of attentional bias may 
be mediated by different underlying mechanisms. 
163 
 
As per research relating to subjective craving effects above, all but one (Adams et 
al., 2012) of the above attentional bias studies incorporated repeated-measures 
designs with a single group of (relatively heavy) ‘social drinkers’. However, levels of 
social drinking vary widely and, accordingly, recent studies have compared groups 
of lighter, more moderate social drinkers to heavier, hazardous drinking groups. 
Fernie et al. (2012) found heavy drinkers’ attentional bias, measured via eye 
movement monitoring during a visual probe task, to be unaffected by a 0.4 g/kg 
dose of alcohol. In light drinkers, however, attentional bias was greater following 
alcohol, relative to placebo. Weafer & Fillmore (2013), on the other hand, reported 
no effect of either 0.45 g/kg or 0.65 g/kg doses of alcohol on visual probe task 
performance in their light drinkers, but found (similar to Duka & Townshend, 2004) 
heavy drinkers to show a dose-dependent decrease in attentional bias following 
alcohol administration. In the study by Adams et al. (2012; above), however, 
attentional bias in neither the alcohol Stroop nor visual probe task varied as a 
function of drinking status. Thus, it is at present unclear how drinking status and 
alcohol doses interact to effect implicit priming effects in non-dependent moderate 
versus heavier drinking groups; further research is needed. 
1. ii) The acute effects of alcohol on inhibitory control 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (pp. 55-57), a number of studies have reported that a 
moderate dose of alcohol (0.4-0.45 g/kg, which produces BACs of around 0.06 g%) 
has a selectively detrimental effect on inhibitory control as measured by tasks such 
as the Stop Signal Task and the cued Go/No-Go task (Marczinski et al., 2005; de Wit, 
Crean & Richards, 2000). Similar doses have also been found to impair performance 
on tasks assessing inhibitory control over attention (Abroms & Fillmore, 2004; 
Abroms, Gottlob & Fillmore, 2006). It is important to note that at this BAC, the 
inhibitory control impairment does not tend to be accompanied by either impaired 
accuracy or slower responding to ‘go’ cues, suggesting that inhibitory control 
disruption is specific rather than a global impairment or psychomotor slowing. 
Schoenmakers and Wiers (2010) have questioned the extent to which findings from 
controlled laboratory settings can be generalised to real-world settings where many 
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factors may influence the motivation to drink. A meta-analysis indicated that 
alcohol effects on both expectancies and pharmacological responses are greater in 
‘natural environment’ labs than in ‘typical’ labs (McKay & Schare, 1999). This may 
reflect the presence of environmental cues normally encountered when drinking 
socially and participants’ relaxation in those participants. Furthermore, the amount 
of alcohol people tend to drink socially generally exceeds the amounts administered 
in priming studies. 
1. iii) Models of alcohol’s acute priming effects 
Priming effects in social drinkers (SDs) have been interpreted in terms of the acute 
effects of alcohol on inhibitory control together with more stable incentive 
motivational factors. Consistent with the preceding review, Field et al. (2010) 
contend that administration of small to moderate alcohol doses increases implicit 
appetitive responses to alcohol-related cues and impairs inhibitory control. They 
argue that these processes may have additive effects on drinking behaviour, such 
that alcohol-induced disinhibition may make the individual less able to resist 
alcohol-induced elevations in attentional bias and other appetitive responses 
elicited by alcohol-related cues. 
Weafer and Fillmore (2008) found that a 0.6 g/kg alcohol dose administered to 
social drinkers increased their commission errors (i.e. failures of inhibitory control) 
on a Go/No-Go task, and that the degree of impairment, relative to a placebo 
condition, predicted twenty percent of the variance in ad libitum beer consumption 
in a subsequent bogus ‘taste-test’. However, since alcohol-seeking behaviour was 
tested only after BACs had fallen to baseline levels, it is unlikely that the acute 
weakening of inhibitory control itself caused the increase in alcohol consumption. 
Rather, it suggests that drinkers most sensitive to the effects of alcohol are also 
those most drawn to it. It is possible that the more alcohol-sensitive participants 
were those with a greater history of social drinking and were therefore a) more 
sensitised to alcohol’s effects on inhibitory control and b) more likely to drink in 
response to alcohol availability. Unfortunately, although Weafer and Fillmore (2008) 
found marked individual differences in the magnitude of alcohol impairment of 
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inhibitory control, they did not examine the relationship between this and habitual 
drinking levels. 
In a double-blind design, Hutchison et al. (2001) randomised twenty-six heavy social 
drinkers to receive either 5 mg of the DA D2 antagonist olanzapine or placebo 
before each of two experimental sessions. Participants were administered a 
moderate alcohol dose in one session and a non-alcoholic beverage in the other, 
before rating their craving. Alcohol increased craving, but olanzapine significantly 
attenuated this effect. This study therefore strengthens the theory that DA systems 
are involved in mediating alcohol priming. 
1. iv) Effects of small alcohol doses on subjective craving, attentional bias and 
inhibitory control 
Priming studies have typically administered moderate to large doses of alcohol (i.e. 
between 0.4 and 0.6 g/kg, or approximately 3.33-5 UK units). The relative lack of 
research utilising smaller doses might reflect beliefs or even pilot findings that 
regular drinkers are insensitive to lower doses; however, in the absence of many 
published studies utilising alcohol doses smaller than 0.4 g/kg it remains an open 
empirical question whether and to what extent doses below this level can influence 
craving and attentional bias to alcohol-related stimuli and inhibitory control in 
moderate social drinkers. 
In one of the few existing studies, Jones & Schulze (2000) observed an effect of a 
very small dose of alcohol – half a unit. Sixty social drinkers consumed either a soft 
drink or alcohol before completing a modified Stroop task. The alcohol group, but 
not the placebo group, were slowed in their colour-naming of alcohol-related words 
relative to alcohol-unrelated words. More recently, however, Adams et al. (2012; 
see p.189) reported no effect of a 0.13 g/kg dose of alcohol (roughly equivalent to 1 
unit) on light drinkers’ performances on the alcohol Stroop task or the visual probe 
task. In an earlier study with SDs, however, Schulze & Jones (1999) found no effect 
of 1 unit of alcohol on desire for alcohol. These findings conform to the notion that 
priming effects in SDs are dose- and task-dependent; though in the absence of 
replications no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
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Whilst Jones and Schulze’s (2000) study is interesting, there are limitations to the 
methodology. Firstly, participants were termed simply ‘social drinkers’; the authors 
did not provide information concerning their average weekly consumption. 
Secondly, the Stroop effect was significant only for words with ‘positive’ alcohol 
connotations and not for words with ‘negative’ connotations. At this fine-grained 
level of analysis, observed effects must be treated very tentatively. 
Thirdly, participants appear not to have been blind to the drink they were given. If 
the observed effect was real, it may therefore have reflected expectancy rather 
than pharmacological actions. In the absence of studies disguising small doses of 
alcohol, it therefore remains unclear whether they do in fact directly affect 
performance on behavioural tasks such as the modified Stroop. 
Thus, one of the principal aims of the present study was to replicate and extend the 
findings of Jones and Schulze (2000) but strengthening various aspects of the 
methodology. A literature search revealed no studies to have examined effects of 
doses equivalent to 1 unit or below on inhibitory control. Further research is 
therefore needed to characterise the effects of small alcohol doses on craving, 
attentional bias and inhibitory control in moderate social drinkers. 
2. Downregulation of MCL DAergic circuitry in chronic drinkers 
2. i) Effects of downregulation on responsiveness to ‘natural’ reinforcers 
As detailed in Chapter 1 (pp. 23-25 and pp. 34-36), there is substantial evidence that 
individuals abusing alcohol demonstrate widespread downregulation of activity in 
MCL DAergic regions as revealed by behavioural tasks, brain imaging and acute 
challenge studies. It is not clear whether this hypodopaminergicity is a consequence 
of, or pre-exists, chronic substance use. In any event, the observation that 
hypodopaminergicity is observed in heavy chronic drinkers leads to the following 
hypothesis: if DA D2 receptors mediate responses to ‘natural’ reinforcers such as 
food and sex, drinkers should show reduced sensitivity to such reinforcers when 
they are acutely abstinent (Volkow et al., 2002). This is likely to manifest as 
‘anhedonia’, ‘a loss of interest or pleasure in all or almost all usual activities and 
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pastimes’ (Snaith, 1992, p. 134). It is relevant to note here that anhedonia is a 
common feature of psychiatric disorders including schizophrenia (Blanchard, Horan 
& Brown, 2001; Mason et al., 2004), depression (Klein, 1974), anxiety and 
adjustment disorders (Silverstone, 1991), suicidal ideation (Oei et al., 1990) and 
successful suicide (Fawcett, 1993), all of which have been associated with 
underfunctioning DAergic MCL systems (Heinz et al., 1994). 
Anhedonia has principally been quantified via self-report questionnaires, the most 
commonly-administered and well-validated measure of which is the Snaith-
Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHPS; Snaith et al., 1995). This fourteen-item instrument 
asks the respondent to rate the extent to which they believe they would enjoy, at 
the moment of responding, a range of hypothetical real-world scenarios – for 
example, having a warm bath and eating one’s favourite meal. It was initially 
developed in a large, non-clinical sample, but has subsequently been employed in 
various psychiatric groups (Janiri et al., 2005). Similar self-report instruments 
include the revised Chapman Physical Anhedonia and Social Anhedonia Scales (PAS 
& SAS; Chapman, Chapman & Raulin, 1976) and the Fawcett-Clark Pleasure Scale 
(FCPS; Fawcett et al., 1983). The SHPS and PAS have been reported to correlate 
highly significantly with each other (Loas et al., 1997). Visual Analog Scales have also 
been used, albeit less frequently, to assess hedonic tone (e.g. Janiri et al., 2005). 
Using instruments such as these, a number of studies have provided clear evidence 
of the presence of anhedonic symptoms in alcohol and other substance-dependent 
individuals (Gawin & Ellinwood, 1988; Miller, Summers & Gold, 1993; Heinz, 
Schmidt & Reischies, 1994; Marra et al., 1998; Sarramon et al., 1999; Bovasso, 2001; 
Shippenberg, Zapata & Chefer, 2007). 
2. ii) The potentially ‘normalising’ effect of a small dose of alcohol in problem 
drinkers 
Because alcohol retains the ability to acutely increase DAergic activity (Di Ciano, 
Blaha & Philips, 1998), PDs’ hypodopaminergicity will remain ‘hidden’ as long as 
chronic intake is maintained. Abstinence, however, ‘unmasks’ the underlying 
dysfunction and a single dose of alcohol should transiently normalise biological and 
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psychological responses to cues with motivational salience where these are not 
themselves alcohol-related. 
The effects of abstinence and acute alcohol on responses to alcohol-related cues, 
however, are harder to predict because there are strong non-biological influences 
on craving. Thus during abstinence problem drinkers (PDs) are almost certainly 
preoccupied with the desire for alcohol to attenuate physical and/or psychological 
discomfort. This is likely to inflate subjective craving and attentional bias to alcohol-
related stimuli during acute abstinence, making it difficult to discern additional 
effects of priming doses (i.e. ceiling effects). It is notable that Powell, Dawkins and 
Davis (2002) found that in smokers cue-elicited craving was lower during acute 
abstinence than after they had smoked. However, in a subsequent study Dawkins et 
al. (2007a) failed to replicate this effect. Thus it is currently theoretically and 
empirically unclear how abstinence and alcohol priming affect responses to alcohol-
related cues in PDs. 
The effects of acute abstinence and priming doses on executive control in PDs are 
also unclear. On the one hand, for the reasons previously outlined, a priming dose 
might be expected to boost DA activity and therefore enhance inhibitory control 
and decision-making. However, as reviewed by Field et al. (2010), even moderate 
doses of alcohol (e.g. 0.4-0.45 g/kg), which do not lead to global cognitive 
impairment, selectively impair inhibitory control. Furthermore, Marczinski, Combs 
and Fillmore (2007), using a 0.65 g/kg alcohol dose, found adverse effects to be 
more pronounced in heavier/binge drinkers. Thus, it may be the case that executive 
performance is significantly impaired under both acute abstinence as well as 
alcohol. 
The compromising effects of alcohol withdrawal on physical well-being and, 
possibly, cognitive faculties, means that investigation of abstinence effects in 
physically dependent drinkers is difficult. Equally, the ethics of administering a dose 
of alcohol to long-term abstainers are problematic, given the possibility of inducing 
relapse. Such research is more straightforward in non-dependent PDs: although 
they may experience mild withdrawal symptoms during short-term abstinence 
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(Grüsser, Mörsen & Flor, 2006), these are not dangerous, nor do they have such a 
detrimental impact on their psychological state as to make them unable to 
complete an experimental testing procedure. To date, however, few such studies 
have been performed in this group or in non-physically-dependent users of other 
substances. 
The effects of acute abstinence versus acute satiation on incentive motivation and 
executive function have been investigated in smokers. Thus, a series of studies by 
Powell et al. are consistent with abstaining smokers having impaired MCL DAergic 
function, normalised by nicotine consumption (cf. Al-Adawi & Powell, 1997; Powell 
et al., 2002; Powell, Tait & Lessiter, 2002; Dawkins, Acaster & Powell, 2007; Dawkins 
& Powell, 2011). In one of the most comprehensive studies, Dawkins et al. (2006, 
2007b) examined the acute effects of nicotine, given to 145 acutely abstinent 
smokers, on a battery of measures indexing incentive motivation and executive 
function. Participants were required to abstain from smoking for twelve hours 
before being tested on an assessment battery on two occasions: once after having 
received an experimental dose of nicotine, and once after receiving placebo. 
Incentive motivation was tapped by the SHPS, the Card-Arranging Reward 
Responsivity Objective Test (CARROT), the modified Stroop task, a cue-reactivity 
task, and the ‘Incentive Motivational Enhancement of Response Speed’ (IMERS) 
task, which tests the effect of reward on performance speed. Executive function 
was measured by an antisaccade task, a Continuous Performance Task (CPT), a 
delayed response spatial working memory task, and a verbal fluency test. 
Compared to performance during abstinence (that is, in the placebo condition), 
nicotine was associated with: higher self-reported pleasure expectations on the 
SHPS; enhanced responsiveness to financial reward in the CARROT; and greater 
interference from appetitive words in the modified Stroop task. Furthermore, it was 
associated with improved inhibitory control as indexed by the antisaccade task, and 
fewer impulsive responses to filler and ‘catch’ stimuli (motor errors) in the CPT. It 
did not, however, affect CPT response bias (an index of impulsive versus cautious 
decision-making), spatial working memory, or verbal fluency. These findings were 
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thus generally, though not entirely, consistent with the proposition that 
dependence is associated with hypofunctioning of MCL circuitry. 
Since alcohol, like nicotine and other drugs of abuse, stimulates DA release within 
MCL circuitry, the present study was designed partly to examine whether low doses 
of alcohol would produce effects in PDs similar to those reported for nicotine in 
smokers. As discussed above, however, administration of moderate doses of alcohol 
(0.4-0.45 g/kg) has been shown to impair the performance of social drinkers on 
tests of inhibitory control such as Go/No-Go, Continuous Performance and Stop 
Signal tasks; Loeber and Duka (2009) suggest that this reflects alcohol-induced 
reduction of frontal lobe activity. The dose used in the present study was therefore 
selected to be unlikely to produce even subtle sedative effects. 
3. Design and Hypotheses of the present study 
A number of tests believed to be sensitive to activity within the MCL DA system 
were administered to participants in two separate but parallel experimental 
designs. In the first part of the study, a group of healthy social drinkers (SDs) 
abstained from alcohol for 12 hours before completing a test battery comprising the 
emotional Stroop task, a cue-reactivity test, the IGT and a modified version of the 
CPT. They repeated the test battery twice within this single session: once following 
a small dose of alcohol (0.5 units) and once after placebo. A pilot study indicated 
that it was impractical to separate the two sessions across different days as a high 
proportion of participants failed to attend the second session. 
Since the MCL DA pathways of healthy SDs should be well-toned, the issue of 
interest was whether the ‘priming’ dose of alcohol would produce detectable 
effects on behavioural performance compared to placebo. Thus, it could be that 
SDs’ systems are functionally at ceiling, such that a priming dose cannot enhance 
performance; this must be an empirical question, with the potential for different 
facets of performance to be differentially sensitive. 
It has been argued here that priming is most likely in heavier drinkers and 
particularly in those who have became psychologically dependent. Thus, in the 
171 
 
second part of the study a group of non-physically-dependent problem drinkers 
(PDs) was tested using the same procedure as for the SDs. PDs with signs of physical 
dependence were excluded as the 12-hour abstinence period would be associated 
with overt withdrawal symptoms likely themselves to interfere with test 
performance. PDs’ performance on these tasks, expected to be compromised 
during acute abstinence, was compared against those of the SDs. Thus, in this part 
of the study, the SDs acted as a healthy control group. However, difficulty in 
recruiting and testing suitable PDs meant that the sample was small (n = 11), and 
analyses were therefore limited in power. This aspect of the study is therefore 
exploratory and interpretation of findings is necessarily speculative. 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
In Social Drinkers: 
1) The priming dose will: 
a) Increase sensitivity to motivationally significant words, as indexed by colour-
naming times and number of errors in the emotional Stroop 
b) Increase cue-elicited craving 
c) Increase risky decision-making on the IGT 
d) Increase impulsive responding on the CPT 
2) Heavier social drinkers will show more pronounced priming effects than lighter 
drinkers, as indicated by the magnitude of alcohol – placebo ‘difference’ scores 
on all the above measures 
Problem versus Social Drinkers: 
3) Anhedonia: Acutely abstinent PDs will demonstrate greater anhedonia than SDs 
4) Impulsivity in daily life: PDs will demonstrate greater impulsiveness than SDs, as 
evidenced by TIS and SIS subscale scores 
5) Incentive motivation: 
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a) Acutely abstinent PDs will show attenuated interference from motivationally 
salient cues compared i) to SDs and ii) to their own sensitivity to such cues 
following a small dose of alcohol 
b) With levels of baseline craving controlled, PDs will show a proportionally 
greater increase than SDs in subjective cue-reactivity following a priming 
dose of alcohol 
6) Decision-making and inhibitory control: PDs will perform better on the IGT and 
CPT following a priming dose of alcohol than during acute abstinence, and the 
magnitude of this improvement will be greater than any shown by SDs 
7) Associations between behavioural measures of incentive motivation and 
impulsiveness and self-reported Recent and Trait Impulsiveness: Within the 
combined sample, performance on the behavioural indices will correlate more 
highly with RIS scores than with TIS scores 
Methods 
Participants: Potentially suitable SDs were initially identified via the King’s College 
London (KCL) Mindsearch database of hundreds of individuals (with or without 
psychiatric diagnoses) who had previously participated in research at KCL and had 
expressed an interest in future participation. Potential PDs were identified by 
members of the Drug and Alcohol Misuse Team (DAMT) at Lantern Hall in Croydon. 
They had been referred to the service in order to cut down or quit alcohol 
consumption; they were tested prior to their attempt to cut down / quit. As a 
group, the SDs were matched as far as possible to the PDs in terms of mean age, 
gender ratio and mean number of years spent in full-time education. SDs were paid 
£20 for their participation on completion. PDs received a £5 voucher for a well-
known supermarket. Both SDs and PDs received reimbursement for travel expenses. 
Inclusion/exclusion criteria: In order to minimise the potential for use of other 
substances (e.g. nicotine, caffeine) to affect the MCL DA system, participants were 
required not to smoke cigarettes or drink tea, coffee and/or caffeinated soft drinks 
on the day of the study. In order to maximise absorption of the alcohol dose, 
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participants were also asked not to eat a meal of high fat content the night or 
morning before the study. Compliance with these criteria was established via verbal 
confirmation from all participants. 
To be categorised as an SD, men had to report drinking an average of at least 1 and 
no more than 26 standard units of alcohol per week, and women between 1 and 16 
units per week, over the previous twelve months (based upon Cox et al., 1999). SD 
candidates were asked to complete the Modified Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ; 
Mehrabian & Russell, 1978) in order to determine their suitability for the study. PDs 
were excluded if they had a current diagnosis of physical dependence on alcohol or 
any other addictive drug, as reported by the DAMT. 
Problems recruiting PDs: The researcher attended DAMT weekly review meetings 
for eighteen months to recruit suitable PDs as they presented to the service but 
before they commenced treatment. 
The vast majority of referrals to the DAMT were unsuitable due to their being either 
physically dependent on alcohol and/or their abuse of other psychoactive drugs. 
Over the course of the eighteen-month recruitment period, approximately 778 new 
clients were considered by the team. Of these, 731 (94%) were excluded from the 
study due to either alcohol-dependence alone and/or other drug abuse (primarily 
marijuana and/or cocaine). Of the remaining 47, 9 were ineligible due to concerns 
regarding their mental state (e.g. personality disorder, acute paranoid schizophrenic 
episode). This left 38 eligible clients, 14 of which the researcher was unable to make 
contact with. Of the remaining 24, 9 did not wish to participate in the study; 4 
agreed to participate but either did not attend for testing (and could not be re-
contacted in order to arrange an alternative testing session) or quit the testing 
procedure prior to its completion. Thus, 11 eligible clients successfully participated 
in the study. 
It is notable that successive and significant cuts were made to the funding of the 
DAMT’s service over the period of participant recruitment (c. April 2009 to 
November 2010 inclusive). Reflecting this, the largest proportion of participants was 
recruited in the initial months. Because of the team’s decreasing capacity to treat 
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PDs, they were increasingly referred to other local non-NHS alcohol services. 
Unfortunately, these were unwilling to be involved in the study. 
Drinks administered to participants 
The alcohol drink: The alcohol drink contained 0.5 units of alcohol, comprising 12.5 
millilitres (ml) of Smirnoff Vodka8, 37.5 ml of Schweppes Tonic Water9 and 8 drops 
of Tabasco Sauce10. 
In people weighing between 140 and 240 pounds (as did all the present 
participants), 0.5 units of alcohol produces a peak Blood Alcohol Concentration 
(BAC) of around 8 mg/100 ml in men and 12 mg/100 ml in women (Barbour, 2001). 
This low dose was used for several inter-related reasons. Firstly, the study was 
designed to test the hypothesis that a dose of alcohol too low to sedate or 
intoxicate may nevertheless be sufficient to stimulate (or ‘prime’) the MCL DA 
system. In SDs, mild intoxication has been reported at doses of 20 mg/100 ml 
(Dougherty et al., 2008), but not at the lower level used here. Secondly, such a low 
dose should not be subjectively detectable; this therefore reduces the risk of 
expectancy effects. And thirdly, this dose would be metabolised within around half 
an hour and would therefore not compromise performance in the placebo 
condition, when this was administered second. 
The placebo drink: The placebo drink consisted of 50 ml of Schweppes Tonic Water 
and 8 drops of Tabasco Sauce. 
Manipulation check: At the end of the study, participants were asked, ‘Do you have 
any idea which drink contained alcohol?’ If they answered ‘Yes’, participants were 
asked: i) to indicate which drink they thought contained alcohol; and ii) how 
confident they were, by marking a vertical line along a 100-mm VAS anchored by 
the statements, ‘Not at all’ and ‘Totally’. 
                                                          
8
 The Pierre Smirnoff Co., London, UK 
9
 Schweppes Ltd., Uxbridge, UK 
10
 McIlhenny Co., Avery Island, CA 
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Of the 31 participants who responded in full, twenty-seven believed that they could 
identify which drink contained alcohol; four did not. Only 12 of the 27 (44.44%) 
were correct in identifying the alcohol drink – that is, accuracy was at chance-level. 
Those who were correct rated their confidence at 51% on average. There were no 
differences between problem drinkers and social drinkers in terms of accuracy [χ2 
(1) = 0.14; ns]. Thus, the drinks appear to have been adequately disguised. 
ASSESSMENTS 
[A] Alcohol-related information: The following instruments were fully described in 
Chapter 3 (pp. 120-121). 
 Modified Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ; Mehrabian & Russell, 1978; 
Appendix 9): The index used here was the number of units of alcohol consumed in a 
typical week during the previous 12 months. 
 Family Tree Questionnaire (FTQ; Mann et al., 1985): The index used here 
was whether or not the respondent indicated that they had a first-degree relative 
with an alcohol use disorder. 
[B] Impulsivity measures 
 Recent and Trait Impulsivity Scales (RIS & TIS; Appendices 12 and 13): These 
parallel impulsivity measures are fully described in Chapter 2. In both cases, 
analyses were conducted on the Cognitive Impulsivity and Motor Impulsivity 
subscale scores separately. 
[C] Mood state 
 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983; 
Appendix 17): The HADS has been used in clinical and general population settings, 
and correlates well with interview-based measures and other screening 
questionnaires that identify psychiatric distress (Green & Benzeval, 2011). The 
HADS has two subscales – one for anxiety, and one for depression, and each has 
seven items scored on a four-point scale from 0 to 3, so that there is a maximum 
score of 21 on each subscale. Total scores of more than 8 or more on each subscale 
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have been shown to have sensitivity and sensitivity of around eighty percent for 
identifying clinical cases. This validation was principally within clinical settings; 
however, a community survey showed similar values (Bjelland et al., 2002). The 
present study administered both the HADS Anxiety and HADS Depression subscales. 
[D] Measures of incentive salience/reward motivation 
 Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHPS; Snaith et al., 1995; Appendix 18): The 
SHPS is a well-validated, 14-item self-report scale measuring hedonic tone. The 
respondent is asked to consider a series of statements concerning hypothetical 
scenarios generally thought to be pleasurable, and to indicate the extent to which 
they believe they would enjoy each. Each statement begins with, ‘I would enjoy...’ 
(e.g. ‘I would enjoy being with my family or close friends’) and following Franken et 
al. (2007), the response options are  ‘Strongly disagree’ (4), ‘Disagree’ (3), ‘Agree’ 
(2) and ‘Strongly agree’ (1). Items are summed to give an overall score ranging from 
14 to 56, higher scores indicating greater levels of anhedonia. The SHPS has good 
test-retest reliability amongst healthy participants over a three-week interval (intra-
class correlation coefficient between test and re-test: r = .70, p < .00; Franken et al., 
2007). 
 Modified Stroop test of attentional bias (Appendix 19): This measures the 
extent to which attention is ‘captured’ by various types of motivationally salient 
stimuli (Powell et al., 2002). Participants must colour-name the ink (red, green, 
yellow or blue) in which each of eighty-eight words (eight repetitions of eleven 
different words from the same semantic category) is printed. A card version was 
used in the present study, with the eighty-eight words presented in four columns. 
Participants were required to colour-name them sequentially (vertically 
downwards) and correct themselves if they made an error. Four classes of semantic 
stimuli (neutral, appetitive, aversive and alcohol-related; e.g. pub, liqueur, wine), 
matched for word frequency and length, were presented on separate cards in 
counterbalanced order. As per convention, colour-naming time and number of 
errors served as dependent variables. 
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The interference index for each of the latter three word-types is computed by 
subtracting their colour-naming times / number of errors from the colour-naming 
times / number of errors in the neutral condition. 
 Cue-Reactivity (CR): Participants rated their desire to drink alcohol: (1) at 
baseline; (2) after two minutes’ exposure to a neutral cue (taking the top off of a 
bottle of water and sniffing it); and (3) after two minutes’ exposure to a bottle of 
alcohol of their preferred brand (taking the top off of the bottle and sniffing it). 
Participants were asked simply, ‘How strong is your desire to have a drink right 
now?’, and responded by placing a mark on a 10-centremetre-long Visual Analog 
Scale (VAS) anchored by the statements ‘Not at all’ and ‘The most I’ve ever felt’. The 
score was derived by measuring the distance (in mm) from the ‘Not at all’ end of 
the VAS to the point marked by the participant; therefore, higher scores indicated 
greater desire. 
[E] Measures of inhibitory control/decision-making 
 Computerised Continuous Performance Test (CPT): Various versions of the 
CPT have been used to investigate attentional control and response inhibition in a 
variety of patient groups; the version used here was adapted from Dougherty et al. 
(1999). Five-digit numbers were presented on a computer monitor at a constant 
rate of two per second for a period of five minutes. Participants were instructed to 
press the left button of a computer mouse whenever a five-digit sequence was 
identical to the preceding one (‘target’ stimuli) but not to respond to other 
sequences, which comprised ‘novel’ stimuli (no digits in common with the 
preceding stimulus) and ‘catch’ stimuli (in which four of the five digits matched 
those of the previous stimulus). Each presentation of a target, catch or novel 
stimulus was separated from the next by three consecutive presentations of the 
‘filler’ sequence ‘12345’, to which participants were likewise instructed not to 
respond. Two fixed sequences were used, with the order counterbalanced across 
conditions. 
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‘Correct detections’ are responses to a target; ‘commission errors’ (CEs) are 
responses to catch stimuli; ‘random errors’ are responses to novel stimuli; and 
‘motor errors’ (MEs) are pre-emptive responses to at least one of the sequence of 
three filler stimuli. Commission errors are believed to result from an inability to 
withhold a response until the stimulus has been completely processed and have 
been reported to be elevated in impulsive populations (Dougherty et al., 2000). 
They have also been associated with impulsivity-related psychopathology (Marsh et 
al., 2002), and they tend to increase following alcohol consumption (Dougherty et 
al., 1999, 2000). Furthermore, high rates of CEs are often observed in normal but 
impulsive individuals (Swann et al., 2001; Mathias et al., 2002; Dougherty et al., 
2003a, 2003b, 2005) and they have been found to correlate significantly with self-
report measures of impulsivity (Marsh et al., 2002; Thompson et al., 2006). The 
present study therefore utilised CE rate as the primary index of impulsivity from the 
CPT. Given that Dawkins et al. (2007b) reported that in smokers, a fewer number of 
MEs were observed following acute nicotine administration compared to acute 
abstinence, MEs were included here as a secondary index of impulsivity in the CPT. 
 Computerised Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994): The IGT is a 
widely-administered instrument which mimics real-life affective decision-making 
and measures the participant’s propensity toward risk-taking. Kasar et al. (2010) 
found individuals with alcohol use disorders to perform worse on this task than 
otherwise healthy controls. 
The task involves 100 card selections from four separate decks (A, B, C and D), 
presented via a computer monitor. Each selection results in either winning or losing 
money. Decks A and B usually yield moderate immediate wins (e.g. $110, $130) but 
occasional heavy losses (e.g. $1250, $1500) and lead to a net loss over repeated 
selections. They are therefore termed ‘high-risk’ decks. Decks C and D typically 
generate smaller wins (e.g. $40, $55) but also occasional smaller penalties (e.g. 
$50); over time they result in an overall net profit, and they are therefore termed 
‘low-risk’ or ‘advantageous’ decks. Since participants completed this task twice, two 
versions were administered. One included the A, B, C and D decks described above, 
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whilst in the other the ‘advantageous’ decks were labelled K and N and the ‘high-
risk’ decks L and M. 
Net score is calculated by subtracting the number of choices from the risky decks (A 
and B; L and M) from the number of choices from the safe decks (C and D; K and N). 
Greater net scores therefore indicate lower risk-taking / good decision-making. For 
the purposes of data analysis, the task was divided into five blocks, each one 
consisting of twenty consecutive card choices, in order to quantify the change in 
decision-making across the course of the task (Bechara et al., 1994). 
PROCEDURE 
SDs completed the procedure in a testing room at Goldsmiths College whilst PDs 
completed the study in one of the assessment rooms at Lantern Hall in Croydon. 
Clinical participants necessarily lived locally to Lantern Hall; presenting for the 
research study at this location was therefore more convenient. The majority of SDs 
lived within South-East London and so for them, presenting for the study at 
Goldsmiths College was more convenient. The experimental procedure itself was 
identical for the two groups. 
Participants were required to have abstained from alcohol for 24 hours and 
cigarettes, tea, coffee or any highly-caffeinated soft drinks for 3 hours. On arrival for 
testing, participants provided a breath alcohol sample on a Lion Alcolmeter (Lion 
Laboratories Ltd., Barry, UK). All participants had a breath alcohol level (BAL) of 
zero. 
Participants were administered the first drink (alcohol or placebo) and instructed to 
consume it as quickly as possible. Immediately following this, they completed the 
RIS, BIS-11 and SHPS. Participants were permitted ten minutes and no more in 
which to complete these questionnaires; if they had not completed them during 
this time, they did so at the end of the session. If they completed them prior to 10 
minutes having elapsed, they had a short break until the ten minutes was reached. 
Ten minutes was identified as the appropriate interval from consumption of the 
alcohol to the start of the behavioural tests i) to allow time for alcohol to reach the 
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bloodstream and ii) because BAC peaks at around 30 minutes (Julien, 2005).11 
Participants then completed the behavioural measures for the first time. 
For those participants who had been administered the alcohol drink first, breath 
alcohol levels (BALs) were taken immediately prior to administration of the second 
(placebo) drink. This was to ensure that BALs had returned to zero and that there 
were thus no carry-over effects into the placebo condition. There was then a further 
interval of 10 minutes during which participants were administered the HADS and 
TIS. As before, if these were not completed within 10 minutes, they were 
completed at the end of the session. Likewise if they were completed in under ten 
minutes, the participant took a short break until the 10 minutes had elapsed. 
Following this, the behavioural tests were administered for the second time. 
Order of drink conditions was counterbalanced within both groups (PDs and SDs). 
Following the second condition, participants completed any incomplete measures 
from earlier parts of the procedure. Finally, participants who had been given the 
alcohol drink second gave another BAL reading to ensure that the alcohol had been 
metabolised before they left the experimental situation. The participant, but not 
the experimenter, was blind to the experimental condition. Table 4.1 provides a 
schematic overview of the order of task administration. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 A pilot study had earlier indicated that a single completion of the test battery took about twenty-
five to thirty minutes. On average, it takes an adult 1 hour to metabolise one unit of ethanol (Julien, 
2005). Thus, consumption of 0.5 units should mean that participants would have some ethanol in 
their system throughout the duration of one test battery completion. With at least a half-hour 
interval between the two conditions, given in counterbalanced order, those receiving placebo 
second would be alcohol-free throughout testing in that condition. 
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Table 4.1: Schematic overview of design and order of assessments in Study Parts 1 
and 2 
St
ar
t 
o
f 
se
ss
io
n
 Participant arrives 
Informed consent 
Expired breath alcohol measured 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
 I 
First drink administered (alcohol or placebo) 
First set of questionnaires administered (duration: 10 mins): 
 RIS 
 BIS-11 
 SHPS 
First administration of behavioural tests (duration: 25-30 mins): 
 IGT 
 Emotional Stroop 
 CPT 
 Cue-reactivity procedure 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
 II
 
Second drink administered (alcohol or placebo) 
Second set of questionnaires administered (duration: 10 mins): 
 HADS 
 TIS 
Expired breath alcohol measured* 
Second administration of behavioural tests (duration: 25-30 mins): 
 IGT 
 Emotional Stroop 
 CPT 
 Cue-reactivity procedure 
En
d
 o
f 
se
ss
io
n
 Any uncompleted questionnaires from Conditions I and II 
Expired breath alcohol measured 
Participant leaves 
*If participant had been administered the alcohol drink first. 
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Data analysis 
All statistical analyses were carried out using SPSS version 16. 
There were two stages to the analyses. Stage 1 focused on the SDs only; data were 
analysed using analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the within-subjects repeated 
measure of DRINK TYPE (placebo vs. alcohol).  Stage 2 compared PDs with SDs: in a 
mixed-measures ANOVA, DRINK TYPE (placebo vs. alcohol) was again the repeated-
measures factor, with DRINKING GROUP (SDs vs. PDs) an additional between-
subjects factor. 
Not all PDs completed every test, and for some indices analyses were based on as 
few as seven participants. Given the exploratory nature of this aspect of the study, 
conservative corrections for multiple testing have not been applied; however any 
positive findings have been interpreted cautiously. 
Results 
1] Does alcohol priming affect test performance in SDs? 
Data screening: Prior to analysis, variables were screened for accuracy of data 
entry, missing values and fit between their distributions and the assumptions of 
multivariate analysis. There was no evidence of any clear non-linearity or 
curvilinearity for any variable. 
Participant characteristics: 
One or two participants had missing data on one or two variables, as shown in Table 
4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Sociodemographic, personality, mood and alcohol-related characteristics 
of social drinkers 
Variable  Social Drinkers  
(N = 23) 
Age (years) Mean (SD) 
Range 
47.13 (9.41) 
29.00 – 63.00 
Gender (female/male) F : M 11:12 
Years of full-time education Mean (SD) 12.70 (2.30) 
Typical weekly alcohol intake (units 
per week during previous 12 months) 
Mean (SD) 
Range 
8.87 (6.51) 
1.00 – 24.45 
Family history of alcohol use disorders 
(presence/absence) 
Y : N 7:16 
Anxiety (HADS-Anx)a Mean (SD) 5.09 (2.49) 
Depression (HADS-Dep)a Mean (SD) 2.82 (2.46) 
Anhedonia (SHPS) Mean (SD) 22.39 (6.46) 
Recent Cognitive Impulsivity (RIS-CI) Mean (SD) 3.57 (1.85) 
Recent Motor Impulsivity (RIS-MI) Mean (SD) 4.26 (2.22) 
Trait Cognitive Impulsiveness (TIS-CI) Mean (SD) 3.87 (1.91) 
Trait Motor Impulsiveness (TIS-MI) Mean (SD) 4.48 (1.83) 
a
N = 22. 
Hypothesis-testing: Each hypothesis is recapitulated below, followed by the 
corresponding analysis/analyses. 
[A] The effects of alcohol administration upon sensitivity to non-alcohol-related 
and alcohol-related motivational cues/stimuli 
Hypothesis 1 a): The priming dose of alcohol will increase sensitivity to 
motivationally significant words, as indexed by i) colour-naming times and ii) 
number of errors in the emotional Stroop 
To simplify analyses, new ‘interference effect’ variables were computed for each 
motivationally significant word-type (appetitive, aversive and alcohol-related) by 
subtracting from their colour-naming times / number of errors the colour-naming 
times / number of errors for neutral words. The derived variables are labelled 
‘AppINT’, AvINT’ and ‘AlcINT’. 
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In all ANOVAs, there was the repeated-measures factor of DRINK (placebo versus 
alcohol). In the ‘interference’ ANOVAs, there was the additional repeated-measures 
factor of WORD-TYPE (AppINT vs. AvINT vs. AlcINT). 
i) Colour-naming times 
An initial ANOVA tested whether alcohol affected baseline colour-naming time for 
neutral words. Table 4.3 shows colour-naming times to all four types of words, and 
the interference effects, for both drink conditions. 
Table 4.3: Stroop colour-naming times (s) and ‘interference’ scores in neutral, 
appetitive, aversive and alcohol-related word conditions in social drinkers after 
placebo and alcohol 
Drink administered Variable Social Drinkers (N = 21) 
Mean (SD) 
 
 
 
Placebo 
Neutral 66.57 (13.29) 
Appetitive 67.29 (12.15) 
Aversive 66.86 (11.55) 
Alcohol-related 69.71 (11.68) 
AppINT 0.71 (7.52) 
AvINT 0.29 (6.74) 
AlcINT 3.14 (8.71) 
 
 
 
Alcohol 
Neutral 67.76 (12.03) 
Appetitive 69.24 (12.94) 
Aversive 68.00 (12.00) 
Alcohol-related 70.52 (13.20) 
AppINT 1.48 (5.12) 
AvINT 0.24 (8.75) 
AlcINT 2.76 (6.66) 
 
Neutral condition: One participant was identified as a univariate outlier and 
excluded from analysis, leaving 21 participants. The main effect of DRINK was non-
significant [F (1, 20) = 0.32; ns]. 
Interference scores: One participant did not provide complete data, and another 
was excluded owing to their being a univariate outlier, leaving 21 participants for 
analysis. The main effect of DRINK was non-significant [F (1, 20) = 0.00; ns], as was 
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the main effect of WORD-TYPE [F (2, 40) = 1.63; ns]. And the DRINK by WORD-TYPE 
interaction [F (2, 40) = 0.19; ns]. 
ii) Number of errors 
An initial ANOVA tested whether alcohol affected baseline errors to neutral words. 
Table 4.4 shows number of errors in all four types of words, and the interference 
effects, for both drink conditions. 
Table 4.4: Stroop errors and ‘interference’ scores in neutral, appetitive, aversive 
and alcohol-related word conditions in social drinkers after placebo and alcohol 
Drink administered Variable Social Drinkers 
Mean (SD) 
 
 
 
Placebo 
Neutrala 1.14 (1.67) 
Appetitivea 1.27 (2.03) 
Aversivea 1.55 (1.90) 
Alcohol-relateda 1.27 (1.42) 
AppINTb  -0.19 (1.44) 
AvINTb 0.29 (1.49) 
AlcINTb 0.00 (1.87) 
 
 
 
Alcohol 
Neutrala 1.77 (1.95) 
Appetitivea 1.41 (1.50) 
Aversivea 2.50 (2.63) 
Alcohol-relateda 1.45 (1.68) 
AppINTb -0.38 (1.53) 
AvINTb 0.71 (2.67) 
AlcINTb -0.29 (1.98) 
aN = 22; bN = 21. 
Neutral condition: The main effect of DRINK was non-significant [F (1, 21) = 1.60; 
ns]. 
Interference Scores: One participant did not provide complete data and another, 
being a univariate outlier, was excluded from analysis, leaving 21 participants. The 
main effect of DRINK was non-significant [F (1, 20) = 0.00; ns] as was the DRINK by 
WORD-TYPE interaction [F (2, 40) = 1.18; ns]. The main effect of WORD-TYPE was 
significant [F (2, 40) = 3.78; p = 0.03]; however, as this was not in itself of theoretical 
interest, it was not explored further. 
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Overall, therefore, the hypothesis was not supported. 
Hypothesis 1 b): The priming dose of alcohol will increase cue-elicited craving 
Data were missing for one participant. 
Table 4.5: Subjective desire for alcohol following presentation of a) participants’ 
preferred alcoholic drink and b) a bottle of water in SDs after placebo and alcohol 
Drink administered Drink presented Social Drinkers (N = 22) 
Mean (SD) 
Placebo Water 13.77 (20.06) 
Alcohol 22.75 (25.35) 
Alcohol Water 12.86 (23.07) 
Alcohol 26.86 (24.98) 
Grand mean (collapsed 
across drink administered) 
Water 13.32 (20.85) 
Alcohol 24.81 (24.42) 
 
No participants were identified as univariate outliers. The main effect of DRINK was 
non-significant [F (1, 21) = 1.23; ns]. As can be seen in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1, the 
main effect of CUE-TYPE was significant [F (1, 21) = 26.11; p = 0.00; ηp
2 = 0.55]. 
 
Figure 4.1: Mean (+/- 1 SE) subjective craving in SDs following presentation of 
neutral and alcohol cues 
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The data were thus not consistent with the hypothesis. 
[B] The effects of alcohol administration upon measures of decision-making and 
inhibitory control 
Hypothesis 1 c): A priming dose of alcohol will increase risky decision-making on 
the IGT 
Participants’ scores in each block of the IGT were analysed via a repeated-measures 
ANOVA, with the within-subjects factors of DRINK (placebo versus alcohol) and IGT 
BLOCK (1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4 vs. 5). For these analyses, there were 23 SDs. Table 4.6 
shows IGT performance in each block, in SDs after placebo and alcohol. 
Table 4.6: IGT score in each block, and net score, in SDs after placebo and alcohol 
drink administration 
Drink administered IGT Block  Social Drinkers (N = 23) 
Mean (SD) 
 
 
Placebo 
1 -4.52 (5.73) 
2 1.65 (8.46) 
3 2.52 (9.67) 
4 2.17 (8.16) 
5 1.74 (7.87) 
Total 3.57 (29.85) 
 
 
Alcohol 
1 -1.48 (4.94) 
2 0.17 (8.86) 
3 2.00 (9.93) 
4 2.43 (8.70) 
5 0.61 (10.40) 
Total 3.74 (28.85) 
 
There were no univariate outliers. There was no main effect of DRINK on net score 
[F (1, 22) < 0.001; ns], meaning that the hypothesis was not supported. As expected, 
there was a main effect of IGT BLOCK [F (4, 88) = 5.34; p < 0.01], reflecting improved 
performance across successive blocks. 
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Hypothesis 1 d): A priming dose of alcohol will increase impulsive responding on 
the CPT 
One participant failed to complete the CPT under both drink conditions, leaving an 
N of 22. 
Table 4.7: Number of correct detections, commission errors and motor errors in SDs 
after placebo and alcohol 
Drink administered Variable Social Drinkers (N = 22) 
Mean (SD) 
 
Placebo 
Correct detections ( / 25) 19.91 (4.16) 
Commission errors ( / 25) 5.23 (4.51) 
Motor errors ( / 25) 1.68 (1.84) 
 
Alcohol 
Correct detections ( / 25) 20.09 (3.70) 
Commission errors ( / 25) 5.23 (4.00) 
Motor errors ( / 25) 1.45 (1.71) 
 
Participants’ Commission Errors and Motor Errors were analysed via separate 
repeated-measures ANOVAs. In neither were there any univariate outliers. 
Commission Errors: The main effect of DRINK was non-significant [F (1, 21) = 0.00; 
ns]. 
Motor Errors: The main effect of DRINK was non-significant [F (1, 21) = 0.50; ns]. 
Again, these findings are not consistent with the hypothesis. 
[C] Associations between habitual level of alcohol intake and measures of non-
alcohol-related and alcohol-related reward responsiveness and measures of 
inhibitory control and decision-making 
Hypothesis 2: Heavier drinkers will show more pronounced priming effects than 
lighter drinkers, as indicated by the magnitude of alcohol – placebo ‘difference’ 
scores on all the above measures 
New ‘difference’ variables were created for all the preceding indices by subtracting 
participants’ performances under the placebo condition from their performances 
during the alcohol condition. Spearman correlations (1-tailed) were then performed 
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with mean number of units of alcohol consumed per week during the previous 
twelve months. 
Table 4.8: Spearman correlations (p value; 1-tailed) between habitual alcohol intake 
and difference scores for behavioural measures of non-alcohol-related and alcohol-
related reward sensitivity and decision-making and inhibitory control in SDs 
Variable 
Correlation with mean alcohol 
consumption (units per week) 
during previous 12 months 
Stroop Interference Scoresa 
 
 
Colour-naming times:  
 Appetitive words: 0.01 (ns) 
 Aversive words: 0.12 (ns) 
 Alcohol-related words: 0.01 (ns) 
Numbers of errors:  
 Appetitive words: 0.03 (ns) 
 Aversive words: -0.21 (ns) 
 Alcohol-related words: 0.21 (ns) 
Cue-elicited cravinga -0.15 (ns) 
IGT net scoreb -0.05 (ns) 
CPT commission errorsa 0.22 (ns) 
CPT motor errorsa -0.16 (ns) 
aN = 22; bN = 23. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not supported. 
2] Are the effects of alcohol priming more pronounced in PDs 
than SDs? 
Data screening: Prior to analysis, variables were screened for accuracy of data 
entry, missing values, and fit between their distributions and the assumptions of 
multivariate analysis. There was no evidence of any clear non-linearity or 
curvilinearity for any variable. 
Participant characteristics: 
One or two participants had missing data on one or two variables, as shown in Table 
4.9. 
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Table 4.9: Sociodemographic, personality, mood and alcohol-related characteristics 
of social versus problem drinkers 
 
Variable 
 Social 
Drinkers 
(n = 23) 
Problem 
Drinkers 
(n = 11) 
Social vs. Problem 
Drinkers 
t/χ2 
value 
p value d 
Age (years) Mean 
(SD) 
47.13 
(9.41) 
47.36 
(12.56) 
-0.06 ns - 
Gender (female/male) F : M 11:12 5:6 -0.02 ns - 
Years of full-time 
education 
Mean 
(SD) 
12.70 
(2.30) 
12.00 
(2.28) 
0.83 ns - 
Typical weekly alcohol 
intake (units per week 
during previous 12 
months)* 
Mean 
(SD) 
8.87 
(6.51) 
81.02 
(30.57) 
-7.74 < 0.01 4.15 
Range 1.00 – 
24.45 
42.00 – 
133.96 
 
Family history of 
alcohol use disorders 
(presence/absence)a 
 
Y : N 
 
7:16 
 
8:2 
 
-6.91 
 
0.01 
 
 
Anxiety (HADS-Anx)b Mean 
(SD) 
5.09 
(2.49) 
9.36 
(4.92) 
-3.34 0.00 1.30 
Depression (HADS-
Dep)b* 
Mean 
(SD) 
2.82 
(2.46) 
6.27 
(5.08) 
-2.13 0.05 1.01 
Anhedonia (SHPS) Mean 
(SD) 
22.39 
(6.46) 
25.55 
(6.90) 
-1.30 ns - 
Recent Cognitive 
Impulsivity (RIS-CI) 
Mean 
(SD) 
3.57 
(1.85) 
4.82 
(2.48) 
-1.65 0.11 0.62 
Recent Motor 
Impulsivity (RIS-MI) 
Mean 
(SD) 
4.26 
(2.22) 
5.55 
(1.63) 
-1.71 0.10 0.65 
Trait Cognitive 
Impulsiveness (TIS-CI) 
Mean 
(SD) 
3.87 
(1.91) 
5.36 
(2.46) 
-1.94 0.06 0.54 
Trait Motor 
Impulsiveness (TIS-MI) 
Mean 
(SD) 
4.48 
(1.83) 
5.64 
(2.11) 
-1.64 0.11 0.62 
P values are two-tailed; 
*Levene’s test for equality of error variance significant at p < 0.05; equal variances 
therefore not assumed; 
a = n (PDs) = 10; n (SDs) = 23; 
b = n (PDs) = 11; n (SDs) = 22. 
One problem drinker did not give his age; the remaining 10 were aged between 25 
and 62 years. The twenty-three social drinkers were aged between 29 and 60 years. 
As evident from the table, the two groups did not differ in mean age, gender ratio, 
or mean years of full-time education. Reflecting the differences in alcohol 
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consumption explicit in categorisation as a problem or social drinker, there was a 
highly significant difference between the groups for self-reported weekly alcohol 
intake. 
PDs self-reported greater symptoms of anxiety and depression than SDs; there were 
no differences between the groups in terms of anhedonia, however. 
Fifteen individuals reported having a first-degree relative with a ‘possible’ or 
‘definite’ history of alcohol problems (‘Family History Positive’ or FHP) and 18 
reported having no such relatives (‘Family History Negative’ or FHN). One PD failed 
to provide any information. PDs were more likely to be FHP than SDs, consistent 
with being familialy more predisposed towards alcohol use disorders. 
In order to explore whether this difference in family history might explain any 
observed differences between the groups on experimental indices, relevant 
ANOVAs were re-run covarying FAMHIST (yes vs. no). Since one PD did not provide 
family history information, this meant that in the latter analyses, there were 10 PDs 
versus 23 SDs. Detailed results from these analyses are reported only if FAMHIST 
altered the original main effect of group, or of any interactions involving group. 
Hypothesis-testing: Each hypothesis is recapitulated below, followed by the 
corresponding analysis/analyses. 
[A] Anhedonia 
Hypothesis 3: Acutely abstinent PDs will demonstrate greater anhedonia than SDs 
An independent-measures t-test was performed to compare problem and social 
drinkers’ SHPS scores. As shown in Table 4.9 (p. 190), the groups did not differ and 
the hypothesis was therefore not supported. 
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[B] Impulsiveness in daily life 
Hypothesis 4: PDs will demonstrate greater impulsiveness than SDs, as manifested 
in TIS and RIS subscale scores 
Independent-measures t-tests compared problem and social drinkers’ TIS and  
RIS subscale scores. As shown in Table 4.9, there were trends for PDs to score more 
highly than SDs on all of the SIS and TIS subscales. 
[C] The effects of alcohol administration upon sensitivity to non-alcohol-related 
and alcohol-related motivational cues/stimuli 
Hypothesis 5 a): Acutely abstinent PDs will show attenuated interference from 
motivationally salient cues compared i) to SDs and ii) to their own sensitivity to 
such cues following a dose of alcohol 
Analysis of the Stroop task focused on the ‘interference effect’ variables (‘AppINT’, 
AvINT’ and ‘AlcINT’) for colour-naming times and number of errors, as described on p. 
177. 
i) Colour-naming times 
An initial ANOVA compared the two groups on their colour-naming times for the 
neutral words only, in the placebo and alcohol conditions. 
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Table 4.10: Emotional Stroop: Colour-naming times and interference effects in 
social and problem drinkers after placebo and alcohol 
Drink 
administered 
Variable Social Drinkers Problem Drinkers 
 
 
 
Placebo 
Neutrala 66.57 (13.29) 69.00 (15.27) 
Appetitivea 67.29 (12.15) 68.00 (12.04) 
Aversivea 66.86 (11.55) 74.33 (14.97) 
Alcohol-relateda 69.71 (11.68) 71.44 (16.73) 
AppINTb  0.71 (7.52) -1.30 (7.63) 
AvINTb 0.29 (6.74) 5.10 (9.60) 
AlcINTb 3.14 (8.71) 1.10 (10.89) 
 
 
 
Alcohol 
Neutrala 67.76 (12.03) 64.56 (11.09) 
Appetitivea 69.24 (12.94) 67.11 (12.32) 
Aversivea 68.00 (12.00) 64.56 (9.04) 
Alcohol-relateda 70.52 (13.20) 68.00 (8.09) 
AppINTb 1.48 (5.12) 2.20 (6.00) 
AvINTb 0.24 (8.75) 0.50 (6.85) 
AlcINTb 2.76 (6.66) 2.70 (5.56) 
a = n (SDs) = 21; n (PDs) = 9; 
b = n (SDs) = 21; n (PDs) = 10. 
Neutral condition: Two univariate outliers (1 PD; 1 SD) were excluded from the 
ANOVA, leaving 21 SDs and 9 PDs. There was no main effect of either GROUP [F (1, 
29) = 0.25; ns] or DRINK [F (1, 29) = 0.58; ns], nor a GROUP x DRINK interaction [F (1, 
29) = 1.89; ns]. 
Interference scores: One univariate outlier (an SD) was excluded from the ANOVA, 
leaving 21 SDs and 10 PDs. Table 4.11 overleaf shows the results. 
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Table 4.11: Emotional stroop colour-naming times: Main and interaction effects 
Main effects F df p ηp
2 
GROUP 0.04 1, 29 ns - 
DRINK 0.01 1, 29 ns - 
WORD-TYPE 0.91 2, 58 ns - 
Interaction effects     
GROUP x DRINK 0.00 1, 29 ns - 
GROUP x WORD-TYPE 1.29 2, 58 ns - 
DRINK x WORD-TYPE 2.91 2, 58 0.06 0.09 
GROUP x DRINK x WORD-TYPE 2.80 2, 58 0.11 0.07 
 
As can be seen, no main effects or interaction effects reached significance, though 
there was a weak trend towards a three-way GROUP x DRINK x WORD-TYPE 
interaction and a strong trend towards a DRINK x WORD-TYPE interaction. These are 
illustrated graphically in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Interference effects for colour-naming times in the motivational word conditions of the Stroop task, under placebo and alcohol, for 
SDs (n = 21; left panel) and PDs (n = 10; right panel)
Problem Drinkers (n = 10) Social Drinkers (n = 21) 
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There was thus a tendency for the PDs to show a more erratic pattern, showing 
greater interference from appetitive and alcohol-related words following a priming 
dose of alcohol than after placebo, but the reverse effect for aversive words. 
Differences between the conditions were much less pronounced in the SDs. 
This apparent difference between the responses of the two groups was explored 
further by running separate ANOVAs for each group. In the SDs, the DRINK x WORD-
TYPE interaction was non-significant [F (2, 40) = 0.19; ns]. In the PDs, however, the 
DRINK x WORD-TYPE interaction demonstrated a suggestion of a trend towards 
significance [F (2, 18) = 2.62; p = 0.10; ηp
2 = 0.23]. 
Exploratory paired-samples t-tests were used to explore the source of the trend in 
PDs. After placebo drink administration, colour-naming time for aversive words was 
greater than for appetitive words [t (9) = -2.92; p = 0.02; d = 0.92]; there was also a 
trend for the greater colour-naming time of aversive words compared to alcohol-
related words [t (9) = 1.98; p = 0.08; d = 0.63]. However, there were no differences 
following administration of alcohol. 
Holding word-type constant, there were no differences between the placebo and 
alcohol administration conditions within any of the Stroop interference variables. 
ii) Numbers of errors 
One univariate outlier (a PD) was excluded from the ANOVA, leaving 9 PDs and 22 
SDs. 
An initial ANOVA compared the two groups on their numbers of errors for the 
neutral words only, in the placebo and alcohol conditions. 
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Table 4.12: Emotional Stroop: Numbers of errors and interference effects in social 
and problem drinkers after placebo and alcohol 
Drink 
administered 
Variable Social Drinkers 
(n = 22) 
Problem Drinkers 
(n = 9) 
 
 
 
Placebo 
Neutral 1.14 (1.67) 3.67 (4.12) 
Appetitive 1.27 (2.03) 1.78 (1.92) 
Aversive 1.55 (1.90) 4.56 (4.50) 
Alcohol-related 1.27 (1.42) 3.11 (4.57) 
AppINT  0.14 (2.08) -1.89 (2.42) 
AvINT 0.41 (1.56) 0.89 (2.26) 
AlcINT 0.14 (1.93) -0.56 (2.07) 
 
 
 
Alcohol 
Neutral 1.77 (1.95) 2.78 (3.46) 
Appetitive 1.41 (1.50) 3.22 (4.60) 
Aversive 2.50 (2.63) 2.44 (3.47) 
Alcohol-related 1.45 (1.68) 2.78 (3.46) 
AppINT -0.36 (1.50) 0.44 (2.79) 
AvINT 0.73 (2.60) -0.33 (1.41) 
AlcINT -0.32 (1.94) 0.00 (2.24) 
 
Neutral condition: The main effect of GROUP demonstrated a strong trend towards 
significance [F (1, 29) = 3.59; p = 0.07; ηp
2 = 0.11], reflecting the greater number of 
errors by PDs than SDs. The main effect of DRINK was non-significant [F (1, 29) = 
0.11; ns], as was the GROUP x DRINK interaction [F (1, 29) = 1.10; ns]. 
Interference scores: 
Table 4.13: Main and interaction effects for 2 (GROUP: SDs vs. PDs) x 2 (DRINK: 
placebo vs. alcohol) x 3 (WORD-TYPE: AppINT vs. AvINT vs. AlcINT) mixed-measures 
ANOVA upon emotional Stroop numbers of errors 
Main effects F df p ηp
2 
GROUP 0.64 1, 29 ns - 
DRINK 0.15 1, 29 ns - 
WORD-TYPE 3.70 2, 58 0.03 0.11 
Interaction effects     
GROUP x DRINK 0.74 1, 29 ns - 
GROUP x WORD-TYPE 0.24 2, 58 ns - 
DRINK x WORD-TYPE 2.79 2, 58 0.07 0.09 
GROUP x DRINK x WORD-TYPE† 7.03 2, 58 0.00 0.20 
† ηp
2 = 0.20. 
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As shown in the table and Figure 4.3, the GROUP x DRINK x WORD-TYPE interaction 
was significant [F (2, 58) = 7.03; p = 0.00; ηp
2 = 0.20], and the DRINK x WORD-TYPE 
interaction demonstrated a strong trend towards significance [F (2, 58) = 2.79; p = 
0.07; ηp
2 = 0.09]. There was a main effect of WORD-TYPE [F (2, 58) = 3.70; p = 0.03]; 
however, as this was not of particular theoretical interest, it was not explored 
further. No other main effects and interaction effects were significant. 
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Figure 4.3: Interference effects for numbers of errors in the motivational word conditions of the Stroop task, under placebo and alcohol, for 
SDs (n = 22; left panel) and PDs (n = 9; right panel)
Social Drinkers (n = 22) Problem Drinkers (n = 9) 
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It appears that alcohol tended to increase interference by appetitive-related words 
in the PDs, but to reduce it in the SDs. The PDs show the reverse pattern for 
aversive words. This apparent difference between the responses of the two groups 
was explored further by running separate ANOVAs within each group. In the SDs, 
the DRINK x WORD-TYPE interaction was non-significant [F (2, 42) = 1.67; ns]. In the 
PDs, however, the DRINK x WORD-TYPE interaction demonstrated a very strong 
trend towards significance [F (2, 16) = 3.30; p = 0.06; ηp
2 = 0.29]. 
Paired-samples t-tests were used to further explore the source of this near-
significance in PDs. After placebo drink administration, more errors occurred during 
aversive words than appetitive words [t (8) = -2.58; p = 0.03; d = 0.86] and alcohol-
related words [t (8) = 2.87; p = 0.02; d = 0.95]. However, there were no differences 
following administration of alcohol. 
Holding word-type constant, there were no differences between the placebo and 
alcohol administration conditions within any of the Stroop interference variables. 
These findings mirror those observed with respect to colour-naming times. 
Family history of AUDs: When a mixed-measures ANOVA was repeated with FAMILY 
HISTORY as an additional independent-measures factor, the GROUP x DRINK by 
WORD-TYPE interaction remained significant [F (2, 54) = 4.63; p = 0.01; ηp
2 = 0.15]. 
Thus, overall, even though Hypothesis 5 a) was not supported, there was some 
evidence for dysfunctional processing of motivationally salient cues in PDs. 
Hypothesis 5 b): With level of baseline craving controlled, PDs will show a 
proportionally greater increase in subjective cue-reactivity following a priming 
dose of alcohol than will SDs 
For these analyses, there were 11 PDs and 22 SDs. No participants were identified 
as univariate outliers. Table 4.14 shows scores of the two groups in the cue-
reactivity test. 
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Table 4.14: Cue-elicited craving: means and standard deviations (s.d.s) for craving 
following exposure to alcohol and water, in SDs and PDs, under placebo and alcohol 
conditions 
Drink 
administered 
Drink presented Social Drinkers  
(n = 22) 
Problem Drinkers  
(n = 11) 
Placebo Water 13.77 (20.06) 13.41 (15.63) 
Alcohol 22.75 (25.35) 30.68 (28.25) 
Alcohol Water 12.86 (23.07) 20.09 (27.36) 
Alcohol 26.86 (24.98) 23.32 (30.47) 
 
Table 4.15 shows the results of the ANOVA, which had the between-subjects factor 
of GROUP (SDs vs. PDs) and the within-subjects factors of DRINK (placebo vs. 
alcohol) and CUE-TYPE (water vs. alcohol). 
Table 4.15: Cue-elicited craving: main and interaction effects 
Main effects F df p ηp
2 
GROUP 0.11 1, 31 ns - 
DRINK 0.20 1, 31 ns - 
CUE-TYPE 29.57 1, 31 0.00 0.49 
Interaction effects     
GROUP x DRINK 0.46 1, 31 ns - 
GROUP x CUE-TYPE 0.10 1, 31 ns - 
DRINK x CUE-TYPE 1.46 1, 31 ns - 
GROUP x DRINK x CUE-TYPE† 6.54 1, 31 0.02 0.17 
† ηp
2 = 0.17. 
A main effect of CUE-TYPE reflected greater subjective craving following 
presentation of the alcohol cue than the neutral cue [F (1, 31) = 29.57; p < 0.01; ηp
2 
= 0.49] (see Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4: Mean (+/- 1 SE) subjective craving in response to water and alcohol 
stimuli 
This was qualified by a 3-way (GROUP x DRINK x CUE-TYPE) interaction [F (1, 31) = 
6.54; p = 0.02; ηp
2 = 0.17], illustrated in Figure 4.5, in which PDs show stronger 
craving in the placebo condition than after alcohol priming whilst SDs showed the 
converse pattern. 
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Figure 4.5: Mean (+/- 1 SE) subjective craving in response to water and alcohol stimuli, under placebo and alcohol, in SDs (n = 22; left panel) 
and PDs (n = 11; right panel)
Problem Drinkers (n = 11) Social Drinkers (n = 22) 
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In order to explore the source of the significant GROUP x DRINK x CUE-TYPE 
interaction, DRINK x CUE-TYPE ANOVAs were performed in PDs and SDs separately. 
These 2-way interactions were significant in PDs [F (1, 10) = 6.89; p = 0.03; ηp
2 = 
0.41] but not SDs [F (1, 21) = 1.23; ns]. 
Repeated-measures t-tests explored the source of the significant interaction in PDs. 
In the placebo drink condition, subjective craving was greater after the alcohol cue 
than the neutral cue [t (10) = -3.01; p = 0.01; d = 0.91]; in the alcohol drink 
condition, there was no difference in subjective craving as a function of cue-type [t 
(10) = -1.45; ns]. 
Family history of AUDs: When a mixed-measures ANOVA was repeated with FAMILY 
HISTORY as an additional independent-measures factor, the GROUP by DRINK by 
CUE-TYPE interaction remained significant [F (1, 29) = 8.50; p = 0.01; ηp
2 = 0.23]. 
The data did thus not on balance support Hypothesis 5 b). 
[D] The effects of alcohol administration upon measures of decision-making and 
inhibitory control 
Hypothesis 6: PDs will perform better on the IGT and CPT following a priming dose 
of alcohol than during acute abstinence, and the magnitude of this improvement 
will be greater than any shown by SDs 
a) IGT 
Over a third of the PDs (n = 4) failed to provide complete IGT data due to their 
experiencing significant problems with the task. This left only 7 PDs, so these 
analyses are highly tentative. The PD and SD groups remained matched for age [t 
(28) = -1.54; ns], gender ratio [χ2 (1) = 0.05; ns] and number of years of full-time 
education [t (28) = 0.02; ns]. 
Table 4.16 shows mean scores. 
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Table 4.16: Means and s.d.s for IGT score by block, and net score, in SDs and PDs, 
after placebo and alcohol drink administration 
Drink 
administered 
IGT Block  Social Drinkers  
(n = 23) 
Problem Drinkers  
(n = 7) 
 
 
Placebo 
1 -4.52 (5.73) 1.14 (5.64) 
2 1.65 (8.46) -1.14 (1.57) 
3 2.52 (9.67) 3.14 (7.47) 
4 2.17 (8.16) 6.00 (6.53) 
5 1.74 (7.87) 3.71 (8.36) 
Total 3.57 (29.85) 12.86 (12.85) 
 
 
Alcohol 
1 -1.48 (4.94) 0.29 (2.14) 
2 0.17 (8.86) -0.86 (5.01) 
3 2.00 (9.93) 1.71 (8.44) 
4 2.43 (8.70) 3.71 (7.43) 
5 0.61 (10.40) -3.14 (9.51) 
Total 3.74 (28.85) 1.71 (25.73) 
 
Table 4.17 shows the results of the ANOVA, which had the between-subjects factor 
of GROUP (SDs vs. PDs) and the within-subjects factors of DRINK (placebo vs. 
alcohol) and IGT BLOCK (1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4 vs. 5). 
Table 4.17: IGT performance: main and interaction effects 
Main effects F df p 
GROUP 0.14 1, 28 ns 
DRINK 0.63 1, 28 ns 
IGT BLOCK 3.63 4, 112 0.01 
Interaction effects    
GROUP x DRINK 0.67 1, 28 ns 
GROUP x IGT BLOCK 1.42 4, 112 ns 
DRINK x IGT BLOCKa 0.80 3.27, 91.55 ns 
GROUP x DRINK x IGT BLOCK 0.49 4, 112 ns 
aGreenhouse-Geisser statistic used due to violation of sphericity. 
A main effect of IGT BLOCK reflected, as would be expected, improved performance 
as the task progressed [F (4, 112) = 3.63; p = 0.01; ηp
2 = 0.12]. As can be seen from 
the table, no other main or interaction effects were significant. 
Hypothesis 6 a) was therefore not supported. 
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b) CPT 
The 4 PDs who failed to complete the IGT likewise had difficulty with, and failed to 
complete, the CPT. These analyses are therefore again very tentative. 
Table 4.18: Means and s.d.s for number of correct detections, commission errors 
and motor errors, in SDs and PDs, under placebo and alcohol 
Drink 
administered 
Variable Social Drinkers  
(n = 22) 
Problem Drinkers  
(n = 7) 
 
Placebo 
Correct detections 19.91 (4.16) 17.57 (3.91) 
Commission errors 5.23 (4.51) 6.71 (4.50) 
Motor errors 1.68 (1.84) 3.86 (4.74) 
 
Alcohol 
Correct detections 20.09 (3.70) 18.57 (4.35) 
Commission errors 5.23 (4.00) 5.71 (2.98) 
Motor errors 1.45 (1.71) 3.29 (2.69) 
 
Commission Errors and Motor Errors were analysed in separate 2 x 2 mixed-
measures ANOVAs. 
Commission Errors: There were no univariate outliers. There was no main effect of 
DRINK [F (1, 27) = 1.02; ns] or GROUP [F (1, 27) = 0.32; ns], nor any GROUP by DRINK 
interaction [F (1, 27) = 1.02; ns]. 
Motor Errors: One PD was identified as a univariate outlier, but was retained in the 
analysis due to the low PD sample size. There was no main effect of DRINK [F (1, 27) 
= 0.54; ns], nor a GROUP x DRINK interaction [F (1, 27) = 0.10; ns], though the main 
effect of GROUP was significant [F (1, 27) = 5.10; p = 0.03; ηp
2 = 0.16]. This reflected 
more motor errors by PDs. 
Hypothesis 6 b) was therefore not supported. 
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[E] Associations of behavioural measures of incentive motivation and 
impulsiveness with Trait and Recent Impulsiveness 
Hypothesis 7: Within the combined sample, performance on the behavioural 
indices will correlate more highly with RIS scores than with TIS scores 
The RIS and TIS were correlated, using Spearman correlations, with the placebo 
performance indices from the emotional Stroop, cue-reactivity, Iowa Gambling and 
Continuous Performance Tasks in the combined sample (Ns = between 29 and 33). 
Dunn and Clark’s (1969) Z1
* statistic was then used for each behavioural index, to 
test whether the magnitude of their correlations with the RIS and TIS subscale 
scores differed. Table 4.19 shows all correlations, with uncorrected p values, and 
then the comparison between RIS and TIS correlations. 
Table 4.19: Spearman correlations for TIS and RIS subscale scores with experimental 
indices in the placebo condition, in the combined sample of SDs and PDs; and 
comparisons of the magnitude of RIS and TIS correlations with each index 
Variable 
Cognitive Impulsiveness Motor Impulsiveness 
TIS 
(r) 
RIS 
(r) 
TIS vs. RIS 
(p) 
TIS 
(r) 
RIS 
(r) 
TIS vs. RIS 
(p) 
Stroop Interferencea       
Colour-naming times:       
 Appetitive words: -0.06 -0.14 ns -0.28† -0.18 ns 
 Aversive words: 0.33* 0.20 ns 0.23† 0.10 ns 
 Alcohol-related words: 0.08 -0.08 ns -0.36* -0.45** ns 
Numbers of errors:       
 Appetitive words: -0.20 -0.28† ns -0.22 -0.27† ns 
 Aversive words: 0.38* 0.34* ns 0.33* 0.12 ns 
 Alcohol-related words: -0.02 -0.08 ns -0.14 -0.18 ns 
Cue-elicited cravingb 0.01 -0.03 ns 0.10 0.19 ns 
IGT net scorec -0.39* -0.27† ns 0.00 -0.14 ns 
CPT commission errorsd 0.41*
* 
0.29† ns 0.25† 0.27† ns 
CPT motor errorsd -0.13 -0.12 ns 0.30† 0.21 ns 
a = N = 32; b = N = 33; c = N = 30; d = 29; 
** p ≤ 0.01 level; *p ≤ 0.05; † trend - p ≤ 0.10.  All tests one-tailed. 
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Although there are some correlations between the questionnaire indices of 
impulsivity and the behavioural indices, there is no clear or consistent tendency for 
these to be greater for the RIS than the TIS. This hypothesis is therefore not 
supported. 
It is of some interest, however, that more cognitively impulsive individuals were 
more prone to making maladaptive reward-oriented responses on the IGT, and to 
making more commission errors on the CPT. They were also rather more error-
prone in colour-naming aversive words on the Stroop task. 
Discussion 
The discussion first considers results from the SDs only, and then the analyses 
comparing PDs and SDs. Particular foci include: the extent to which the reward 
sensitivity data are congruent with Robinson and Berridge’s (1993; 2000) models of 
incentive salience; the findings pertaining to inhibitory control, decision-making and 
impulsiveness contextualised in relation to addiction theories which emphasise 
impairments in frontal regions (e.g. Jentsch & Taylor, 1999); and the implications of 
the TIS and RIS data. 
1) Social Drinkers 
The present sample of moderate social drinkers, none of whom reported either 
regular use of other psychoactive drugs or regular binge-drinking, demonstrated no 
evidence of priming or disinhibition following ingestion of half a unit of alcohol. The 
present study adopted only a single-blind design. However, when asked to identify 
which drink contained alcohol, correct identification occurred only at chance-level. 
Furthermore, confidence levels amongst those who had correctly identified the 
alcohol drink were only around fifty percent. Thus, the results of the present study 
probably cannot be attributed to expectancy effects. 
1. i) Lack of priming effects 
Hypothesis 1 a), which predicted that the priming dose of alcohol would increase 
sensitivity to motivationally significant words, was not supported. This appears to 
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contradict the finding of Jones and Schulze (2000) that half a unit of alcohol 
produced greater levels of Stroop interference for alcohol-related words. However, 
differences in the design of the two studies limit direct comparisons. Whereas the 
present study used as stimuli the generic names of well-known alcoholic drinks (e.g. 
‘wine’, ‘beer’), Jones and Schulze’s (2000) stimuli had a more implicit and tangential 
relationship with alcohol, with connotations which could be considered either 
appetitive (e.g. ‘peaceful’, ‘sexy’) or aversive (e.g. ‘clumsy’, ‘thoughtless’). Also, they 
did not disguise their alcoholic and placebo drinks, meaning that it is impossible to 
separate pharmacological effects from those pertaining to expectancy; 
interestingly, expectancy can itself elicit increases in DA (Heinz et al., 2009) though 
effects on word-processing could be purely cognitive in origin. 
At any rate, the effect of an alcohol dose on attentional bias remains unclear. There 
could be important dose-related relationships, with no effects at small doses (as 
here), greater ones at moderate doses and possibly a reduction at large doses. 
Thus, Duka and Townshend (2004) and Schoenmakers et al. (2008) both reported a 
priming effect of a 0.3 g/kg dose (higher than the present dose of approximately 
0.06 g/kg), whilst Duka and Townshend (2004) additionally found that a 0.6 g/kg 
dose did not elevate attentional bias relative to placebo. This led Fernie et al. (2012) 
to speculate that attentional bias peaks at moderate but declines at higher doses. It 
is unclear why this might be, or even whether this is a genuine pattern at present 
(given the relatively small number of studies); further research is needed. 
Correlational analyses produced no indication of an association between social 
drinkers’ habitual alcohol intake and attentional bias in the Stroop task. This finding 
is in contrast to the studies of Weafer and Fillmore (2013) and Fernie et al. (2012), 
both of which reported effects of alcohol doses on attentional bias to be moderated 
by social drinking status – though the two studies reported somewhat conflicting 
findings. To recapitulate, whilst Weafer and Fillmore (2013) reported a dose-
dependent increase in attentional bias after 0.45 g/kg and 0.65 g/kg doses of 
alcohol in heavy social drinkers but not moderate drinkers, Fernie et al. (2012) 
found that, compared to placebo, a 0.4 g/kg alcohol dose increased attentional bias 
in moderate but not heavy social drinkers. Similar to the present findings, Adams et 
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al. (2012) found no effect of social drinking status on attentional bias in the visual 
probe task or the modified Stroop following 0.13 g/kg and 0.40 g/kg alcohol doses. 
Conflicting findings aside, some important methodological differences limit 
comparison between the present study and those previous. Firstly, the positive 
findings reported by Weafer and Fillmore (2013) and Fernie et al. (2012) were 
observed for the visual probe task, as opposed to the emotional Stroop used here. 
This is important as the effects of alcohol on attentional bias seem to vary as a 
function of the task used; Adams et al. (2012) found an effect of alcohol in the 
visual probe task but not the modified Stroop. Secondly, the previous three studies 
all divided their participants into heavy and moderate/lighter social drinking groups, 
whereas the present study used a single group of moderate social drinkers. It may 
be that the necessarily lower and narrower range of alcohol consumption exhibited 
by the present sample, and crucially, the presumably lower levels of incentive 
salience this group would have attributed to alcohol-related stimuli, reduced the 
chances for effects of alcohol on attentional bias. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the present study administered a 
comparatively smaller dose than Weafer and Fillmore (2013), Fernie et al. (2012) 
and Adams et al. (2012). Although a limitation of the present study was its failure to 
take BACs at pre- and post-test following consumption of the alcohol dose, peak 
BAC following the half unit administered here would nevertheless have been 
expected to have been around 8 mg/100 ml in men and 12 mg/100 ml in women 
(Barbour, 2001). By comparison, the larger doses of alcohol administered in recent 
studies comparing heavier / hazardous drinkers to lighter, moderate drinking 
groups on attentional bias following alcohol produced peak BACs substantially 
higher than those expected here. For example, the doses of 0.45 g/kg and 0.65 g/kg 
administered by Weafer & Fillmore (2012) – typical of the doses given in such 
research – produced average peak BACs of 60 mg/100 ml and 80 mg/100 ml, 
respectively. Though Fernie et al. (2012) did not report BACs, participants were 
administered a 0.40 g/kg dose; thus, peak BACs should have been similar to those of 
Weafer & Fillmore’s (2012) 0.45 g/kg dose. Adams et al. (2012) administered doses 
of 0.13 g/kg and 0.40 g/kg; the former would have produced peak BACs of around 
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15 mg/100 ml in men and 24 mg/100 ml in women. Adams et al. (2012) found no 
effect of either dose on modified Stroop performance; in a visual probe task, 
however, attentional bias increased in both light and heavy drinking participants 
under the 0.40 g/kg dose. Taken together with the present findings, it appears that 
small doses of alcohol (i.e. those producing peak BACs equal to and less than 15 
mg/100 ml in men and 24 mg/100 ml in women) do not influence attentional bias 
(as measured via modified Stroop or visual probe task) in social drinking groups. On 
balance, therefore, Jones & Schulze’s (2000) finding of attentional bias (only to 
alcohol-related words with positive connotations) in social drinkers following half a 
unit appears spurious. The effects of doses which produce BACs of around 60 
mg/100 ml and above on attentional bias in heavier and more moderate social 
drinkers appear conflicting and further research is needed. 
The second hypothesis (1 b), which predicted that the priming dose would increase 
SDs’ cue-elicited craving, was also unsupported. Interestingly, Schulze and Jones 
(2000) reported that doses ‘up to’ a maximum of 1 unit (in a bogus taste test) 
significantly increased SDs’ craving, relative to placebo. Although some participants 
(27%) did not finish the drink, it is likely that on average the alcohol dose consumed 
was larger than that used here. Again, the interpretation of their findings is 
seriously compromised by the fact that they did not disguise the alcohol and 
placebo drinks. A final important difference between that study and this one is that 
Schulze and Jones measured subjective craving via the Desires for Alcohol 
Questionnaire (DAQ; Love et al., 1998), whereas the present study used a VAS. 
Whilst it is possible that the DAQ has greater sensitivity to changes in subjective CR, 
it did not detect effects of 1 unit of alcohol in an earlier study by Schulze and Jones 
(1999). 
As noted in the Introduction of this chapter, previous studies have suggested that 
subjective CR may increase with increasing alcohol doses (e.g. Chutuape et al., 
1994; Duka et al., 1999; Rose & Duka, 2006). The results of the present study may 
imply a starting threshold somewhere between the 0.5 units (approximately 0.06 
g/kg; producing peak BACs of around 8 mg/100 ml (men) to 12 mg/100 ml (women) 
used here and the lowest dose of 0.3 g/kg (which should produce peak BACs of 
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around 37.5 mg/100 ml in men and 60 mg/100 ml in women) at which effects have 
been reported in social drinkers. Further research is needed to clarify this situation. 
Although there was no effect of alcohol priming, subjective craving did increase 
following presentation of the alcohol cue, relative to presentation of the neutral 
cue. In the Stroop task, however, greater interference was not observed for alcohol-
related compared to neutral words. This may well reflect the relative lack of 
significance that alcohol has for normal social drinkers. This is not inconsistent with 
the ability of explicit cues to elicit conscious associations of relaxation and 
enjoyment, and elevated desire to have a drink. However, Stroop interference 
effects from alcohol-related words have been reported in social drinkers elsewhere 
(e.g. Bauer & Cox, 1998; Ryan, 2002a), and further research is needed to determine 
whether inconsistency in findings relates to particular methodological or sample 
characteristics. In any event, it is evidently not a robust phenomenon in SDs. 
To summarise, then, in the present sample of moderate social drinkers, doses of 
alcohol of half a unit did not precipitate pharmacological effects sufficient to 
produce increases in either implicit craving, measured via attentional bias, or 
explicit, subjective craving. 
1. ii) Lack of disinhibiting effects of the priming dose 
Hypotheses 1 c) and d), that the priming dose would increase risky decision-making 
on the IGT and impulsive responding on the CPT, were not supported. There was no 
indication whatsoever that the ‘priming’ dose had had any effect in either case. 
A literature review revealed no previous studies of the effects of alcohol on the IGT. 
However, a number of previous studies have reported disinhibiting effects of 
alcohol in SDs as measured via the Stop Signal Task (e.g. Dougherty et al., 2008), 
Go/No-Go task (e.g. Marczinski et al., 2005) and Continuous Performance Task (e.g. 
Dougherty et al., 2008). However, the smallest dose at which these studies tend to 
report inhibitory control failures is 0.40 g/kg – broadly equivalent to 3.33 units. Few 
published studies have investigated the potentially disinhibiting effects of smaller 
doses. Dougherty et al. (1999) have reported disinhibition on the CPT at 0.2 g/kg 
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(broadly equivalent to 1.7 units); however, these same authors later reported that 
0.2 g/kg did not affect CPT performance (Dougherty et al., 2008). It therefore 
remains unclear at what dosage inhibitory control failures begin to emerge. 
Different doses appear to affect different impulsivity indices in different ways. 
Dougherty et al. (2008) examined performance on a CPT, SST and delay discounting 
task after placebo and doses of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 g/kg alcohol across five 
experimental days, with task performance being assessed at 0.5 hours (h) before, 
and 0.25, 1.00 and 2.00 h after alcohol administration. The two larger doses, but 
not the lower ones, increased disinhibition in the CPT across time and at peak 
breath alcohol concentration (BrAC). Disinhibition increased over time regardless of 
the alcohol dose size in the SST and delay discounting task, with no differences 
among dose conditions, nor any difference from placebo, at peak BrAC. Few, if any 
other studies, have administered multiple doses and multiple performance 
measures; more are needed to illuminate potentially complex relationships 
between alcohol dose and different facets of impulsivity. 
1. iii) Results of the present study in the context of priming theory 
Field et al.’s (2010) model of alcohol’s priming effects posits an interaction of the 
acutely disinhibiting effects of alcohol with underlying and enduring incentive 
salience attributions to alcohol and associated stimuli. Thus a reduction in inhibitory 
control increases the emergence of appetitive responses to alcohol-related stimuli. 
Whilst the present findings suggest that in this sample of SDs, frontal inhibitory 
control mechanisms were not adversely affected by alcohol, the fact that alcohol 
cue exposure elicited subjective craving suggests that they did make incentive 
salience attributions. It is possible that a larger dose would have magnified their 
cue-reactivity through disinhibiting effects, and further research varying the dose 
level would be interesting in this regard. 
It is interesting to contrast the findings of craving and attentional bias at doses at or 
less than 1 unit (e.g. Schulze & Jones, 2000; Jones & Schulze, 2000) with the 
apparent absence of effects on inhibitory control at similar doses. It may be that 
measures of inhibitory control are simply less sensitive to real but subtle effects of 
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low doses. Alternatively, low doses may induce no disinhibition but nevertheless 
exert direct effects on reward centres and thus promote responding to reward-
associated stimuli. A third possibility concerns expectancy effects. The negative 
results of the present study, contrasting with the positive findings in the non-
blinded studies by Jones & Schulze, are consistent with the priming effects observed 
being a product of expectancy. In ‘real-life’ drinking situations people tend to be 
aware of the alcoholic content of their beverage, raising the distinct possibility that 
any priming they experience is to some extent cognitively driven. 
In order to distinguish between these possible factors, future studies could include 
indices of both incentive motivation and inhibitory control, administer doses of 
alcohol varying between 0.5 to 3 or 4 units, and manipulate expectancies/beliefs 
about alcohol content (c.f. Marlatt’s work using the ‘balanced placebo’ design; e.g. 
Marlatt, Demming & Reid, 1973; Rohsenow & Marlatt, 1981). Though some studies 
have adopted elements of this approach (e.g. Dougherty et al., 2008; Guillot et al., 
2011), they have typically not included indices of reward responsiveness. In so 
doing, the progressive effects of increasing doses could be better explored and 
mapped. In an ideal world of substantial resources and large sample sizes, brain 
imaging would also be used to study the effects of these manipulations on MCL 
DAergic circuitry. However, such a complex study involving so many manipulations 
would be rather impractical as hundreds of participants would be needed in order 
to give sufficient power. 
1. iv) Sample characteristics 
The social drinkers recruited here were generally moderate in their consumption, 
drinking less than 10 units per week on average. Priming studies have more typically 
recruited heavy social drinkers who, as suggested by Field et al. (2010), may be 
sensitised to the disinhibiting effects of alcohol. This could reflect dysregulations in 
their MCL DA systems which render them more sensitive than the present 
moderate social drinkers to the effects of the small alcohol dose used here. There 
was no evidence of any tendency for heavier SDs to show more pronounced priming 
effects than lighter drinkers, even though the sample varied in their consumption 
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between 1 and 24 units per week. However, with a fairly modest N of 23, there was 
little statistical power to detect such a relationship. 
2) Problem versus Social Drinkers 
Problem drinkers (PDs) were sufficiently psychologically dependent to be seeking 
treatment, they normally drank throughout the day and during the testing session 
they (unusually for them) were 12 hours abstinent. 
2. i) Reward Sensitivity: Self-reported anhedonia 
Hypothesis 3, that abstaining PDs would demonstrate greater anhedonia than SDs 
as manifested in higher SHPS scores, was not supported. This may imply that the 
relevant brain circuitry was not compromised during acute abstinence, or that any 
disturbance was relatively mild and was not experienced subjectively. However, the 
lack of difference is surprising given (a) that PDs were acutely abstinent and 
therefore likely to be experiencing disturbed affect as well as putatively reduced 
dopaminergic tone, and (b) that PDs tend to be exposed to various stressful life 
circumstances as either cause or consequence of their heavy drinking, and in clinical 
studies have been found to present with low mood (Mossberg, Liljeberg & Borg, 
1985; Tόmasson & Vaglum, 1995). This suggests that the present sample was 
atypical. In comparative terms they were not anhedonic, as indicated by SHPS 
scores which (a) approximated to those reported in healthy adults (Franken, Rassin 
& Muris, 2007) and (b) were lower than those reported in other addict groups 
(Dawkins et al., 2006) and people with depression (Franken et al., 2007; Nakonezny 
et al., 2010). By contrast, however, their anxiety and depression scores on the HADS 
were on average around 30% and 100% higher than published norms (Crawford et 
al., 2001), and were also significantly higher than those of the SDs tested here. Thus 
the SHPS did not detect anhedonia despite the presence, as expected, of other 
forms of affective disturbance. However, it is important to note that anhedonia is 
only one aspect of depressed mood: for example, schizophrenic and traumatic brain 
injury (TBI) patients have both been reported to demonstrate anhedonic symptoms 
without meeting criteria for depressive disorder (Rao et al., 2007). Anhedonia may 
thus be correlated with – but separable from – depression. The above 
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notwithstanding, the present PDs’ lack of anhedonia is inconsistent with 
neurobiological models (e.g. Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2000) positing 
dysfunctional MCL DA activity and reward sensitivity in addicted individuals during 
early abstinence. 
One potentially relevant difference between the SHPS and the HADS as employed 
here was in relation to their reference time-frames, the former relating here to how 
respondents felt ‘right now’, and those of the former to ‘in the last week’. Thus, it is 
possible that the mood of this small sample was better than usual on the day of 
testing – either by chance, or perhaps in response to the social context of engaging 
with the researcher or to anticipation of consuming alcohol during and/or after the 
assessment. 
2. ii) Reward sensitivity: The emotional Stroop task 
There was partial support for Hypothesis 5 a), that compared to SDs, PDs’ sensitivity 
to motivationally significant words, as indexed by colour-naming times and number 
of errors in the modified Stroop, would be more strongly influenced by a priming 
dose of alcohol. As predicted, for PDs but not SDs there were trends for alcohol to 
heighten interference from appetitive words and decrease sensitivity to aversive 
words; it had no effect on responsiveness to alcohol-related words in either group. 
Several caveats must be borne in mind, however. Firstly, although there was a 
strong GROUP by DRINK by WORD-TYPE interaction for the number of Stroop 
errors, only a (relatively weak) trend for this interaction was observed in relation to 
colour-naming times. Post-hoc analyses for colour-naming times did, however, 
support a pattern of alcohol increasing interference from appetitive words, 
decreasing interference to aversive words, whilst having no effect (relative to 
placebo) on responsiveness to alcohol-related words. Secondly, the GROUP by 
DRINK by WORD-TYPE effects notwithstanding, there was no overall main effect of 
alcohol priming, nor did this interact with GROUP. Thus, the alcohol dose influenced 
PDs’ relative sensitivity to the different forms of affective stimuli rather than having 
a general effect or one which affected responses to alcohol-related cues in 
particular. The third caveat concerns the small number of PDs and the fact that the 
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Bonferroni correction was not applied to post-hoc analyses due to their exploratory 
nature. It is possible therefore that the findings are spurious; although interesting, 
they should be considered tentative and in need of replication in an independent 
sample. 
PDs’ reduced responsivity to appetitive words during acute abstinence is congruent 
with models of alcohol addiction (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2000; Goldstein & 
Volkow, 2002) which posit down-regulation of reward pathways and hence 
attenuated responses to non-drug-related rewarding stimuli which can be 
transiently reversed by alcohol. That is, the under-responsivity of DAergic MCL 
pathways is exposed during acute abstinence; and the DAergic ‘boost’ of alcohol 
‘normalises’ sensitivity to natural reinforcers. Dawkins et al. (2006) reported similar 
results with smokers. 
This appears to conflict with the finding that PDs and SDs did not differ in terms of 
self-reported anhedonia. This discrepancy might reflect differences between self-
report and behavioural forms of measurement (i.e. the former can be subject to 
conscious or unconscious biases whereas the latter are more objective). Thus, for 
instance, demand characteristics may have led the PDs to report what they 
considered to be a ‘normal’ anticipation of enjoyment rather than their actual 
feelings. Alternatively, these findings may reflect a progressive reduction in 
incentive salience which parallels increasingly dysfunctional MCL DAergic activity. 
Thus subtle changes which are detected by behavioural tests may not impinge on 
subjective experience (anhedonia) until a certain threshold is reached. 
During abstinence, PDs demonstrated slightly greater attentional bias than SDs 
towards aversive words; however, following alcohol administration, PDs’ bias 
disappeared whilst in SDs it increased. It is possible that PDs were experiencing mild 
withdrawal symptoms during abstinence and that this made them sensitive to 
mood-congruent aversive stimuli. Consistent with this, PDs reported greater anxiety 
(a symptom of withdrawal) than SDs at baseline. 
PDs’ interference from alcohol-related words did not differ between placebo and 
alcohol conditions. No previous studies have compared Stroop interference in those 
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with an AUD under abstinence and after alcohol ingestion. In smokers, however, 
Munafò et al. (2003), Rusted et al. (2000) and Dawkins et al. (2006) have all similarly 
reported no effects of nicotine ingestion. However, Johnsen et al. (1997) did report 
increased interference from smoking cues following nicotine administration 
compared to acute abstinence. Then again, other studies using similar paradigms 
have reported greater attentional bias towards smoking-associated stimuli during 
abstinence (e.g. Gross, Jarvik & Rosenblatt, 1993; Waters et al., 2003). These mixed 
findings may reflect the complexity of substance-associated Stroop tasks in addicted 
groups. During acute abstinence, the drinker is likely to be preoccupied with 
thoughts relating to alcohol and drinking. This is likely to give rise to ‘semantic 
priming’ – the preferential processing of stimuli related to recent cognitive content. 
This effect would oppose any concomitant abstinence-related reduction in 
neurobiological ‘appetitive priming’ (i.e. impaired sensitivity to appetitive stimuli in 
general). The converse might apply after alcohol ingestion: that is, those with an 
AUD may be less likely to think about alcohol and drinking, thereby reducing 
semantic priming, whilst the DAergic ‘boost’ triggered by alcohol ingestion will tend 
to elevate appetitive priming. Since it is likely that the relative impact of these two 
salience attribution mechanisms are a function of such variables as length of 
abstinence, dose of alcohol, alcohol expectations and level of dependence, virtually 
any pattern of results could arise. The same is not true, however, for appetitive cues 
which are not substance-related, since abstinence is most unlikely to give rise to 
semantic priming for stimuli other than those related to the individual’s preferred 
drug. 
It is also possible that the suggestion raised by Field and Christiansen (2012; see p. 
31) may be relevant here. To recapitulate, these authors have argued that since 
drinkers often tend to drink only a certain brand of beer, for example, they will 
probably be most responsive to words related to that brand, less so to those related 
to other beer brands and potentially not at all responsive to words associated with 
cider, wine or spirits. One could argue that such an effect may be strongest in 
problem and physically-dependent drinkers (compared to heavy / hazardous 
drinkers) due to the progressively compulsive nature of addiction; that is, such 
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drinkers tend to drink very high volumes of only a certain brand and type of alcohol. 
It may make sense for future studies using the alcohol Stroop task to include only 
words considered relevant to the participant’s habitual drinking habits. Indeed, it 
may be considered rather strange that this is not already the status quo, particularly 
when one considers that those with panic disorder, for example, tend to be 
presented specifically with words synonymous with ‘anxiety’ and not with words 
associated with other forms of affective status. This of course is the logic underlying 
most CR procedures in which the participant is exposed to the sight and smell of 
their preferred alcoholic beverage. 
2. iii) Cue-elicited craving 
Hypothesis 5 b) was that PDs’ cue-elicited craving would be more strongly 
influenced than that of SDs by a priming dose of alcohol. Unexpectedly, PDs showed 
greater cue-elicited craving in the placebo (abstinent) than the alcohol priming 
condition; this was opposite to the predicted effects. There was no interaction 
effect in SDs. 
The pattern of findings in PDs further illustrates the problems arising from the dual-
route model of CR discussed earlier in relation to the alcohol Stroop task. That is, 
the observed cue-reactivity in the placebo condition could reflect semantic priming 
being elevated during abstinence, whilst the small priming dose is hypothesised to 
trigger craving via a pharmacological DA ‘boost’. The lack of any interaction effect in 
SDs and the unexpected pattern in PDs can both be explained by the dual route 
model, but of course this model is intrinsically irrefutable. 
It is notable that exposure to direct alcohol-related stimuli triggered craving in SDs, 
reflecting previous observations in relation both to cue-elicited craving (e.g. 
McCusker & Brown, 1990; Walitzer & Sher, 1990; Greeley et al., 1993) as well as 
behavioural and/or (electro)physiological CR (e.g. McCusker & Brown, 1990; 
Walitzer & Sher, 1990; Bauer & Cox, 1998; Cox et al., 1999; Jones & Schulze, 2000; 
Sharma et al., 2001; Ryan, 2002a; Chapter 3 of the present thesis). Lusher et al. 
(2004) have suggested that alcohol-related stimuli acquire motivational salience 
long before dependence develops. The lack of an overall difference between the 
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groups in subjective craving found here may suggest that salience attribution 
plateaus quite early in the development of drinking behaviour. 
Family history of AUDs did not add further explanatory value. However, its ability to 
do so was limited by a) the lack of difference between groups in CR; b) the small 
sample; and c) the fact that the PDs were twice as likely to have a family history 
than the SDs and base rate in PDs was so high (80%). The index used to measure 
this variable, the Family Tree Questionnaire (FTQ; Mann et al., 1985), is a self-report 
questionnaire, and clearly cannot provide any direct information concerning an 
individual’s genetics; thus, the present finding does not preclude the influence of 
genetic factors. 
2. iv) Impulsiveness 
Hypothesis 4 was that PDs would demonstrate greater impulsiveness than SDs, as 
manifested in TIS and RIS subscale scores, and in IGT net score and CPT commission 
and motor errors change variables. There was partial support for this. Self-reported 
levels of impulsivity tended to be higher in PDs than SDs, consistent with the 
characteristically chaotic and disorganised personal lives often observed in addicts. 
In contrast, for the three experimental indices of impulsiveness, the groups differed 
only with respect to motor errors in the CPT. That is, PDs made three times more 
responses to the ‘to be ignored’ filler stimuli. However the difference was not 
affected by whether or not participants had consumed alcohol or placebo. 
Alternatively, the discrepancies between the different experimental indices may be 
related to the multi-faceted nature of impulsiveness and/or differential sensitivity 
of those indices. These issues are detailed in Chapter 2 (pp. 52-53). Indeed, the 
present findings are in line with other reports of only weak to moderate 
correlations, if any, between different measures of impulsiveness (Dom et al., 
2006b; Reynolds et al., 2006a). 
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2. v) Inhibitory control and decision-making during acute abstinence and following 
alcohol administration 
Hypothesis 6 a) predicted that compared to SDs, PDs’ decision-making, as 
manifested in the IGT net score, would be impaired during acute abstinence and 
‘normalised’ following the priming dose of alcohol. This was not supported: acutely 
abstinent PDs were not impaired in terms of their decision-making abilities. No 
previous study has investigated the IGT in non-dependent drinkers, though deficits 
have been reported in physically dependent drinkers (Mazas et al., 2000; Bechara et 
al., 2001; Dom et al., 2006a; Vicenzi et al., 2006; Loeber et al., 2009a, 2009b). 
Perhaps the arguably more diverse (relative to the CPT) set of decision-making skills 
required by the IGT makes performance relatively robust against transient 
alterations in MCL DA activity in those without physical dependence. Alternatively, 
it is of course possible that the absence of a deficit in the present PDs may simply 
relate to the small sample size (N = 7) and consequent lack of power. Though both 
Vuchinuch and Simpson (1998) and Field et al. (2007) have reported delay aversion 
in non-dependent heavy and problem drinkers via a delay discounting task (a 
theoretical ‘cousin’ of the IGT), there are few other comparable studies; further 
research is therefore needed. 
Hypothesis 6 b) was that PDs’ inhibitory control, as manifested in CPT Commission 
Errors (CEs) and Motor Errors (MEs), would be impaired during acute abstinence 
and ‘normalised’ following acute alcohol administration, to a greater extent than in 
SDs. Although this pattern was not in fact found, PDs committed more MEs than 
SDs across both drink conditions. 
As with the IGT, few published studies have examined whether non-dependent 
drinkers show impaired inhibitory control in the CPT. Those which have, have 
tended to report (positive) correlations between level of consumption and 
impairment (e.g. Newman & Kosson, 1986; Colder & Connor, 2002). Thus, the 
findings for MEs are consistent with such previous reports. 
It may be argued that the half unit of alcohol was simply not able to produce 
alterations in MCL DA measurable via behavioural performance. However, the fact 
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that the drink administered was found to significantly interact with group and word-
type factors in the Stroop and CR tasks indicates that the half unit was able to 
produce meaningful changes in MCL DA. 
It is interesting to compare the CPT findings here with those of Dawkins et al. 
(2007b) in smokers, where MEs were elevated during acute abstinence and reduced 
following nicotine administration. In both studies MEs proved more sensitive than 
other CE indices to between-groups or between-conditions differences. This may be 
significant with regards to addicts’ failure to exercise sufficient levels of control over 
their drug-taking behaviour. However, it is not clear why nicotine priming in 
smokers, but not alcohol priming in drinkers, influenced the level of MEs. There are 
several possible explanations. Most simply, perhaps the small number of PDs here 
was key. Alternatively, it is possible that a combination of the disinhibiting effects of 
alcohol, together with a greater sensitivity to these effects in PDs compared to SDs, 
had the simultaneous effects that a) the greater level of MEs was maintained in PDs 
whilst b) MEs were unaffected in SDs. Further research is needed to examine such 
speculations. 
Overall, therefore, the findings concerning behavioural measures of executive 
control only partly supported previous observations of prefrontal deficits in non-
dependent substance-abusing groups. 
3) Recent versus trait Impulsiveness 
Hypothesis 7 was that recent impulsivity (RIS) scores would correlate more strongly 
than would trait impulsiveness (TIS) scores with behavioural indices of reward 
responsiveness and impulsivity, in the placebo (abstinent) condition. This was not 
supported. 
The lack of difference can probably be accounted for via recourse to the small 
sample size. As demonstrated in Chapter 2 (p. 93), correlations between the 
corresponding TIS and RIS subscales of cognitive impulsivity and motor impulsivity 
subscales were strong (i.e. they ranged from 0.57 to 0.80), meaning that it was 
unlikely that anything other than a very large difference in sensitivity to the 
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behavioural indices of impulsivity would have been detected in a sample of such 
modest size. However, these analyses were, as stated in the methods section of this 
chapter, run on an exploratory basis given the small N; thus, in order to properly 
test the hypothesis a much larger sample would be needed. Another possibility is 
that the RIS is flawed in that its time-scale of the previous two weeks is too broad. 
This may have had the effect that no meaningful temporal differentiation existed 
between the TIS and RIS. This limitation of the RIS has been discussed in Chapter 2 
(p. 97). 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present study found no evidence that a small priming dose of 
alcohol had any priming or disinhibitory effects in SDs; nor that their habitual level 
of alcohol consumption predicted their sensitivity to priming effects on behavioural 
indices. When compared to these SDs, however, a group of acutely abstinent PDs 
demonstrated dysfunctional reward-related processing in a modified Stroop task 
and in a cue-reactivity procedure; these appeared to normalise somewhat following 
alcohol priming. The same was not true for behavioural indices of impulsivity. 
Finally, there was no evidence that Recent Impulsivity was more associated with 
behavioural measures of reward responsivity and impulsivity than Trait Impulsivity. 
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Chapter 5: General Discussion 
Overview 
The present thesis consisted of three studies. The first was concerned with the 
development and initial validation of a new questionnaire to measure recent 
impulsivity – the Recent Impulsivity Scale (RIS). The second and third studies were 
primarily concerned with examining whether and to what extent phenomena 
typically observed in alcohol dependence syndrome (ADS) – notably heightened 
cue-reactivity (CR) and impulsiveness, putatively reflecting attenuated activity 
within the mesocorticolimbic (MCL) dopamine (DA) system – were present in 
samples of non-physically-dependent heavy social drinkers (HDs) and problem 
drinkers (PDs), respectively, compared to controls. These latter studies also sought 
to explore relationships with the newly-developed RIS. This chapter will discuss the 
principal findings, implications, methodological issues and future research questions 
raised by the studies of this thesis. 
1) Development and Validation of the Recent Impulsivity Scale 
The items for an initial version of the Recent Impulsivity Scale (RIS) were devised by 
converting those of existing trait-based questionnaires and relating them to a 
‘previous two weeks’ time-frame. Factor analyses of the RIS and a Trait equivalent 
(the TIS), administered to first-year psychology undergraduate students, revealed 
two factors; these were named ‘Cognitive Impulsivity’ and ‘Motor Impulsivity’. 
The sensitivity and construct validity of the RIS were explored throughout the three 
studies of this thesis. The following evidence in support of its validity was found. In 
Study 1: i) it correlated less strongly with an established trait measure, the BIS-11 
(Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995) than did the TIS, consistent with it being affected 
by factors other than an underlying stable trait; ii) there was a trend for the RIS-MI 
subscale to show less temporal stability (test-retest correlation) than the TIS-MI 
subscale; iii) the TIS and RIS CI subscales were more highly correlated in stable 
drinkers than in ‘increasing’ or ‘decreasing’ drinkers, consistent with an effect of 
alcohol consumption on recent (but also trait) impulsivity; and iv) there was a 
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significant positive correlation between recent change in recent MI and recent 
alcohol intake. 
In Study 2, there was a strong trend for electrophysiological (ERP) cue-reactivity 
(CR) to correlate more strongly with RIS-MI than with TIS MI. On the other hand, RIS 
scores did not correlate more strongly than scores with other self-report and 
behavioural indices of interest. To some extent the lack of differences reflects the 
strong inter-correlations between the TIS and RIS subscales and the modest sample 
sizes in Studies 2 and 3, which were rather low-powered for correlational analyses; 
thus, only very large effect sizes could have been detected (for a full discussion of 
issues related to low power, see ‘Problems associated with low power and small 
sample sizes’ on p. 279). Clearly, further research with larger sample sizes is 
needed. 
There were notable differences in the patterns observed for the Motor Impulsivity 
(MI) and Cognitive Impulsivity (CI) subscales. With respect to MI, Study 1 revealed 
that for participants whose recent alcohol intake was atypical, recent alcohol intake 
correlated significantly with recent change in MI but not CI. Similarly, there was a 
strong trend for RIS-MI but not RIS-CI to correlate with electrophysiological cue-
reactivity. These findings are consistent with MI being more strongly influenced 
than CI by (or influential on) recent alcohol use. In relation to this it is notable that 
the items of the MI subscale are more clearly behaviour-oriented than those of the 
CI (e.g. the top-loading MI item was ‘I have encountered problems because I did 
things without stopping to think’ whilst the top-loading CI item was ‘I have planned 
work tasks and activities in my free time carefully’). This behavioural orientation 
may make the MI more sensitive to change in as much as recent actions are 
probably more salient and memorable than recent thoughts and intentions, which 
are intrinsically more ephemeral and abstract. Consistent with this, there was a 
tendency for recent MI, but not recent CI, to be more unstable than its ‘trait’ 
counterpart (i.e. RIS-MI showed lower test-retest stability than TIS-MI). These 
findings suggest that MI may be more sensitive than CI to short-term fluctuations, 
or that the RIS index of MI is more sensitive than that of CI. 
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The two-week timeframe over which RIS items are judged make it an index of 
recent/‘short-term’ impulsivity rather than of impulsivity at that particular moment 
in time. It is difficult to think of behavioural indicators with sufficient base-rate 
frequency to make meaningful judgements over shorter timescales (e.g. ‘today’ or 
‘right now’). However, this does mean that scores are likely to index something 
between traditional trait questionnaires and behavioural ‘state’ measures. Given 
this, the failure of the RIS to correlate significantly more strongly than the TIS with 
behavioural measures is not surprising, especially given the small sample sizes and 
limited statistical power. 
Implications of findings concerning the Recent Impulsivity Scale 
Mixed findings and small sample sizes notwithstanding, the present results give 
some encouragement to the view that state impulsivity is a meaningful construct 
which can be measured via a self-report questionnaire. Although various authors 
have previously referred to SI as being indexed by behavioural indices such the Stop 
Signal, Go/No-Go, Continuous Performance and Delay Discounting Tasks (e.g. de 
Wit, Enggasser & Richards, 2002; Shiels et al., 2009; Strakowski et al., 2010), until 
now self-report measures have been confined to trait impulsiveness. 
The concept of State Impulsivity raises many interesting questions for further 
research. For example, what is the typical time course over which changes in SI take 
place? What is the ‘normal’ scale of such changes? Are certain people more 
susceptible to SI changes? Such questions could be addressed by administering the 
SIS and TIS to a large number of respondents repeatedly over a period of several 
months. 
Measuring and understanding SI may eventually prove important for expanding our 
understanding of alcohol misuse and/or addiction. As discussed in Chapter 2 (pp. 
65-67), a number of studies have reported that alcohol acutely reduces inhibitory 
control (e.g. Fillmore & Vogel-Sprott, 1998, 1999; Rose & Duka, 2008). Field et al. 
(2010) have contended that alcohol-induced disinhibition may make the individual 
less able to resist the appetitive responses elicited by alcohol-related cues, and thus 
to drink more. Relatedly, some people may be particularly susceptible to state-
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based changes in impulsivity, perhaps because they have genotypes which render 
their mesolimbic circuitry more reactive to agonist stimulation (e.g. Guiramand et 
al., 1995; Gardner, Hall & Strange, 1996; Fraeyman & Vermis, 2003). It may be that 
the acutely disinhibiting effects of alcohol consumption are particularly potent in 
such individuals, putting them at increased risk of continued and problematic 
alcohol consumption in individual drinking sessions and chronically. 
2) Behavioural indices of appetitive responding and impulsiveness in heavy / 
problem drinkers versus lighter social drinkers 
Studies 2 and 3 compared groups of non-physically-dependent but heavy or 
problem drinkers with lighter social drinkers, in relation to indices of reward-
responsiveness, inhibitory control, decision-making and impulsivity. 
Appetitive Responding 
It is notable that the presentation of alcohol or associated stimuli increased 
subjective craving in both the heavy and light drinkers (HDs & LDs) in Study 2 and 
also in the problem drinkers (PDs) and social drinkers (SDs) tested in Study 3. Thus, 
the presentation of alcohol-related words in Study 2 and the holding and smelling of 
preferred alcoholic beverages in Study 3 both resulted in increases in the urge to 
drink independent of participants’ drinking status. Acutely abstinent PDs reported 
greater increases in subjective craving following exposure to the alcohol cue than 
did the SDs, but after consumption of the priming dose of alcohol there was no 
difference in CR between the groups. Thus, consistent with previous observations 
(e.g. Walitzer & Sher, 1990), subjective cue-elicited craving is experienced by even 
relatively low levels of drinking experience. Thus the LDs in Study 2 reported an 
average weekly intake of only 2 units. It seems unlikely that alcohol and associated 
stimuli have acquired strong conditioned incentive salience in such light drinkers; it 
may rather be that their self-reported desire to drink when prompted by such cues 
reflects widely-held beliefs about the enjoyment and relaxation which alcohol 
offers. It is interesting in this regard that though the electrophysiological (P3) index 
of cue-reactivity used in Study 2 was stronger to alcohol-related words than to 
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neutral words in HDs than in LDs, there were no differences in terms of subjective 
craving in response to the alcohol-related and household-related words. 
Similar absences of group differences have also been found in other studies 
comparing non-dependent heavy and light drinkers (e.g. Johnsen et al., 1994; 
Stetter et al., 1994; Cox, Yeates & Regan, 1999). It may be that at heavier or more 
problematic levels of alcohol consumption between-groups differences would 
emerge; further prospective research is needed and it would be particularly 
interesting to examine whether any temporal patterns differ between subjective 
and behavioural or physiological indices. 
That HDs and PDs showed dysfunctional reward-related processing in the objective 
indices of electrophysiological response and the emotional Stroop task may suggest 
that such ‘unconscious’ reward-related processing is a general feature of relatively 
heavy or problematic alcohol intake. It is notable, however, that neither HDs’ nor 
PDs’ responses to alcohol-related stimuli were in themselves abnormal. Thus in 
Study 2 HDs demonstrated an attenuated P3 response to neutral household-related 
stimuli rather than a heightened P3 to alcohol-related stimuli. Similarly, in Study 3 
acutely abstinent PDs demonstrated somewhat abnormal responses to non-alcohol-
related appetitive and aversive cues rather than to alcohol-related cues. After a 
priming dose of alcohol, PDs’ colour-naming tended to normalise. This suggests that 
excessive alcohol intake may be associated more with reduced interest in non-
alcohol-related stimuli than with elevated interest in alcohol. However, other 
published studies using behavioural indices of CR have found HDs or PDs to show 
abnormally strong responses to alcohol-related stimuli specifically (e.g. Herrmann et 
al., 2001). Whilst there is no obvious explanation for these differences in findings 
between studies, there are many potentially relevant differences in the 
methodologies – for example, sample characteristics, specific features of cue-
reactivity tasks and protocols. All studies to date have also had relatively small 
sample sizes (tens, rather than hundreds) and findings from some could therefore 
be spurious. When more comparable studies using the same tasks have been 
carried out a meta-analysis might enable underlying patterns and influences to be 
detected. 
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In any event, the apparent greater sensitivity of behavioural and EEG indices than of 
self-reported cue-reactivity to differences in drinking history could reflect the 
involvement of cognitive processes in the latter but not the former. This is 
somewhat in keeping with Tiffany’s (1990; Tiffany & Conklin, 2000) model of 
craving, which contends that experienced substance users preferentially and 
automatically (i.e. unconsciously) process substance-related stimuli (as well as 
presumably demonstrating (electro)physiological correlates of such unconscious 
processes). It is only in circumstances in which drug-procurement or -taking is 
impeded that more conscious processes become activated (aimed at obtaining the 
substance). Thus whilst such conscious processes may, as discussed above, have 
been present in both heavier and lighter drinkers, only the former group would 
have been expected to – and indeed only they did – demonstrate evidence of 
somewhat abnormal unconscious processes. 
Inhibitory control, decision-making and impulsivity 
Study 2 found no evidence that HDs were more impulsive than LDs, on any of a 
battery of self-report and behavioural measures (RIS and TIS CI and MI subscales, 
‘commission’ errors (CEs; responses to distractor stimuli) in the Continuous 
Performance Task (CPT) and electrophysiological correlates of impulsivity during 
CPT performance). On the other hand, Study 3 found PDs to be more impulsive than 
SDs, as indicated both by the self-report measures (RIS and TIS CI and MI subscales) 
and CPT motor errors – that is, when the participant fails to withhold responding to 
the to-be-ignored ‘filler’ stimuli. However, the groups did not differ in either CPT 
CEs or rational decision-making in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). 
The apparent inconsistency between tasks may reflect findings elsewhere of small 
or non-existent correlations between different impulsivity indices (e.g. Dom et al., 
2006b). However the findings of Studies 2 and 3 offer some support for the thesis 
that impulsivity/inhibitory control deficits increase with heavier levels of habitual 
alcohol consumption. That the drinking levels of the SDs in Study 3 (average unit 
consumption (AUC)/week was 8.87) were rather more similar to the LDs of Study 2 
(AUC/week was 2.13) than the HDs (AUC/week was 44.26) is consistent with this 
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idea. So, in Study 2 the heavier drinkers did not show greater impulsivity than 
lighter drinkers; but in Study 3 PDs were, on some indices, more impulsive than SDs. 
Comparisons here are restricted to the RIS and TIS CI and MI subscales and CPT CEs 
(all of which were administered in both studies 2 and 3; only Study 3 included both 
CPT commission and motor errors). There were also differences in the average ages 
of participants in the two studies, as those in Study 2 were principally aged between 
18 and 23 (mean age was 22 years) whereas those in Study 3 were between 25 and 
63 and had a mean age of 47. This could be relevant in that patterns of heavy 
alcohol consumption may have a greater effect on the still-developing late-
adolescent brain than that of the adult (e.g. Crews & Boettiger, 2009). However, 
there was no difference between the studies in terms of the gender ratio of 
participants (χ2 (1) = 0.37; ns). Overall, these findings are at least in keeping with 
Jentsch and Taylor’s (1999) contention that inhibitory control deficits develop over 
a period of chronic alcohol consumption. A limitation of their model is its lack of 
explanation of the processes which underpin and maintain the initial phase of 
alcohol consumption. It may be, however, that to some extent elevated impulsivity 
pre-dates and is a vulnerability factor for excessive and uncontrolled drinking (e.g. 
Sher, Bartholow & Wood, 2000; Habeych et al., 2006; Rubio et al., 2008). 
A significant methodological limitation of Study 3 was its small sample size and the 
fact that only 7 PDs completed the CPT and IGT tasks. These data must therefore be 
treated very tentatively and indeed the inclusion of the PD group was from the 
outset exploratory. The data do, however, suggest that further research in larger 
samples may be justified. Few studies to date have studied impulsivity and 
inhibitory control deficits in non-physically-dependent drinkers, and to gain greater 
understanding of their development and causal role in dependence it will be 
necessary to conduct longitudinal studies following a large cohort from adolescence 
(i.e. when participants are relatively ‘alcohol-naive’) through to adulthood, when a 
proportion will have developed alcohol use disorders. Such studies are time-
consuming and costly, however. In the meantime further cross-sectional studies 
could usefully compare matched samples drinking at several ‘bands’ of severity on a 
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range of impulsivity indices. This might clarify whether impulsivity-related features 
tend to increase between particular bands. 
Family history of alcohol use disorders 
Study 2 HD and LD groups did not differ in number of first-degree relatives with a 
definite or suspected alcohol use disorder (AUD). Although in Study 3 the PDs had a 
greater proportion of first-degree relatives with an AUD, this variable did not 
explain between-group (PD vs. SD) differences on any measure. Although the 
sample was small this suggests that abnormalities in task performance were not a 
result of familial transmission but were likely to relate to their chronic drinking 
patterns per se. This is consistent with evidence that chronic alcohol intake is able 
to bring about dysfunction within MCL DAergic pathways (Diana et al., 1992a, 
1992b; Rossetti, Hmaidan & Gessa, 1992; Shen & Chiodo, 1993; Weiss et al., 1996). 
Wider implications of the present thesis concerning reward responsivity and 
impulsiveness 
Overall, the findings of Studies 2 and 3 indicate that even in the absence of physical 
dependence heavy social drinkers and problem drinkers can show differential 
responsiveness towards alcohol and associated stimuli and/or attenuated responses 
to non-alcohol-related rewarding stimuli. Thus elements of the present data are 
consistent with Robinson and Berridge’s (1993, 2000) incentive sensitisation model 
of addiction which posits that with increasing consumption, drugs and associated 
stimuli develop incentive motivational properties: that is, they grab attention and 
become attractive and ‘wanted’. Combined with impaired executive control and 
decision-making, this can explain the core symptoms of addiction. That Study 2 
found evidence of alcohol cue-reactivity in the absence of impulsiveness in a sample 
of light and heavier social drinkers, whereas the PDs in Study 3 demonstrated 
dysfunctional reward processing as well as impulsivity, may suggest that impulsivity 
is a critical factor in the transition to problematic drinking. However, since these 
studies were cross-sectional rather than prospective they were unable to address 
issues of causality. 
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An interesting question is whether there are differences in the degree to which 
these phenomena are demonstrated by light, moderate and heavy social drinkers, 
hazardous drinkers, problem drinkers and dependent drinkers. To the extent that 
they are a consequence of cumulative alcohol consumption, they should develop 
progressively and therefore manifest more strongly with increasing severity of 
alcohol use disorder. If, however, pre-existing abnormalities in reward sensitivity 
predispose to heavier substance use, they may be present to similar levels in heavy, 
hazardous and problem drinkers. The same or similar issues apply to impulsivity, 
and it is presently unclear whether CR and impulsivity develop in parallel or 
differently. As previously noted, longitudinal or large-scale cross-sectional studies 
will be needed if these questions are to be addressed with high statistical power. 
In an ideal world it would be desirable to include physiological and brain imaging 
assessments in such studies to try and better characterise non-dependent heavy 
drinking. It would be of particular interest to examine whether such individuals 
demonstrate abnormal levels of DA D2 receptors in the striatum and PFC, as has 
been found in physically-dependent drinkers (e.g. Volkow et al., 1993, 2001; London 
et al., 2000; Robinson et al., 2001). To date, no studies have examined this directly, 
though Kubota et al. (2001) found heavy social drinkers to be at a significantly 
increased risk of frontal lobe shrinkage. More recently, Yan and Li (2009) and 
Bednarski et al. (2012) have reported heavy social drinkers to demonstrate 
abnormalities in amygdala, caudate and superior frontal cortex, brain regions linked 
to successful performance in the Stop Signal Task. 
Whether or not there is a continuum in the development of cue-reactivity and 
impulsivity, it is certainly important to consider the role they may play in triggering 
or maintaining ‘real-world’ drinking behaviour. 
Problems associated with low statistical power and small sample size 
The studies of the present thesis – in particular, Studies 2 and 3 – were relatively 
low-powered since they were performed using rather small sample sizes. This is 
somewhat problematic given the issues known to be associated with low statistical 
power (Button et al., 2013). These problems can be broadly divided into two 
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categories: i) problems that are mathematically expected, even if the research is 
perfect in all other respects; and ii) problems which tend to co-occur with low-
powered studies, or which often become worse in small, low-powered studies. 
With regards to the first category, low statistical power is associated with three 
principal mathematical problems. Firstly, low statistical power reduces the chances 
of finding an effect when it genuinely exists: all other things being equal, low-
powered studies return more false negatives than high-powered studies. Thus, if a 
series of studies in a given area only have a power of 20%, when there are 100 
genuine non-null effects to be discovered in that area, such studies would only be 
expected to discover 20 of them. 
Secondly, the lower the power, the lower the probability that an observed effect 
passing the required significance threshold (such as p < 0.05, for example) actually 
reflects a true effect. This probability is termed the ‘positive predictive value’ (PPV) 
of a claimed discovery. The formula which links the PPV to power is: 
PPV = ([1 – β] x R) / ([1 – β] x R + α) 
where (1 – β) is the power, β is the type II error, α is the type I error and R is the 
pre-study odds that a probed effect is non-null. This formula means that, with a 
given pre-study odds R, the lower the power and the higher the type I error, the 
lower the PPV. This can be illustrated if we consider the example of a scientific field 
in which one in five of the effects tested are expected to be genuinely non-null (i.e. 
R = 1 / (5 – 1) = 0.25). If we claim to have discovered an effect at p < 0.05, and the 
studies have 20% power, then PPV = 0.20 x 0.25 / (0.20 x 0.25 + 0.05) = 0.05 / 0.10 = 
0.05; thus, just half of the claims for discoveries would be correct. With 80% power, 
on the other hand, PPV = 0.80 x 0.25 / (0.80 x 0.25 + 0.05) = 0.20 / 0.25 = 0.80; thus, 
80% of discovery claims would be correct. 
Thirdly, even when an under-powered study returns a genuine effect, the 
magnitude of this effect is likely to be over-estimated; a scenario referred to as the 
‘winner’s curse’. This tends to occur whenever claims of discovery are based on 
thresholds of statistical significance, such as p < 0.05, for example. Effect inflation is 
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worst for small, low-powered studies since such studies can only detect large 
effects. For example, if an effect is medium-sized, only those small studies which 
over-estimate the size of the effect will surpass the threshold for discovery. To 
illustrate, suppose that a genuine association exists with an odds ratio of 1.20 and a 
small, low-powered study with 20% power is conducted to detect this effect. In any 
study, the measurements of the variables and outcomes of interest are open to 
sampling variation and random error. Thus, although on average such small studies 
would return an odds ratio of 1.20, due to random errors a single study may find an 
odds ratio smaller than 1.20 (e.g. 1.00) or larger than 1.20 (e.g. 1.60). Due to the 
small sample size, odds ratios of 1.00 or 1.20 would not attain statistical 
significance. Nominal significance would be attained, however, in the third case in 
which the odds ratio was found to be 1.60. Thus, the winner’s curse refers to the 
researcher making the discovery being, in fact, cursed by an inflated effect. 
In terms of the second category of additional biases associated with low power, 
there are three chief problems. Firstly, studies of low power are more likely to 
provide a wide range of effect magnitude estimates. Termed ‘vibration of effects’, 
this refers to the scenario whereby varying estimates of the magnitude of an effect 
are obtained as a function of the analytical options implemented. Such options refer 
to the definition of the variables of interest, the statistical model used, the use (or 
not) of adjustments for particular potential confounders, and so on. The range of 
potential results consequent of vibration of effects is wider in small studies, relative 
to larger studies; this is because, broadly, results in the latter tend to be more 
uncertain and will thus be more sensitive to analytical changes. 
Secondly, smaller, under-powered studies are more likely to be affected by 
publication bias and selective reporting of outcomes. That is, negative results in 
larger studies – often more widely-known, their results being eagerly anticipated – 
cannot be easily explained in terms of low power; reviewers and editors may thus 
be more willing to publish the study. On the other hand, a small ‘negative’ study is 
generally considered inconclusive or uninformative, and has a reduced chance of 
publication. 
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Thirdly, smaller studies may have a poorer design quality than larger studies. The 
former may be more opportunistic, their data collection and analysis possibly 
proceeding with relatively little planning. In contrast, the greater funding and 
personnel resources associated with larger studies tend to mean that their designs 
are examined more carefully prior to data collection, and that their analyses and 
reporting is more structured. 
It is important at this juncture to note that the small sample sizes and low power of 
the studies within the present thesis are anything but particular; indeed, low power 
and small sample sizes are endemic within psychology and its associated fields. For 
example, Button et al. (2013) estimate that median statistical power across 
neuroscience research in general is just 21%, and that this figure is between 18 and 
31% in the specific area of animal model studies, and that it is only 8% in the field of 
neuroimaging studies. This may mean that a substantial proportion of ‘statistically 
significant’ research findings are in fact spurious. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Firstly, the present thesis developed and piloted a self-report questionnaire to 
measure State Impulsivity. Preliminary validation and tests of the measure’s 
sensitivity to alcohol consumption was limited by sample sizes that were relatively 
small for correlational analyses. Nevertheless, there was support for the reality of 
state variations in impulsivity, and for its measurability. This has potentially 
important implications for understanding acute alcohol effects and the 
development of alcohol use disorders. 
Two cross-sectional studies examined differences between non-physically-
dependent but heavy drinkers and lighter social drinkers on a range of self-report, 
behavioural and physiological measures of reward responsivity and impulsivity. 
Compared to light drinkers, heavy social drinkers demonstrated electrophysiological 
cue-reactivity to alcohol-related words, though they did not show elevated 
impulsivity. In acutely abstinent PDs there was some evidence of both dysfunctional 
reward responsivity and impulsivity compared to social drinkers. These findings are 
consistent with existing models of addiction (e.g. Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2000; 
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Jentsch & Taylor, 1999) and may suggest a continuum along which abnormalities 
develop in parallel with alcohol use disorder severity. However, the small sample 
sizes and attendant low power of Studies 2 and 3 act as a caveat to such 
conclusions. Longitudinal studies are needed to test these propositions further. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, 
Stanford & Barratt, 1995) 
 Rarely 
/ Never 
Occasio
nally 
 
Often 
Almost 
Always / 
Always 
1. I plan tasks carefully.*     
2. I do things without thinking.     
3. I make-up my mind quickly.     
4. I am happy-go-lucky.     
5. I don’t ‘pay attention’.     
6. I have ‘racing’ thoughts.     
7. I plan trips well ahead of time.*     
8. I am self-controlled.*     
9. I concentrate easily.*     
10. I save regularly.*     
11. I ‘squirm’ at plays or lectures.     
12. I am a careful thinker.*     
13. I plan for job security.*     
14. I say things without thinking.     
15. I like to think about complex 
problems.* 
    
16. I change jobs.     
17. I act ‘on impulse’.     
18. I get easily bored when solving 
thought problems. 
    
19. I act on the spur of the moment.     
20. I am a steady thinker.*     
21. I change residences.     
22. I buy things on impulse.     
23. I can only think about one problem 
at a time. 
    
24. I change hobbies.     
25. I spend more than I earn.     
26. I often have extraneous thoughts 
when thinking. 
    
BIS-11 continues over the page 
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BIS-11 continued 
 Rarely 
/ Never 
Occasio
nally 
 
Often 
Almost 
Always / 
Always 
27. I am more interested in the present 
than in the future. 
    
28. I am restless at the theatre / cinema 
/ lectures. 
    
29. I like puzzles.*     
30. I am future oriented.*     
Items are scored 1, 2, 3, 4; *Indicates item is reverse-scored; 
Attentional Impulsiveness subscale = items 5, 6, 9, 11, 20, 24, 26 and 28; 
Motor Impulsiveness subscale = items 2, 3, 4, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23 and 30; 
Non-Planning Impulsiveness subscale = items 1, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 27 and 29. 
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Appendix 2: EASI-III Temperament Survey: Impulsivity 
Subscales (Buss & Plomin, 1984) 
Instructions: For each question, try to rate yourself on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 
being uncharacteristic or not at all like you and 5 being characteristic or very much 
like you. 
Inhibitory control 
1. I have trouble controlling my impulses: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
2. Usually I can’t stand waiting: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
3. I can tolerate frustration better than most (reverse): 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
4. I have trouble resisting my cravings (for food, cigarettes, etc.): 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
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Continued 
5. I like to spend my money right away rather than save it for long-range 
goals: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
Decision time 
1. I often say the first thing that comes into my head: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
2. I often have trouble making up my mind (reverse): 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
3. I like to plan things way ahead of time (reverse): 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
4. I often act on the spur of the moment: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
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Continued 
5. I like to make detailed plans before I do something (reverse): 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
Sensation seeking 
1. I generally seek new and exciting experiences and sensations: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
2. I’ll try anything once: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
3. I sometimes do “crazy” things just to be different: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
4. I’m happiest in familiar surroundings (reverse): 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
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Continued 
5. I get bored easily: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
Persistence 
1. I generally like to see things through to the end (reverse): 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
2. I tend to hop from interest to interest quickly: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
3. I tend to give up easily: 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
 
4. Unfinished tasks really bother me (reverse): 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
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Continued 
5. Once I get going on something I hate to stop (reverse): 
1 Uncharacteristic (NOT at all like you) 
2 Somewhat Uncharacteristic (NOT very much like you) 
3 Neither Uncharacteristic nor Characteristic 
4 Somewhat Characteristic (sort of like you) 
5 Characteristic (very much like you) 
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Appendix 3: Functional and Dysfunctional Impulsivity Scales 
(Dickman, 1990) 
 TRUE FALSE 
Functional Impulsivity   
1. I don’t like to make decisions quickly, even simple decisions, 
such as choosing what to wear, or what to have for dinner. 
  
2. I am good at taking advantage of unexpected opportunities, 
where you have to do something immediately or lose your 
chance. 
  
3. Most of the time, I can put my thoughts into words very 
rapidly. 
  
4. I am uncomfortable when I have to make up my mind 
rapidly. 
  
5. I like to take part in really fast-paced conversations, where 
you don’t have much time to think before you speak. 
  
6. I don’t like to do things quickly, even when I am doing 
something that is not very difficult. 
  
7. I would enjoy working at a job that required me to make a 
lot of split-second decisions. 
  
8. I like sports and games in which you have to choose your 
next move very quickly. 
  
9. I have often missed out on opportunities because I couldn’t 
make up my mind fast enough. 
  
10. People have admired me because I can think quickly.   
11. I try to avoid activities where you have to act without much 
time to think first. 
  
 
Dysfunctional Impulsivity   
1. I will often say whatever comes into my head without 
thinking first. 
  
2. I enjoy working out problems slowly and carefully.   
3. I frequently make appointments without thinking about 
whether I will be able to keep them. 
  
4. I frequently buy things without thinking about whether or 
not I can really afford them. 
  
5. I often make up my mind without taking the time to consider 
the situation from all angles. 
  
6. Often, I don’t spend enough time thinking over a situation 
before I act. 
  
7. I often get into trouble because I don’t think before I act.   
Functional and Dysfunctional Impulsivity Scales continue over the page 
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Functional and Dysfunctional Impulsivity Scales continued 
8. Many times the plans I make don’t work out because I 
haven’t gone over them carefully enough in advance. 
  
9. I rarely get involved in projects without first considering the 
potential problems. 
  
10. Before making any important decision, I carefully weigh the 
pros and cons. 
  
11. I am good at careful reasoning.   
12. I often say and do things without considering the 
consequences. 
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Appendix 4: I-7 (Eysenck et al., 1985a) 
Instructions: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the ‘YES’ or 
‘NO’ following the questions. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick 
questions. Work quickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the 
question. 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO ANSWER EACH QUESTION 
 YES NO 
1. Do you often buy things on impulse?   
2. Do you generally do and say things without stopping to 
think? 
  
3. Do you often get into a jam because you do things without 
thinking? 
  
4. Are you an impulsive person?   
5. Do you usually think carefully before doing anything?   
6. Do you often do things on the spur of the moment?   
7. Do you mostly speak before thinking things out?   
8. Do you often get involved in things you later wish you 
could get out of? 
  
9. Do you get so ‘carried away’ by new and exciting ideas that 
you never think of possible snags? 
  
10. Do you need to use a lot of self-control to keep out of 
trouble? 
  
11. Would you agree that almost everything enjoyable is 
illegal or immoral? 
  
12. Are you often surprised at people’s reactions to what you 
do or say? 
  
13. Do you think an evening out is more successful if it is 
unplanned or arranged at the last moment? 
  
14. Do you usually work quickly, without bothering to check?   
15. Do you often change your interests?   
16. Before making up your mind, do you consider all the 
advantages and disadvantages? 
  
17. Do you prefer to ‘sleep on it’ before making decisions?   
18. When people shout at you, do you shout back?   
19. Do you usually make up your mind quickly?   
‘Yes’ responses receive a score of 1; ‘No’ responses receive a score of 0. 
PLEASE CHECK TO SEE THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS 
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Appendix 5: UPPS Impulsive Behaviour Scale (Whiteside & 
Lynam, 2001) 
 Rarely / 
Never 
Occasio
-nally 
 
Often 
Almost 
Always / 
Always 
Premeditation     
1. I have a reserved and cautious 
attitude toward life. 
    
2. My thinking is usually careful and 
purposeful. 
    
3. I am not one of those people who 
blurt out things without thinking. 
    
4. I like to stop and think things over 
before I do them. 
    
5. I don’t like to start a project 
before I know exactly how to 
proceed. 
    
6. I tend to value and follow a 
rational, “sensible” approach to 
things. 
    
7. I usually make up my mind 
through careful reasoning. 
    
8. I am a cautious person.     
9. Before I get into a new situation I 
like to find out what to expect from 
it. 
    
10. I usually think carefully before 
doing anything. 
    
11. Before making up my mind, I 
consider all the advantages and 
disadvantages. 
    
 
Urgency     
1. I have trouble controlling my 
impulses. 
    
2. I have trouble resisting my 
cravings (for food, cigarettes, etc.). 
    
3. I often get involved with things I 
later wish I could get out of. 
    
UPPS continues over the page 
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UPPS continued 
 Rarely / 
Never 
Occasio
-nally 
 
Often 
Almost 
Always / 
Always 
4. When I feel bad, I will often do 
things I later regret in order to make 
myself feel better now. 
    
5. Sometimes when I feel bad, I can’t 
seem to stop what I am doing even 
though it is making me feel worse. 
    
6. When I am upset I often act 
without thinking. 
    
7. When I feel rejected, I will often 
say things that I later regret. 
    
8. It is hard for me to resist acting on 
my feelings. 
    
9. I often make matters worse 
because I will act without thinking 
when I am upset. 
    
10. In the heat of an argument, I will 
often say things that I later regret. 
    
11. I am always able to keep my 
feelings under control. (R) 
    
12. Sometimes I do things on 
impulse that I later regret. 
    
 
Sensation Seeking     
1. I generally seek new and exciting 
experiences and sensations. 
    
2. I’ll try anything once.     
3. I like sports and games in which 
you have to choose your next move 
very quickly. 
    
4. I would enjoy water skiing.     
5. I quite enjoy taking risks.     
6. I would enjoy parachute jumping.     
7. I welcome new and exciting 
experiences and sensations, even if 
they are a little frightening and 
unconventional. 
    
8. I would like to learn to fly an 
aeroplane. 
    
UPPS continues over the page 
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UPPS continued 
 Rarely / 
Never 
Occasio
-nally 
 
Often 
Almost 
Always / 
Always 
9. I sometimes like doing things that 
are a bit frightening. 
    
10. I would enjoy the sensation of 
skiing very fast down a high 
mountain slope. 
    
11. I would like to go scuba diving.     
12. I would enjoy fast driving.     
 
 Perseverance     
1. I generally like to see things 
through to the end. 
    
2. I tend to give up easily. (R)     
3. Unfinished tasks really bother me.     
4. Once I get going on something I 
hate to stop. 
    
5. I concentrate easily.     
6. I finish what I start.     
7. I’m pretty good about pacing 
myself so as to get things done on 
time. 
    
8. I am a productive person who 
always gets the job done. 
    
9. Once I start a project, I almost 
always finish it. 
    
10. There are so many little jobs that 
need to be done that I sometimes 
just ignore them all. (R) 
    
Items scored 1, 2, 3, 4; (R) – indicates that the item is reverse-scored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
302 
 
Appendix 6: Pilot Version of the Recent Impulsivity Scale (RIS) 
Instructions: The following questionnaire asks about your behaviour over THE 
LAST 2 WEEKS. Please read through each statement, and put a tick in one of the 
four response categories to indicate how often you have behaved as described. 
IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS: 
Item Never Rarely Quite 
Often 
Very 
Often 
1. I have thought carefully before doing 
and saying things.* 
    
2. I have been surprised at people’s 
reactions to things that I have done or said. 
    
3. I have become so frustrated when 
waiting, for example in a shop queue, that I 
have left. 
    
4. I have found it easy to concentrate.*     
5. I have tended to act ‘on impulse’.     
6. I have tended to work quickly, without 
bothering to check. 
    
7. I have planned work tasks and activities 
in my free time carefully.* 
    
8. I have found it difficult thinking ahead.     
9. I have found it easy to exercise self-
control.* 
    
10. I have been focused, seeing things 
through to the end.* 
    
11. I have encountered problems because I 
did things without stopping to think. 
    
12. I have spent more money than I should 
have. 
    
13. I have been restless when watching 
things, for example at the cinema / 
theatre, on television, at lectures. 
    
14. I have become involved with something 
that I later wished I could have got out of. 
    
Pilot RIS continues over the page 
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Pilot RIS continued 
Item Never Rarely Quite 
Often 
Very 
Often 
15. I have planned events and activities 
well ahead of time.* 
    
16. I have tended to jump from one interest 
to another. 
    
17. I have become easily bored when 
working. 
    
Items scored 0, 1, 2 and 3; * Indicates item is reverse-scored. 
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Appendix 7: Pilot Version of the Trait Impulsivity Scale (TIS) 
Instructions: The following questionnaire asks about your behaviour IN GENERAL. 
Please read through each statement, and put a tick in one of the four response 
categories to indicate how often you behave as described. 
IN GENERAL: 
Item Never Rarely Quite 
Often 
Very 
Often 
1. I think carefully before doing and saying 
things.* 
    
2. I am surprised at people’s reactions to 
things that I do or say. 
    
3. I become so frustrated when waiting, for 
example in a shop queue, that I leave. 
    
4. I find it easy to concentrate.*     
5. I tend to act ‘on impulse’.     
6. I tend to work quickly, without bothering 
to check. 
    
7. I plan work tasks and activities in my free 
time carefully.* 
    
8. I find it difficult thinking ahead.     
9. I find it easy to exercise self-control.*     
10. I am focused, seeing things through to 
the end.* 
    
11. I encounter problems because I do 
things without thinking. 
    
12. I spend more money than I should.     
13. I am restless when watching things, for 
example at the cinema / theatre, on 
television, at lectures. 
    
14. I become involved with something that I 
later wish I could get out of. 
    
15. I plan events and activities well ahead of 
time.* 
    
16. I tend to jump from one interest to 
another. 
    
17. I b come easily bored when working.     
Items scored 0, 1, 2 and 3; * Indicates item is reverse-scored. 
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Appendix 8: Initial Correlation Matrix for the pilot TIS at Time 1 
Table A1 shows the initial correlation matrix for the 17 items of the pilot TIS at Time 1. 
Table A1: Initial correlation matrix for pilot TIS items at Time 1 
 Item 
1 
Item 
2 
Item 
3 
Item 
4 
Item 
5 
Item 
6 
Item 
7 
Item 
8 
Item 
9 
Item 
10 
Item 
11 
Item 
12 
Item 
13 
Item 
14 
Item 
15 
Item 
16 
Item 
17 
Item 1 1.00 0.05 -0.02 0.32 0.30 -0.05 0.16 0.36 0.25 0.37 0.43 0.35 0.21 0.10 0.18 0.39 0.08 
Item 2 0.05 1.00 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.22 0.09 0.27 0.14 0.17 0.25 0.00 0.21 
Item 3 -0.02 0.30 1.00 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.17 -0.05 -0.01 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.28 -0.05 0.23 
Item 4 0.32 0.15 0.18 1.00 0.06 -0.30 0.32 0.23 0.18 0.33 0.34 0.19 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.14 
Item 5 0.30 0.15 0.12 0.06 1.00 0.22 0.25 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.41 0.32 0.14 0.28 0.14 0.25 
Item 6 -0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.30 0.22 1.00 -0.03 -0.14 0.17 -0.15 -0.24 0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.05 -0.13 0.07 
Item 7 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.32 0.25 -0.03 1.00 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.31 0.13 0.33 
Item 8 0.36 0.01 -0.05 0.23 0.12 -0.14 0.24 1.00 0.23 0.29 0.44 0.15 0.20 0.06 0.22 0.53 0.05 
Item 9 0.25 0.09 -0.01 0.18 0.12 -0.17 0.20 0.23 1.00 0.20 0.29 0.21 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.28 0.14 
Item 10 0.37 0.22 0.11 0.33 0.16 -0.15 0.16 0.29 0.20 1.00 0.47 0.23 0.21 0.07 0.14 0.20 0.17 
Item 11 0.43 0.09 0.04 0.34 0.15 -0.24 0.29 0.44 0.29 0.47 1.00 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.36 0.15 
Item 12 0.35 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.41 0.07 0.23 0.15 0.21 0.23 0.22 1.00 0.36 0.32 0.41 0.19 0.31 
Item 13 0.21 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.32 0.09 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.36 1.00 0.11 0.20 0.18 0.19 
Item 14 0.10 0.17 0.08 0.09 0.14 -0.07 0.22 0.06 0.19 0.07 0.17 0.32 0.11 1.00 0.32 0.08 0.23 
Item 15 0.18 0.25 0.28 0.13 0.28 0.05 0.31 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.32 1.00 0.12 0.36 
Item 16 0.39 0.00 -0.05 0.17 0.14 -0.13 0.13 0.53 0.28 0.20 0.36 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.12 1.00 0.01 
Item 17 0.08 0.21 0.23 0.14 0.25 0.07 0.33 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.31 0.19 0.23 0.36 0.01 1.00 
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Appendix 9: Modified Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ: 
Mehrabian & Russell, 1978) 
Instructions: The following questions ask you about your habitual use of various 
types of alcoholic beverages. Please consider your drinking for the last 12 months 
in answering the questions and take your time to give an accurate answer to each 
question.  
 
Item 
Respond 
in this 
column 
0. If you never drink, type a ‘1’ in the response column for this item 
and ignore all the remaining questions. If you do drink, ignore this 
item and answer all the remaining questions. 
 
1. How many days per week do you drink some wine (at least one 
small, 125 ml glass)? 
 
2. On those days you do drink wine, about how many glasses (125 ml 
each) do you typically have? 
 
3. How many glasses (125 ml) of wine do you have in a week, in 
total? 
 
4. How many days a week do you drink some beer, lager, or cider (at 
least 1 pint of approx. 5%)? 
 
5. On the days you do drink beer, lager, or cider, about how many 
pints do you have? 
 
6. How many pints of beer do you have in a week, in total?  
7. How many days a week do you drink spirits (whisky, scotch, 
brandy, bourbon, vodka, gin, rum, etc.)? 
 
8. On the days you do drink spirits, about how many drinks do you 
typically have (a drink being 25 ml of spirits, that is, a single shot, 
alone or mixed)? 
 
9. How many drinks of spirits do you have in a week, in total?  
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Appendix 10: Drug Abuse Screening Test (DAST-10; Skinner, 1982) 
Instructions: The following questionnaire asks about your typical drug use over the past 12 months. Please read through each question and 
circle the response that best describes your behaviour. For the purposes of this questionnaire, term ‘drug’ includes recreational use of both 
prescription drugs and other illicit drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, LSD, ecstasy, etc. but does not include alcohol. 
Item Circle your response 
1. Have you used drugs other than those required for medical reasons? Yes No 
2. Do you abuse more than one drug at a time? Yes No 
3. Are you always able to stop using drugs when you want to? Yes No 
4. Have you had “blackouts” or “flashbacks” as a result of drug use? Yes No 
5. Do you ever feel bad or guilty about your drug use? Yes No 
6. Does your spouse (or parents) ever complain about your involvement with 
drugs? 
Yes No 
7. Have you neglected your family because of your use of drugs? Yes No 
8. Have you engaged in illegal activities in order to obtain drugs? Yes No 
9. Have you ever experienced withdrawal symptoms (felt sick) when you 
stopped taking drugs? 
Yes No 
10. Have you had medical problems as a result of your drug use (e.g. memory 
loss, hepatitis, convulsions, bleeding, etc.)? 
Yes No 
‘Yes’ responses receive a score of 1; ‘No’ responses receive a score of 0.
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Appendix 11: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire – Revised: 
Extraversion Scale (EPQ-R; Eysenck et al., 1985b) 
Instructions: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the ‘YES’ or 
‘NO’ following the question. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick 
questions. Work quickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the 
questions. 
PLEASE REMEMBER TO ANSWER EACH QUESTION 
1. Do you have many different hobbies?     YES / NO 
2. Are you a talkative person?      YES / NO 
3. Are you rather lively?       YES / NO 
4. Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively party? YES / NO 
5. Do you enjoy meeting new people?     YES / NO 
6. Do you tend to keep in the background on social occasions?  YES / NO 
7. Do you like going out a lot?      YES / NO 
8. Do you prefer reading to meeting people?    YES / NO 
9. Do you have many friends?      YES / NO 
10. Would you call yourself happy-go-lucky?     YES / NO 
11. Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends?  YES / NO 
12. Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people?   YES / NO 
13. Can you easily get some life into a rather dull party?   YES / NO 
14. Do you like telling jokes and funny stories to your friends?  YES / NO 
15. Do you like mixing with people?      YES / NO 
16. Have people said that you sometimes act too rashly?   YES / NO 
17. Do you nearly always have a ‘ready answer’ when people talk to you? YES / NO 
18. Do you like doing things in which you have to act quickly?  YES / NO 
EPQ-R continues over the page 
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Continued 
19. Do you often make decisions at the spur of the moment?  YES / NO 
20. Do you often take on more activities than you have time for?  YES / NO 
21. Can you get a party going?      YES / NO 
22. Do you like plenty of bustle and excitement around you?  YES / NO 
23. Do other people think of you as being very lively?   YES / NO 
PLEASE CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS 
‘Yes’ responses receive a score of 1; ‘No’ responses receive a score of 0. 
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Appendix 12: Recent Impulsivity Scale (RIS) – Final Version 
Instructions: The following questionnaire asks about your behaviour over THE 
LAST 2 WEEKS. Please read through each statement, and put a tick in one of the 
four response categories to indicate how often you have behaved as described. 
IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS: 
Item Never Rarely Quite 
Often 
Very 
Often 
1. I have thought carefully before doing 
and saying things.* 
    
2. I have tended to act ‘on impulse’.     
3. I have planned work tasks and 
activities in my free time carefully.* 
    
4. I have been focused, seeing things 
through to the end.* 
    
5. I have encountered problems because I 
did things without stopping to think. 
    
6. I have become involved with 
something that I later wished I could 
have got out of. 
    
7. I have planned events and activities 
well ahead of time.* 
    
8. I have tended to jump from one 
interest to another. 
    
Items scored 0, 1, 2, and 3; 
* Indicates item is reverse-scored. 
Items 1, 3, 4, and 7 constitute the Cognitive Impulsivity Subscale; 
Items 2, 5, 6, and 8 constitute the Motor Impulsivity Subscale. 
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Appendix 13: Trait Impulsivity Scale (TIS) – Final Version 
Instructions: The following questionnaire asks about your behaviour IN GENERAL. 
Please read through each statement, and put a tick in one of the four response 
categories to indicate how often you have behaved as described. 
IN GENERAL: 
Item Never Rarely Quite 
Often 
Very 
Often 
1. I think carefully before doing and 
saying things.* 
    
2. I tend to act ‘on impulse’.     
3. I plan work tasks and activities in my 
free time carefully.* 
    
4. I am focused, seeing things through to 
the end.* 
    
5. I encounter problems because I do 
things without stopping to think. 
    
6. I become involved with something that 
I later wish I could get out of. 
    
7. I plan events and activities well ahead 
of time.* 
    
8. I t nd to jump from one interest to 
another. 
    
Items scored 0, 1, 2, and 3; 
* Indicates item is reverse-scored. 
Items 1, 3, 4 and 7 constitute the Cognitive Impulsivity Subscale; 
Items 2, 5, 6 and 8 constitute the Motor Impulsivity Subscale. 
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Appendix 14: Details of go/no-go stimuli 
The animal-related (‘go’) words were: tiger; horse; elephant; seal; shark; cat; dog; 
giraffe; zebra; goat; lion; snake; kangaroo; and whale. The non-animal-related (‘no-
go’) words were all stationary-related and were as follows: pencil; ruler; stapler; 
pen; eraser; pin; holepunch; paper; glue; sharpener; laptop; paperclip; folder; and 
tray. The subsets of 14 animal-related and stationery-related words were matched 
for word length, number of syllables and frequency in the English language as 
indexed in the CELEX database (Baayen, Piepenbrock & Gulikers, 1995; see Table 
A2). 
Table A2: Means (standard deviations) of the final go and no-go word stimuli 
 
Characteristic 
Go words 
(n = 14) 
No-go 
words  
(n = 14) 
 
t value 
p 
value 
Word length (no of letters) 5.07 (1.59) 5.86 (2.07) -1.13 (df = 26) ns 
Number of syllables 1.57 (0.76) 1.93 (0.73) -1.27 (df = 26) ns 
Word frequency 
(appearances per million 
words) 
35.79 
(43.34) 
28.58 
(63.37) 
 
0.34 (df = 24) 
 
ns 
 
Note = word frequency data for ‘laptop’ and ‘holepunch’ was not available in the CELEX 
database; therefore, the independent-measures t-test for word frequency was conducted 
without these items (hence df = 24). 
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Appendix 15: Main Effects of ELECTRODE REGION on no-go P3 
and N2 Amplitudes and Latencies 
Table A3 shows all main effects of ELECTRODE REGION for the 2 (DRINKING GROUP: 
HDs vs. LDs) x 5 (ELECTRODE REGION: frontal vs. central vs. parietal vs. temporal vs. 
occipital) ANOVAs on HDs’ and LDs’ P3 and N2 amplitudes and latencies for no-go 
trials in the CPT. In all cases the Greenhouse-Geisser statistic is reported due to 
violations of the sphericity assumption. 
Table A3: Main effects of ELECTRODE REGION on no-go P3 and N2 amplitudes and 
latencies 
 Main effect of ELECTRODE REGION 
F df p 
Nogo P3 amplitude 17.33 1.62, 29.23 < 0.01 
Nogo P3 latency 1.36 1.87, 33.59 ns 
Nogo N2 amplitude 4.62 1.97, 35.50 0.02 
Nogo N2 latency 20.86 2.65, 47.67 < 0.01 
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Appendix 16: Main and Interaction Effects of 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 
ANOVA on P3 Amplitudes 
Table A4 shows all main and interaction effects for the 2 (DRINKING GROUP: HDs 
vs. LDs) x 2 (WORD-TYPE: AR vs. HR) x 2 (HEMISHERE: left vs. right) x 3 (CAUDALITY: 
anterior vs. central vs. posterior) ANOVA on HDs’ and LDs’ P3 amplitudes in 
response to AR and HR words. 
Table A4: Main and interaction effects of mean P3 amplitudes 
Main effects F df p 
DRINKING GROUP 0.24 1, 20 ns 
WORD-TYPE 3.63 1, 20 0.07 
HEMISPHERE 5.88 1, 20 0.03 
CAUDALITY† 9.76 1.24, 24.78 < 0.01 
Interaction effects    
DRINKING GROUP x WORD-TYPE 4.89 1, 20 0.04 
DRINKING GROUP x HEMISPHERE 0.00 1, 20 ns 
DRINKING GROUP x CAUDALITY 0.33 2, 40 ns 
WORD-TYPE x HEMISPHERE 1.22 1, 20 ns 
WORD-TYPE x CAUDALITY† 0.21 1.29, 25.76 ns 
HEMISPHERE x CAUDALITY† 4.16 1.45, 28.93 0.04 
DRINKING GROUP x WORD-TYPE x 
HEMISPHERE 
2.13 1, 20 ns 
DRINKING GROUP x WORD-TYPE x 
CAUDALITY 
1.33 2, 40 ns 
DRINKING GROUP x HEMISPHERE x 
CAUDALITY 
0.43 2, 40 ns 
WORD-TYPE x HEMISPHERE x 
CAUDALITY 
1.65 2, 40 ns 
DRINKING GROUP x WORD-TYPE x 
HEMISPHERE x CAUDALITY 
0.29 2, 40 ns 
†Greenhouse-Geisser statistic used due to a violation of sphericity. 
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Appendix 17: Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; 
Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
Instructions: This questionnaire is concerned with how you have been feeling within 
the last week. Please answer each question by putting a tick next to the sentence 
underneath it that best describes how much you have had that feeling over the last 
week. 
1. I feel tense or ‘wound up’:  2. I still enjoy the things I used 
to enjoy: 
 
Most of the time  Definitely as much  
A lot of the time  Not quite so much  
Time to time, occasionally  Only a little  
Not at all  Not at all  
    
3. I get a sort of frightened 
feeling like something awful is 
about to happen: 
 4. I can laugh and see the funny 
side of things: 
 
Very definitely and quite badly  As much as I always could  
Yes, but not too badly  Not quite so much now  
A little, but it doesn’t worry me  Definitely not so much now  
Not at all  Not at all  
    
5. Worrying thoughts go 
through my mind: 
 6. I feel cheerful:  
A great deal of the time  Not at all  
A lot of the time  Not often  
From time to time but not too 
often 
 Sometimes  
Only occasionally  Most of the time  
    
7. I can sit at ease and feel 
relaxed: 
 8. I feel as if I am slowed down:  
Definitely  Nearly all of the time  
Usually  Very often  
Not often  Sometimes  
Not at all  Not at all  
    
HADS continues over the page 
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HADS continued 
9. I get a sort of frightened 
feeling like ‘butterflies in the 
stomach’: 
 10. I have lost interest in my 
appearance: 
 
Nearly all of the time  Definitely  
Very often  I don’t take as much care as I 
should 
 
Sometimes  I may not take quite as much 
care 
 
Not at all  I take just as much care as ever  
    
11. I feel restless as if I have to 
be on the move: 
 12. I look forward with 
enjoyment to things: 
 
Very much indeed  As much as I ever did  
Quite a lot  Rather less than I used to  
Not very much  Definitely less than I used to  
Not at all  Hardly at all  
    
13. I get sudden feelings of 
panic: 
 14. I can enjoy a good book or 
radio or TV programme: 
 
Very often indeed  Often  
Quite often  Sometimes  
Not very often  Not often  
Not at all  Very seldom  
    
Items are scored 0, 1, 2, 3; 
HADS Anxiety Scale = Items 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11 and 13; 
HADS Depression Scale = Items 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12. 
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Appendix 18: The Snaith-Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHPS; Snaith 
et al., 1995) 
Instructions: This questionnaire is designed to measure your ability to experience 
pleasure. It is important to read each statement very carefully. Tick one of the 
boxes [   ] to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement. 
1. I would enjoy my favourite television or radio programme: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
2. I would enjoy being with my family or close friends: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
3. I would find pleasure in my hobbies and pastimes: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
4. I would be able to enjoy my favourite meal: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
5. I would enjoy a warm bath or refreshing shower: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
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6. I would find pleasure in the scent of flowers or the smell of a fresh sea breeze 
or freshly baked bread: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
7. I would enjoy seeing other people’s smiling faces: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
8. I would enjoy looking smart when I have made an effort with my appearance: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
9. I would enjoy reading a book, magazine or newsletter: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
10. I would enjoy a cup of tea or coffee or my favourite drink: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
11. I would find pleasure in small things, e.g. bright sunny day, a telephone call 
from a friend: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
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12. I would be able to enjoy a beautiful landscape or view: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
13. I would get pleasure from helping others: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
14. I would feel pleasure when I receive praise from other people: 
Strongly disagree  [     ] 
Disagree   [     ] 
Agree   [     ] 
Strongly agree  [     ] 
Responses are scored 4, 3, 2, 1 (Franken et al., 2007). 
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Appendix 19: Emotional Stroop Task 
1. Neutral words condition: 
Percent  Bound  Courier  Engineers 
Cadet   Associate  Apartment  Level 
Level   Hoop   Emulsion  Pavement 
Associate  Courier  Engineers  Cadet 
Apartment  Cadet   Hoop   Associate 
Courier  Apartment  Pavement  Percent 
Engineers  Level   Bound  Hoop 
Associate  Percent  Percent  Apartment 
Pavement  Emulsion  Courier  Associate 
Apartment  Cadet   Level   Hoop 
Bound  Associate  Engineers  Emulsion 
Percent  Engineers  Apartment  Courier 
Emulsion  Percent  Hoop   Percent 
Cadet   Pavement  Bound  Level 
Engineers  Emulsion  Emulsion  Courier 
Courier  Bound  Pavement  Pavement 
Bound  Hoop   Engineers  Apartment 
Pavement  Cadet   Bound  Associate 
Percent  Associate  Hoop   Level 
Emulsion  Level   Apartment  Hoop 
Level   Bound  Cadet   Emulsion 
Engineers  Pavement  Courier  Cadet 
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2. Appetitive words condition: 
Ecstatic  Adventure  Caress  Euphoria 
Adventure  Euphoria  Affection  Adventure 
Cuddle  Love   Love   Cuddle 
Love   Pleasure  Euphoria  Passion 
Euphoria  Bliss   Passion  Ecstatic 
Kiss   Ecstatic  Kiss   Love 
Ecstatic  Kiss   Affection  Caress 
Caress  Passion  Cuddle  Pleasure 
Affection  Caress  Ecstatic  Passion 
Pleasure  Euphoria  Love   Adventure 
Adventure  Affection  Bliss   Kiss 
Love   Bliss   Cuddle  Pleasure 
Euphoria  Cuddle  Caress  Affection 
Affection  Adventure  Adventure  Love 
Caress  Passion  Pleasure  Bliss 
Passion  Caress  Bliss   Kiss 
Ecstatic  Kiss   Affection  Affection 
Pleasure  Euphoria  Kiss   Passion 
Cuddle  Bliss   Passion  Pleasure 
Bliss   Pleasure  Euphoria  Kiss 
Caress  Cuddle  Cuddle  Adventure 
Ecstatic  Ecstatic  Bliss   Love 
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3. Aversive words condition: 
Coffin   Emergency  Embarrassed Paralysed 
Pathetic  Ambulance  Lonely  Ashamed 
Paralysed  Coffin   Emergency  Lonely 
Embarrassed Paralysed  Ashamed  Coffin 
Emergency  Pathetic  Lonely  Ambulance 
Coffin   Embarrassed Blunder  Harm 
Corpse  Coffin   Paralysed  Emergency 
Blunder  Emergency  Ambulance  Pathetic 
Ambulance  Harm   Ashamed  Coffin 
Pathetic  Coffin   Pathetic  Paralysed 
Harm   Ambulance  Blunder  Lonely 
Emergency  Ashamed  Paralysed  Embarrassed 
Pathetic  Ashamed  Ambulance  Blunder 
Ambulance  Coffin   Lonely  Corpse 
Blunder  Emergency  Ashamed  Harm 
Corpse  Embarrassed Harm   Emergency 
Ashamed  Corpse  Blunder  Lonely 
Embarrassed Ashamed  Paralysed  Blunder 
Lonely  Embarrassed Corpse  Pathetic 
Ambulance  Blunder  Corpse  Harm 
Lonely  Harm   Embarrassed Paralysed 
Corpse  Pathetic  Harm   Corpse  
 
323 
 
4. Alcohol-related words condition: 
Pub   Liqueur  Beer   Cider 
Liqueur  Cider   Spirits  Liqueur 
Wine   Whisky  Whisky  Wine 
Whisky  Drunk  Cider   Scotch 
Cider   Booze  Scotch  Pub 
Alcohol  Pub   Alcohol  Whisky 
Pub   Alcohol  Spirits  Beer 
Beer   Scotch  Wine   Drunk 
Spirits  Beer   Pub   Scotch 
Drunk  Cider   Whisky  Liqueur 
Liqueur  Spirits  Booze  Alcohol 
Whisky  Booze  Wine   Drunk 
Cider   Wine   Beer   Spirits 
Spirits  Liqueur  Liqueur  Whisky 
Beer   Scotch  Drunk  Booze 
Scotch  Beer   Booze  Alcohol 
Pub   Pub   Spirits  Spirits 
Drunk  Cider   Alcohol  Scotch 
Wine   Booze  Scotch  Drunk 
Booze  Drunk  Cider   Alcohol 
Beer   Wine   Wine   Liqueur 
Pub   Alcohol  Booze  Whisky 
 
